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By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with [2]
“Never in our history have Iran and Russia worked as closely as now”, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on meeting Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Tuesday (October 20).
This was not a diplomatic nicety, nor is it an academic exaggeration. The history of distrust and warfighting between their two states is more than two hundred years long. It was vivid on the Iranian side when they resisted General Alexei Yermolov in the Caucasus wars of 1805-1813 and on the Russian side, the revenge killing of Alexander Griboyedov, dragged out of the Russian embassy in Teheran and murdered on January 30, 1829 [3].
For knives in the back, steel ones and figurative ones, Araghchi remembers Joseph Stalin’s scheming in the 1940s for an Azeri secession and with Prime Minister Qavam al-Saltaneh for a coup against the Shah [3]. Lavrov remembers Araghchi’s predecessor, Mohammed Javad Zarif, as a backstabber and liar in 2021 [4].
Mohsen Rezaei, head of the Supreme National Security Council, whom Lavrov also met in Teheran on Tuesday, remembers with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) he once commanded, the record of President Vladimir Putin’s collaboration with Israel in their operations in Syria – against IRGC forces and commanders, and against the Bashar al-Assad presidency [5].
In the official Russian communiqué [6], and then more explicitly in the press conference, Lavrov emphasized “strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership in the light of the agreements reached following the meetings of the Presidents of Russia and Iran in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) on 1 September and Avaz (Turkmenistan) on 8 October [6].” “Russian-Iranian cooperation is developing dynamically, contrary to known circumstances. We have a solid foundation for further forward-looking progress. This is the renewed basic interstate treaty that came into force on October 2, 2025, which for the first time recorded our relations at the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership. Russia proves its commitment to this fundamental document.”
Lavrov means that the requirements for Russian collaboration in military and intelligence-sharing with Iran of the strategic partnership pact of January 2025 [7] are being met now, and will continue to be honoured by the Kremlin despite the “known circumstances” – that’s the euphemism for US warnings and threats, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s summons to Lavrov of July 13, 2026 [8].
Lavrov was defending Putin against his Iranian doubters and attacking the Americans. He was replying to President Donald Trump’s claims, tweeted on October 18 and repeated the next day, September 19. “Russia is doing very little, if anything, to help the Islamic Republic of Iran, compared to what they could be doing, and I want to keep it that way”, Trump had written [9]. Putin, he told reporters, “[is] laying off Iran, that’s nice because we’re hitting Iran very hard, as you know, and economically as well as militarily. And Russia has done nothing there that we can see, and I think that’s a very positive. And of course, we’re negotiating with him on Ukraine. So, I’m not looking to break up negotiations right in the middle… I’m in the midst of negotiating a deal. When you’re negotiating a deal, you don’t do that to the people you’re negotiating with. And the deals — the Ukraine deal. Also, I’m negotiating with them [Putin] on Iran because they’ve been very well-behaved on Iran [10].”
“Russia could have done a lot more? That’s right, Russia could have done a lot more to help. If you put it bluntly, Russia could have done a lot more to help Iran. Russia has done very little for Iran [10].”
Trump had been briefed to contradict Rubio’s warning to Lavrov, and to play up Iranian suspicion of Putin’s readiness to betray the 2025 strategic partnership treaty in exchange for Trump’s concessions on Ukraine war terms.
Lavrov asked Araghchi and Rezaei to believe Russia’s “commitment to this fundamental document”, and to set aside Putin’s record. Araghchi’s reply of “never in our history” was a vote of confidence. One vote.
Lavrov went further: “Despite the difficult situation mentioned, Russia does not intend to abandon the implementation of agreements with Iran in the economic and investment spheres. Our specialists are gradually returning to the Bushehr nuclear power plant. We have great prospects in the field of hydrocarbon production and transportation. The Russian contractor continues engineering research on the route of the future railway Resht-Astara and will begin construction as soon as the Iranian side completes the registration of the necessary documents…
We believe that it is important to return to the pre-crisis situation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, including the restoration of freedom of navigation and guarantees of non-repetition of aggression. We appreciate the efforts of international mediators who are trying to facilitate the achievement of such a reliable agreement. It is important to resume dialogue on the situation in and around Yemen. It is optimal to return to the road map, which was developed in Saudi Arabia in 2023 and was acceptable to both the internationally recognized authorities in Aden and the Ansar Allah movement [11].”
