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Key: Rear left, Congressman Bill Pascrell, Democrat, New Jersey
Rear right, NBA Commissioner David Stern
Centre, Stuart Levey, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Intelligence
Rack: Mikhail Prokhorov
Front left, Senator Paul Sarbanes, author of financial accountability statute
Front right, Daniel Goelzer, Chairman of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

For Immediate Release
September 23, 2009

For Information Contact
Paul Brubaker (973) 523-5152

CONGRESSMAN PASCRELL REQUESTS NBA COMISSIONER
DAVID STERN TO INVESTIGATE NEW JERSEY NETS SALE

WASHINGTON – U.S. Rep. Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D-NJ-8) today sent a letter to NBA Commissioner David Stern urging him to thoroughly investigate former nickel mining baron Mikhail Prokhorov, who reached an agreement today to buy the New Jersey Nets.

The text of the letter follows:

September 23, 2009

Mr. David J. Stern
Commissioner
National Basketball Association
645 Fifth Ave
New York, NY 10022

Dear Mr. Stern:

I write to you today regarding the reported ownership deal between the New Jersey Nets and a Russian national, Mr. Mikhail Prokhorov.

As you are no doubt aware, there have been numerous media reports that Mr. Prokhorov has reached a deal to finance a large potion of the construction costs for current Nets owner Bruce Ratner’s Atlantic Yards project in exchange for an interest in the project, as well as a controlling interest in the Nets. Mr. Ratner faces a December deadline to break ground on his development, or else lose much of his tax-free financing. Due to the large level of taxpayer subsidies involved in the project, and Mr. Prokhorov’s background, this potential sale raises concerns.

According to documents released by the Empire State Development Corporation, taxpayers are providing over $2 billion dollars in financing and direct grants towards the Atlantic Yards project. This represents a significant investment and risk by the taxpaying public. Should this sale go through, a large stake in the project, as well as a majority stake in the Nets, would be controlled by a foreign corporation, a first for the NBA. As a result, these taxpayer dollars will be directly subsidizing the profits and business risks of this foreign corporation, whose investment will be reportedly smaller then the public’s, instead of benefiting the taxpaying public. Especially during these tough economic times, this is, at best, a questionable use of taxpayer money and it is a question that should be explored.

Furthermore, Mr. Prokhorov’s background raises questions about his fitness to be the owner of a high-profile NBA franchise. Both Mr. Prokhorov’s business and personal history have come under intense scrutiny in his home country and abroad. I expect that the NBA will conduct a full and thorough review of Mr. Prokhorov’s background and businesses before allowing him to purchase a majority stake in the Nets.

I thank you for your attention to this matter and look forward to the favor of your reply.

Sincerely,

Bill Pascrell, Jr.

Member of Congress

Office of Investment Security
________________________________________
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS)

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)

CFIUS is an inter-agency committee authorized to review transactions that could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person (“covered transactions”), in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the national security of the United States. CFIUS operates pursuant to section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) (section 721) and as implemented by Executive Order 11858, as amended, and regulations at 31 C.F.R. Part 800.
The CFIUS process has been the subject of significant reforms over the past several years. These include numerous improvements in internal CFIUS procedures, enactment of FINSA in July 2007, amendment of Executive Order 11858 in January 2008, revision of the CFIUS regulations in November 2008, and publication of guidance on CFIUS’s national security considerations in December 2008. Further information about each of these reforms is available via the links to the right.
________________________________________
Last Updated: February 20, 2009

PUBLIC LAW 107–204—JULY 30, 2002

116 STAT. 745

July 30, 2002
[H.R. 3763]
Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.
Corporate
responsibility.
15 USC 7201
note.

Public Law 107–204
107th Congress

An Act

To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures
made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002’’.
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Commission rules and enforcement.
TITLE I—PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD
Sec. 101. Establishment; administrative provisions.
Sec. 102. Registration with the Board.
Sec. 103. Auditing, quality control, and independence standards and rules.
Sec. 104. Inspections of registered public accounting firms.
Sec. 105. Investigations and disciplinary proceedings.
Sec. 106. Foreign public accounting firms.
Sec. 107. Commission oversight of the Board.
Sec. 108. Accounting standards.
Sec. 109. Funding.
TITLE II—AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Sec. 201. Services outside the scope of practice of auditors.
Sec. 202. Preapproval requirements.
Sec. 203. Audit partner rotation.
Sec. 204. Auditor reports to audit committees.
Sec. 205. Conforming amendments.
Sec. 206. Conflicts of interest.
Sec. 207. Study of mandatory rotation of registered public accounting firms.
Sec. 208. Commission authority.
Sec. 209. Considerations by appropriate State regulatory authorities.
TITLE III—CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
Sec. 301. Public company audit committees.
Sec. 302. Corporate responsibility for financial reports.
Sec. 303. Improper influence on conduct of audits.
Sec. 304. Forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits.
Sec. 305. Officer and director bars and penalties.
Sec. 306. Insider trades during pension fund blackout periods.
Sec. 307. Rules of professional responsibility for attorneys.
Sec. 308. Fair funds for investors.
TITLE IV—ENHANCED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES
Sec. 401. Disclosures in periodic reports.
Sec. 402. Enhanced conflict of interest provisions.
Sec. 403. Disclosures of transactions involving management and principal stockholders.

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