[1]
By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with [2]
Constipation causes desperation in middle age; incontinence causes desperation in old age. The Peskovite faction in Moscow is showing political desperation, and also the symptoms of its age.
The public attacks by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on the points of the plan for US-Russia economic concessions endorsed by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov after their negotiation in Miami last month by Kirill Dmitriev, have exposed a loss of confidence in President Vladimir Putin which has not been acknowledged by Moscow sources since the two-day revolt of Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023.
Details of the Dmitriev plan, and the counterattack from Lavrov and other sources, have been reported here [3].
A Moscow source in a position to know comments: “I see this betrayal all round. The only certain thing is that the military and GRU have drawn their lines on the [Ukraine] map – I don’t see any compromise on territory and military terms. But the de-dollarization issue has been thirty years in the making. It has been rebuffed by the Chinese. There could not have been another outcome. The Dmitriev plan is a stab in the back because Putin lost this before he started it. All that the [Russian] business wants is to be trading with the Americans. The interesting thing is everyone is silent.”
In reaction, Peskov has announced that the plan for the Geneva talks “is to discuss a wide range of issues.” These issues, he said [4], “include[e] the key ones, which concern territories and all other things, and are related to the demands that we have put forth. This is why the presence of the chief negotiator – that is, Medinsky – is necessary,” This explanation [5] for Vladimir Medinsky, a junior ranking assistant in the Kremlin, is not believed by the Moscow sources. For one thing, the sources say, he is outranked in Geneva on both the Ukrainian side and the US side. He is there because neither the Foreign Ministry, to be represented in Geneva by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, nor the General Staff represented by Admiral Igor Kostyukov, the GRU chief, is trusted by Putin to make the concessions to the US side which he and Dmitriev have agreed.
Altogether, the Russian delegation in Geneva is reported [6] to number “more than twenty”. This is intended to display the consensus which Dmitriev has upset and Lavrov has exposed.
Peskov told [4] Tass: “Russian President Vladimir Putin is in constant contact with the negotiators; he gave them detailed instructions before their departure for Geneva.” The problem of what concessions meet Putin’s instructions – and what concessions to the Americans the Russian officials are reluctant to make — has been acknowledged by Peskov: “Dmitriev is on a separate track as a member of a working group on Russia-US economic cooperation.”
The implication – corroborated by Moscow sources – is that Putin’s instructions to Dmitriev are different (“separate track”) from the instructions to Kostyukov. The military will stand fast on the positions they presented in the Abu Dhabi round of talks; Dmitriev will give the Americans what was agreed in their Miami talks on January 31. Medinsky has been appointed as Putin’s stand-in – the sources believe – because the Foreign Ministry and General Staff are refusing to make the concessions on the end-of-war settlement which Dmitriev has told Witkoff he accepts while Putin is attempting to resolve the contradictions between them.
The role of the Peskovites is to hope he can do this and pretend if he cannot.
Internal resistance to Dmitriev’s presence at the negotiating table in Geneva initially led the state media platform RIA Novosti to report on February 13 [7] that Dmitriev would not be part of the official delegation in the trilateral talks with the US and Ukraine in Geneva. Instead, he would go to Geneva and separately “hold a meeting with members of the US delegation. It will also be held in Geneva.” The Dmitriev talks were reported again by RIA Novosti [8] on Tuesday afternoon: “Meetings of the working group on economic issues will also be held in Geneva, which includes the head of RDIF [Russian Direct Investment Fund] [9] Kirill Dmitriev.”
Before Galuzin took his seat in Geneva, the Foreign Ministry announced its version of Putin’s instructions. Sergei Ryabkov, a deputy foreign minister like Galuzin, has told Tass [10]: “The Russian delegation is heading to Geneva with the clearest possible instructions to act within the framework agreed upon by the presidents [of Russia and the US] during their meeting in Anchorage. Without this, success cannot be achieved.” By the Anchorage framework – aka the Anchorage formula – Ryabkov means the undertakings Trump exchanged with Putin not to escalate the sanctions war against Russia.
Ryabkov then used [10] Soviet terminology to attack Trump’s escalation in the war at sea against tanker deliveries of Russian oil. “Moscow proceeds from the understanding that agreements on Ukraine must be durable in nature and eliminate the root causes of the conflict: We must ensure that any potential agreement is sustainable in nature. This means that, among other things, it must cover the settlement of issues that fall into the category of root causes of this conflict… Cuba is definitely in focus as yet another object of US imperialist actions, which completely disregard the norms of international law and the international law of the sea: We are unwaveringly engaged with this [the issue of Cuba]. Russia boasts sound experience of protecting the freedom of navigation and experiments of ill-wishers on ‘locking up’ the Russian fleet may end sadly for them: considerable experience is already in place here on implementing, including by our Navy, activities for protection of freedom of navigation. If somebody assumes ‘experiments’ may be continued, it may have a sad end directly for those experimenting.”
Indirectly referring to Dmitriev, Ryabkov said: “Russia will continue working toward normalizing relations with the United States: This work will continue.”
