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By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with [2]
There are two reasons why President Vladimir Putin is serious about making the Oreshnik threat of retaliation in public, and also serious in holding it back. A red light, which is also flashing yellow and green.
One reason is political. Russian public opinion is strongly in favour of a peace settlement negotiated with President Donald Trump if that’s possible, and for as long as the public believes Putin should continue to try. Russians do not support military escalation by the Kremlin to compel a peace agreement in Washington and Kiev. This is because they don’t believe escalation will work that way, and because the price they believe they will pay is too high to suffer. Reflecting this calculation of cost, benefit, risk, and probability of outcome for escalation, public support for Putin’s performance, including his conduct of the war and negotiations with Trump, is stable and high – 87% at the moment, two points short of the 2015 record [3].
This indicator should not be misinterpreted as unconditional in the personality cult or state propaganda fashion. Rather, it is the calculated consensus that Putin’s combination of goals, political and military, is the right one. Also, because Putin’s method of ambiguity, compromise, and flexibility is the only practical one for the time being.
The second reason is military. A strike by hypersonic multiple-warhead Oreshnik missiles against Ukrainian targets, including decapitation targets in Kiev and Lvov, will not produce the capitulation of the Ukrainian regime and surrender of the Ukrainian armed forces. It also cannot stop or deter the US, Germany, France, the UK, Poland, Finland, and other NATO states from continuing their war against Russia on the Ukrainian battlefield, and simultaneously on the fresh war fronts they are preparing along the full extent of Russia’s borders in the north, the Arctic, the far east, and the south in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and Iran.
If the Russian public can make this calculation in an approximate fashion, it’s plain the General Staff, intelligence services and Foreign Ministry have calculated it with precision. Moscow sources in a position to know confirm this, and also the details leading to it. Opening the file on the latter in wartime will give aid and comfort to the enemy — not here.
Read instead the latest summary reports – here [4] and then here [5].
Putin has tied the credibility of the Oreshnik for the Ukrainian battlefield to the strategic battlefield – this means the nuclear war calculation – in the START nuclear arms control treaty talks which he and Trump have opened and agreed to extend for a year until February 2027 [6]. About these negotiations, at the Valdai conference last Thursday (October 2) Putin cracked what looked like a joke, a pun on names.
Asked what will happen next if the extended START talks fail, Putin replied [7]: “it is very difficult to say what would happen next because the answer does not depend on us alone. I know what will happen within a year if the US administration accepts our proposal, but it is difficult to say what would happen beyond this limit. It is not a simple dialogue; we are aware of the pitfalls. First, we have created many modern high-tech weapons, like Oreshnik. Not Oreshkin, but Oreshnik.”
Maxim Oreshkin [8] is the deputy chief of the President’s staff, a former minister of economic development, and a principal domestic policy advisor to Putin at present. Misspelling the missile name Oreshnik [9], literally hazel tree, as Oreshkin is a common mistake in Russian. Putin was joking — and he wasn’t.
“We have recently shown that such systems are not strategic weapons,” Putin went on in his answer [7]. “Yet some experts in the United States claim that they are strategic weapons. This issue must be clarified. I will not go into detail now, but it needs clarification, which will take time, of course.”
The point has been missed by most commentaries from the Russian and American military bloggers on the test firing of the Oreshnik against a Dniepropetrovsk target on November 21, 2024. Read the archive [10] on what happened then and on interpretation of the Oreshnik Moment since then.
Putin tried elaborating. “The second issue concerns tactical nuclear weapons. The treaty covers strategic weapons, but modern tactical weapons are many times more powerful than the bombs which the Americans dropped on Japan, on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I believe those were 20-kiloton bombs, but modern weapons – tactical systems – are several times more powerful. There are pitfalls in this sphere too. The only place where we have deployed them outside Russia is Belarus, whereas the Americans have such weapons all over the world – in Europe, Turkiye [Kremlin spelling], and in various other places. But it is true that we have more such weapons. It is an issue that needs attention.”
