By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
A black valentine is a communication between intelligence services with a message that looks well-meant but is the reverse in fact. Between friendly, cooperating or allied intelligence services, like the Russian and Iranian, the black valentine is a criticism. A sharp one.
Yevgeny Krutikov, a former Russian military intelligence (GRU) officer and now a security analyst for Vzglyad, the Kremlin-backed security analysis platform in Moscow, reports frequently on intelligence operations against Russia by the US, British, German, and Israeli agencies. In a new report he analyzes the open-source materials on how the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was planned and carried out; the division of labour between the Israeli intelligence agencies and the CIA; and the conduct of Iran’s security services.
Krutikov does not say explicitly that he has checked with his Russian intelligence sources. That he has made these checks before composing and publishing his report is communicated by indirection: with his phrases “details are gradually becoming clear”, “as a rule”, “classic picture”, and “quite convincing”; in the question with which Vzglyad cleared the title of the report before running it: “Who is responsible for the failure to protect the Supreme Leader of Iran?”; and finally, in Krutikov’s answer: “Iran has been negligent about security measures and facilities which many other countries would consider compulsory. The reasons for this are related both to the technological lag (including due to years of sanctions), and to the psychology of Iranian officials and top-level politicians, as well as the general mentality of the local population.”
Krutikov endorses as accurate the London newspaper account, based on Israeli sources, which appeared on March 2: “killing Khamenei was a political decision, not simply a technological achievement, said more than half a dozen current and former Israeli intelligence officials interviewed for this story. When the CIA and Israel determined that Khamenei would be holding a meeting on Saturday morning [February 28] at his offices near Pasteur Street, the chance to kill him alongside so much of Iran’s senior leadership was especially opportune.”
This Financial Times publication was also used by the Israelis and Americans to send their own black valentine to the Iranians. “Israeli intelligence had information from signals intelligence, such as the hacked traffic cameras and deeply penetrated mobile phone networks. One of the people said it showed that the meeting with Khamenei was on schedule, with senior officials heading to the location. But the Americans had something even more concrete — a human source, both people familiar with the situation said. The CIA declined to comment.”
Whether these claims are true or false, Krutikov’s republication is a signal of the negative Russian assessment of the first stage of the war. This assessment is that the Iranians have failed to follow the technical advice and special assistance which the Russian military has been providing, especially since the war of last June. This is alibi and hand-washing — Krutikov is reporting that in Moscow military and intelligence officers are saying they are not at fault for the deaths of Khamenei and senior Iranian military officers who were with him at the time of the attack.
Krutikov does not disclose what his sources know nor the questions they don’t want to answer in public: when did GRU learn the Israel-American attack of February 28 was about to begin? When was this intelligence warning sent to the Security Council and President Vladimir Putin? Was this warning communicated to the Iranians, and when? Did the attack catch Putin by as much surprise as it took Khamenei?
Krutikov’s conclusion is that the Iranians are to blame for the misfortune. This conclusion contradicts the claims, repeated in the alternative media of American military bloggers, of Russian (and Chinese) assistance to Iran for its defence; early warning, electronic jamming, and interception of Israeli and US air, ground and ship-fired missiles and drones; command and control of operations; and target and flight guidance for Iran’s missile and drone counter-attacks.
In explaining his conclusion Krutikov claims there can be no meeting of minds between the Russians and the Iranians – the “psychology” and the “general mentality” are too far apart.
If this is true – that’s to say, if President Putin, his security advisor Yury Ushakov, the military and intelligence members of the Security Council, and the General Staff believe it to be true – then this is a signal to the Trump Administration that they can escalate their operations against Iran without the risk of clashing with or killing Russian forces.
On the other hand, if this isn’t true, then Krutikov’s black valentine is meant for the Americans and Israelis, in order to deceive them into over-confidence and lure them into an Iranian-Russian trap.
This is a verbatim translation of yesterday’s Vzglyad report into English. There are no illustrations or reference links in the Russian text; they have been added here for clarification and corroboration.
The last black valentine Krutikov published was addressed to the Mossad on December 10, 2025; read more of that here.
Source: https://vz.ru/world/2026/3/4/1399100.html
March 4, 2026
Who is responsible for the failure to protect the Supreme Leader of Iran
By Yevgeny Krutikov
Details are gradually becoming clear about the exact means of intelligence used by the United States and Israel to launch a decapitation strike which destroyed the Iranian leadership, including Ayatollah Khamenei. The operating agents, the latest technical systems, and the very structure of Iranian society played a role.
The western press have begun publishing leaks about the actions of the US and Israeli intelligence services to ensure the success of the war on Iran. So, the British edition of the Financial Times reports that the strike plan was hatched over many months, but it was adjusted at the last moment: intelligence confirmed that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his associates would be at their Teheran office complex on Saturday morning. And this was sourced from an American intelligence asset in Khamenei’s entourage.
Unlike his ally, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Khamenei did not live in constant hiding. “It was unusual for him to be outside the bunker (he had two of them), and if he had been there, Israel would not have been able to get him with the bombs it had,” the FT source said.