Ryabkov was hinting [10] that Dmitriev should continue negotiating for several months more — there should be no hurry now in Geneva to accept his plan under pressure from the US side. “Russia needs to see how the outcomes of the midterm elections in the United States in this November will impact the Trump administration’s foreign policy activity and how the agenda on which the Trump administration operates may evolve.”
Trump himself has hinted that Dmitriev has convinced him that the economic terms have already been accepted by Putin, and that Ukrainian resistance to the Russian military terms is all that remains for his chief negotiators, Steven Witkoff and General Alexus Grynkewich, to finalize in Geneva. “What are you expecting there?” a reporter asked [11] Trump. “Well, we’re big talks. It’s gonna be, uh, very easy. I mean, it’s, look so far, Ukraine better come to the table fast, it’s all I’m telling you.”
“Uh, we are in a position, we want them to come,” Trump trailed off. The position Trump thinks he is in at Geneva is the Dmitriev plan.
Peskov has responded [8] with his agenda for the talks, omitting the Dmitriev plan: “They will discuss the key parameters of the settlement – military, political and humanitarian. The topic of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant may also be touched upon.”
A Geneva banker with long experience in Russian business says: “the Kremlin is at a crossroads, with Putin potentially choosing a high-risk, short-term economic fix over long-term strategic realignment and military certainty. Whether this is a brilliant gambit or a profound miscalculation will depend on whether Trump can (or will) deliver the sanctions relief [of the Dmitriev plan] and whether the Russian military and its allies will accept the outcome. I am pessimistic about Trump.”
“The war has created a firehose economy—massive state spending fuels growth in military industries but creates acute distortions: critical labor shortages (exacerbated by mobilization), high inflation, and a crash in civilian sectors. It’s unsustainable long-term, draining the National Wealth Fund and diverting resources from infrastructure, health care, and education. The naval blockade directly attacks Russia’s primary revenue source: energy exports. The current high bank interest] rates are designed to combat inflation fueled by massive state spending (primarily military). This policy suppresses civilian investment and consumption, slowing growth. It is a calculated risk to achieve a soft landing.”
View or listen [12] to the new podcast with Nima Alkhorshid recorded on Tuesday afternoon as the Geneva talks began.
[13]Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQrBhZf2TXIv [14]
In the discussion, Nima asked what trust do Russians have in Trump to agree on and then implement the terms in the current negotiations. The latest opinion polling by the Levada Centre reveals that almost half of the country responds negatively, and almost a quarter say they are unsure. The polling record shows Russian public opinion is moving as swiftly as Trump has been changing his line towards Russia.
[15]Source: https://www.levada.ru/2026/02/05/otnoshenie-k-kitayu-ssha-es-i-ukraine-v-yanvare-2026-goda/ [16]
For evidence of the US and allied strategy of attacking Russia’s oil production, export sales, and tanker deliveries at sea, there are western and Russian industry media reports predicting that the stocking of Russian oil at sea, awaiting discounted sale contracts, and the refinery orders from China and India have reached their maximum and will now begin to decline this month after a 70% drop in Turkish refinery purchases was recorded since October [17].
[18]Source: https://energyandcleanair.org/december-2025-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/ [19] The Centre for Research on Clean Air and Energy (CREA) is a Finland-based think tank which supports the economic sanctions and sea war against Russia. The data tables come from Kpler and other commercial maritime and oil industry sources; these are more credible than CREA’s conclusions. “[Through December 31] China’s seaborne crude imports from Russia saw a 23% month-on-month increase, corresponding to an 11% increase in total imports. Russian crude oil saw the biggest bump in China’s December supplies, with imports of Russian ESPO (Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean) grade crude rising to the highest levels in four months. India’s Russian crude imports recorded a sharp 29% month-on-month reduction to the lowest volumes since the implementation of the price cap policy. These drops occurred despite total imports growing marginally. These drops were led by sharp reductions in imports by the Jamnagar refinery (-49%) and a 15% reduction by state-owned refineries in December. Entity-based sanctions and price caps have been easily circumvented through special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and ‘shadow’ fleet growth.”
The Russian military response to the US escalation of the war at sea is to promise long-term naval preparations but without commitment to short-term responses such as naval convoy escorts and armed special forces on board tankers. Nikolai Patrushev, former head of the Security Council and currently head of the Maritime Board, told [20] the press this week that “measures are being developed for the military protection of merchant ships from Western attacks…We are setting down the relevant requirements for the development of the Navy in the updated program of shipbuilding of the Navy until 2050, which is now being finalized and will soon be presented to the president.”
Responding to the US seizures of Russian-flagged vessels or tankers carrying Russian oil cargoes, Patrushev acknowledged: “If we do not give them a tough rebuff, then soon the British, the French and even the Balts will be brazen to such an extent that they will try to tightly block our country’s access to the seas at least in the Atlantic basin…NATO is creating a group in the Baltic that is focused on offensive actions against Russia. So, Finland receives corvettes with strike weapons, capable of reaching the north-western regions. Among other things, NATO plans imply the blocking of the Kaliningrad region and the seizure of Russian merchant ships, as well as sabotage on underwater communications, which will then be blamed on us. When naval blockade is attempted, Moscow will first use legal mechanisms. If it is not removed peacefully, the Navy will break through. Russia in response may also be interested in ships under European flags.”