Lavrov’s reference to the Russian return to Bushehr was an attempt at undoing the damage Putin had done when he revealed [12] he had reached an agreement with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that neither he nor the Americans would strike at the Bushehr reactor during the June 2025 war against Iran. Read what Putin said on June 19, 2025 [13]. And for analysis of that episode, click here [14].
Those remarks of Putin’s on June 19, 2025, created a unique problem which Lavrov cannot easily resolve.
Asked by Karim Talbi of Agence France Presse, “if tomorrow Israel – with or without US assistance – were to assassinate Khamenei, what would be your reaction, Russia’s response, and your immediate actions?” Putin had replied: “I do not wish to even discuss such a possibility. Karim Talbi: But they are openly discussing it – Mr Trump, Mr Netanyahu. Vladimir Putin: I am aware of these statements. But I do not wish to even discuss this.” Why was Putin refusing to condemn the threats of assassination – Iranian officials asked at the time.
When Khamenei and then Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme National Security Council, were assassinated by Israeli and American operations in February and March 2026, why did Putin respond with evasions [15] and euphemisms [16]?
The previous June, the French reporter had pressed Putin to answer a second question: “Given the current escalation [June 2025], are you prepared to supply Iran with new types of weapons to enable its defence against Israeli strikes?”
Putin answered: “You know, we once proposed to our Iranian partners cooperation in air defence systems. At the time, our partners showed limited interest, and the matter concluded there.
Regarding the Strategic Partnership Treaty you mentioned, it contains no clauses pertaining to defence cooperation. That is the second point [17].”
Putin’s second point was false, Iranian officials knew at once. Articles 4 and 5 of the treaty expressly require [18] “exchange of information” and “cooperation” between the “intelligence and security agencies”, including “cooper[ation] within the framework of separate agreements.” The defence cooperation spelled out in Article 5 is detailed and comprehensive, and includes “countering common military and security threats of a bilateral and regional nature.”
Was Putin lying clumsily about these provisions of the pact? Or was he making a specious distinction between the pact and the “separate agreements” which the treaty delegated to a secret “Working Group on Military Cooperation”? In private, Iranian officials believe both.
Article 3(3) of the strategic partnership treaty also provides [18] that “in the event that either Contracting Party is subject to aggression, the other Contracting Party shall not provide any military or other assistance to the aggressor which would contribute to the continued aggression, and shall help to ensure that the differences that have arisen are settled on the basis of the United Nations Charter and other applicable rules of international law.”
Iranian officials have pressed Lavrov to say if Putin will allow fresh Russian weapons transfers to Saudi Arabia and the UAE during the present war; and whether the treaty commitment to Iran requires Russia to block the proposed Turkish transfer of S-400 missile batteries to Saudi Arabia, if the latter requests the transfer under the terms of the Mecca pact with Turkey?
There has been no clear answer from Putin. On Tuesday, asked [11] for Russia’s interpretation of the Mecca pact, Lavrov implied that he believes it should not be directed against Iran: “As for the Pact of Mecca, this is another configuration – Pakistan, Turkey and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We welcomed the announcement of the formation of such a structure. We believe that the goals of this association are to achieve stability, promote peace and cooperation. We know that some other states of the region, including Arab countries, are showing interest in joining the work of this ‘troika’. If, at some stage, the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran has decided that contacts with this structure can contribute to the advancement of the world and free development, we will respect this choice of our friends.”
The Iranian interpretation is that this is waffling by Lavrov because he lacks the power to commit Putin, and because he does not know what Putin will decide.
Following his meeting with Lavrov, President Masoud Pezeshkian published [19] a cautious endorsement of Lavrov’s promise. “Emphasis. The necessity to accelerate the implementation of Tehran-Moscow agreements and understandings — Strengthening bilateral cooperation — The necessity to move beyond unilateral approaches.” Pezeshkian was saying through Lavrov to Putin to stick to the agreement he has signed, and to avoid separate deals that undermine the pact with “unilateral approaches”: that’s Persian for telephone calls with Netanyahu and Trump.
About his meeting with Lavrov, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rezaei has kept silent [20].
For the time being, the Iranians have been less convinced than Araghchi has tweeted that Trump is not telling the truth when he claimed Putin is “very well-behaved on Iran.”
In the new podcast with Nima Alkhorshid, we focus on the Russian moves towards the Iran war; the Ukraine war negotiations with Trump and the Europeans; and in the last minutes of the discussion, the anti-Muslim and white racist appeals which the Kremlin representative Kirill Dmitirev is making on the events in France and Spain. The podcast went to air on Tuesday afternoon, Moscow time. Click [21].