Israel, in turn, had electronic intelligence data. In particular, it managed to hack into Teheran’s traffic cameras. One of the cameras was particularly helpful – it showed Israeli intelligence where Khamenei’s security cars were parked and how the government complex on Pasteur Street was organized. In addition, Israel managed to turn off mobile communications in the government quarter area – the security phones seemed “busy”, blocking warnings. As an Israeli intelligence source boasted, “we knew Teheran as well as Jerusalem.”
Source: https://www.ft.com/content/bf998c69-ab46-4fa3-aae4-8f18f7387836
We have the classic picture before us: Israel relies primarily on its technical capabilities (hacked cameras), the United States relies on a live network of agents. At first glance, it seems that this is the perfect combination. Only here it is important to determine what is considered primary. As a rule, the main information is considered to be from a verified agent source, and surveillance data, including those obtained electronically, should reinforce the agent information. It is possible that the Mossad thinks exactly the opposite, and in recent years they have become accustomed to relying on technical intelligence data first of all.
If these leaks are true, which looks quite convincing, then we have evidence that Iran has been negligent about security measures and facilities that many other countries would consider compulsory. The reasons for this are related both to the technological lag (including due to years of sanctions), and to the psychology of Iranian officials and top-level politicians, as well as the general mentality of the local population.
Iran, as a state, has been able to organize the protection of its most sensitive military facilities – nuclear and missile production. But civilian systems, such as street cameras or cellular networks, have been left out of the proper attention of the authorities.
Simply put, it could well turn out that the system of Teheran’s urban surveillance cameras was not equipped with appropriate protection, and this allowed the Israeli special services to connect to them. However, the physical connection itself could have been made by some employee of the Teheran municipal economy bribed by Israeli intelligence. It is difficult to avoid this situation in any society, and in Iran there are also enough internal problems, including protest sentiments, which facilitate this kind of penetration. You can’t test every electrician on a lie detector.
It is worth recalling that last summer Iran suffered serious losses in the air defence system and among the top leaders of the army, the IRGC and military research scientists precisely as a result of the massive penetration by Israeli intelligence into the country. Relatively minor conclusions were drawn. Changes have occurred only in the sphere of internal and public security against the background of an externally provoked surge in protest actions. For example, the “hunt for Starlink terminals” was successfully carried out, but the civilian communications infrastructure was not transferred to paramilitary control channels.
Source: https://www.wired.me/story/how-starlink-broke-irans-internet-blackout
The point here is that a number of seemingly harmless civil systems are directly related to the security of the state as such. For example, for obvious reasons, access to water supply is always and everywhere controlled by special services. But the electronic systems that cover any modern city also require a similar level of control, eliminating the possibility of external intrusion. It seems this was not taken into account in Iran.
Internal security systems, including civil, municipal, or regional ones, should be recognized as part of the overall depth of State security. This applies not only to cellular and internet communication systems, but also to less obvious ones such as street surveillance cameras, databases, registration forms, and transport infrastructure.
In addition to such systemic problems, it turned out that the Iranian leadership itself did not take seriously the level of the security threats, including personal ones, no matter how surprising this may sound. It would seem that ensuring the security of the country’s top leadership should be a priority. The confrontation with Israel and the United States has been going on for half a century now. But as a result, a generation of politicians, officials and military men has grown up in Iran who are determined not so much to win this confrontation as to die heroically in it.
Dying for the Motherland sounds appealing, to be sure, but in the case of senior leaders, this kind of approach is extremely harmful to the fate of the state. Many Iranian leaders, starting with the late Rahbar, have neglected personal safety for the sake of noble gestures or demonstrative behaviour.
This would have looked fine in more peaceful circumstances, but in the current circumstances and with a more pragmatic view of the world, the Iranian security services should have compulsorily sent Ali Khamenei to protection a month earlier, as soon as the so-called negotiations with the United States began. However, no such emergency security measures were introduced in Iran.
In addition, the Iranian counterintelligence clearly did not have enough resources to conduct a large-scale operation to identify Israeli and American agents. With a proper understanding of the problem, it would be possible to minimize the damage at least at the senior management level. The problem of introducing agents into Iranian society, including, as it turns out, into the highest echelons of power, has turned out to be critically dangerous for the entire Iranian security system. The agent could have been a simple security guard, a chauffeur, or a maid, but that was enough.
It has been urgently necessary to reorganize the security system for senior officials, including adding the option of unconditional subordination of officials and officers to the recommendations of the relevant security services. However, the habit of Oriental decorum and the attitude to counterintelligence and security as “service personnel” in such a society preclude the possibility of strict subordination of senior officials to the protocols of conduct in wartime.
The same applies to counterintelligence activities. Intelligence remains the main form of information gathering by the enemy, no matter how one treats technological progress in the field of security. The strengthening of counterintelligence control measures can be perceived not only by society, but also by representatives of the state leadership, as an intrusion on their natural rights. However, the result of neglecting such measures may end up being exactly what we are seeing in Iran.
The only failure of the US and Israeli intelligence agencies that we are witnessing today is these leaks in the Western press. The desire to report to the leadership and voters is understandable, but in fact, American and Israeli intelligence reveal their methods of work, albeit in the most general terms. Perhaps this will help the Iranian counterintelligence, at least to some extent in the future.
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