“Several other aspects still need to be worked out. We know there are voices in the US who say they ‘do not need an extension.’ Well, if they do not need it, then neither do we. Overall, we are doing fine as is; we are confident in our nuclear shield, and we know what we will be doing tomorrow and the day after. So, if they do not need it, neither do we [7].”
For the time being, that’s the Russian response to Trump’s escalation to the long-range Tomahawk missile and the space weapon system he is calling Golden Dome. Politically, the Moscow sources judge this is enough said. The military discussion of the Ukraine battlefield options, they say, must remain under wraps. Putin has made explicit also that this discussion, and the conclusions reached, are collective ones with his “colleagues”, civilian and military [5]. Enough to speak operationally, not strategically for the time being, the sources say. “The operational strategy is to keep the line hot; keep the Ukrainians, and of course the Americans, in doubt about which direction we will concentrate our ground movements. This is operational dominance, manoeuvre control, control of the surprise factor [5].”
The Foreign Ministry has followed by indicating the conclusion that the Russian oligarchs have failed to get Trump and his intermediary, Steven Witkoff, to accept the billion-dollar business deals and bribes which have been offered by the Kremlin’s emissary, Kirill Dmitriev, in exchange for sanctions relief. This is the meaning of Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov’s announcement on October 8: “Unfortunately, we have to admit that Anchorage’s powerful momentum in favour of agreements has been largely exhausted by the efforts of opponents and supporters of the war. This is the result of destructive activities, primarily by the Europeans,” Ryabkov explained [11] with the qualifier in the adverb.
By “Europeans”, Ryabkov meant the money lobbies in Europe and the UK, and also in Washington. Since January Putin has agreed to authorize the Dmitriev strategy of neutralizing them by outbidding them with more money. Here [12] is how that started in January with the oligarchs’ picnic. Here is how it was failing in April [13]. The Anchorage summit meeting on August 16 was Dmitriev’s last chance.
Those Moscow officials who believed Dmitriev would fail with Witkoff have been saying, “we told you so”, but Ryabkov practises diplomatic discretion.
Russian public opinion remains powerful. US military bloggers miss its significance. Putin does not.
Translated verbatim, here is the new poll report by the Levada Centre in Moscow, published on October 7 [14]. The nationwide survey was conducted from September 23 to October 1, covering a sample of 1,610 “people aged 18 and older in 137 settlements, 50 subjects of the Russian Federation. The study was conducted at home with the respondent by the personal interview method. The distribution of responses is given as a percentage of the total number. The data array has been weighed by gender, age, level of education for each type of settlement (large cities, medium cities, small towns, villages) inside each federal district independently, in accordance with Rosstat data.”
For enlarged view of the tables and chart in Russian, click on the original link [14].
[15]In September, the events around Ukraine were more or less closely watched by half of the respondents. The level of support for the actions of the Russian military remains stable. The proportion of respondents for the transition to peace talks in the last six months is above 60%. The majority of respondents would support Vladimir Putin’s decision if “right now this week” he decided to end the military conflict with Ukraine. However, if the end of the conflict requires the return of the annexed territories, such a decision of the President would be supported by only a third of the respondents.
In September 2025, the level of attention to the situation around Ukraine decreased slightly (by 8 percentage points compared to May 2025): half of the respondents (50%, answering “very carefully” and “quite carefully”); another third of respondents (35%) followed without much attention; and 14% of respondents did not follow at all.
The events around Ukraine were most closely followed by older respondents (67% among respondents aged 55 and older); less wealthy respondents (58% among those who have barely enough for food); those who believe that things in the country are going in the right direction (53%); those for whom television is a source of information (62%); those who support the activities of the Russian military in Ukraine (57%); and those who believe that military operations should continue for the time being (68%).
Less attention to the situation around Ukraine is being paid by young people under 25 years old (23%); better-off respondents (49% among those who can afford durable goods); those who believe that things in the country are on the wrong track (41%); the same for those whom social networks and telegram channels are a source of information (45% respectively); those who do not support the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine (30%); and those who believe that they should move to peace negotiations.
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[17]The level of support for the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine remains high – 78% (including 48% definitely support, and 30%, rather support). The percentage of the same who do not support the actions of the Armed Forces comes to 15% (6%, definitely do not support, 9%, rather do not support).
The level of support for the actions of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine is higher among the following groups: men (83%); older age respondents (82% among respondents 55 and over); Muscovites (83%); those who believe that things in the country are going in the right direction (87%); those who approve the overall performance of Putin as president (83%); those who trust television as a source of information (87%); and those who believe that military action should continue (96 percent).
The level of support for the Russian military in Ukraine is lower among the following groups: women (75%); young people under 25 years old (66%); residents of cities with a population of more than 50,000 (76%); those who believe that things in the country are on the wrong track (51%); those who disapprove the overall performance of the President (45%); those who trust social networks and telegram channels as a source of information (76 percent each); and those who believe they should now move to peace.
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[19]The share of respondents who believe it is now necessary to move to peace negotiations has not changed significantly over the last six months and is currently at around two-thirds – 62% in September 2025 (including 31%, “definitely start peace negotiations” and 31%, “rather start peace negotiations”). Those who believe it is necessary to continue military actions amount to 29% of the respondents (including 18%, “definitely continue military operations” and 11%, “rather continue military operations”).
The proportional share of supporters of peace talks is higher among women (70%); young people under the age of 25 (82%); those who believe things in the country are going in the wrong direction (77%); those who disapprove of Putin’s performance as president overall (73%); those who trust social networks as a source of information (73%); and those who do not support the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine (89%).
The share of supporters for the continuation of hostilities is higher among men (39%); older respondents (36% at the age of 55 and older); residents of Moscow (45%); those who believe that things in the country are going in the right direction (34%); those who approve the activities of the incumbent president (31%); those who trust television as a source of information (34%); those who support the actions of the Russian military (36%).
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[22]As part of the September poll, a survey experiment — already conducted by Levada several times before — was again repeated. With the help of a random number generator, the survey participants were divided into two equal groups, each of which was asked the question in one of the two formulations. In the first case, respondents were asked to say whether they would or would not support the President’s decision to end the military conflict immediately without any conditions. In the second case, the respondents were asked to answer whether they would support or not support the same decision, but if the condition is that the Novorossiya territories are returned.
The majority of respondents — 80%, this has grown by 18 percentage points since May 2023 — would support the decision of Putin if “this week” he decided to end the military conflict with Ukraine. However, if “this week” Putin decided to end the conflict on the condition that the annexed territories are returned, then his decision would be supported by a significantly smaller number of Russians – a third of the respondents; that is to say 33%, an increase of 5 percentage points since February 2025.
More often than not, the President would be supported in the decision to end the military conflict this week by women (84%); young people under 25 (93%); those who believe that things in the country are on the wrong track (88%); those who approve of Putin’s performance as president (84%); those who trust social networks and telegram channels as sources of information (89% each); those who support the activities of the Russian military in Ukraine (97%); and those who believe that military action should continue now (95%).
Comparatively speaking, the decision of the President to end the military conflict immediately is not supported by men (18%); older respondents (20% aged 55 and older); residents of Moscow (19%); those who believe that things in the country are going in the right direction (15%); those who approve of the performance of Putin as president (14%); those who trust television as a source of information (17%); those who support the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine (18%); and those who believe that military action should continue (34%).
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[25]Relatively more often than others, the hypothetical president’s decision to end the military conflict this week and return the annexed territories is favoured by women (35%); young people under 25 (53%); residents of rural villages (38%); those who believe that things in the country are on the wrong track (43%); those approving Putin’s performance in his job (40%); those who trust social networks as a source of information (42%); those who do not support the operations of the Russian military in Ukraine (51%); and those who believe that the priority now is for peace talks (43%).
Relatively more often than the others, a decision by the President to end the military conflict this week would not be supported by men (62%); old respondents (62% among respondents 40 and over); residents of Moscow (19%); those who believe that things in the country are going in the right direction (15%); those who approve of Putin’s performance in the presidency (61%); those who trust television and telegram channels as a source of information (61%); those who support the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine (65%); and those who believe that military action should continue as now (81%).
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