

By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
There are two reasons why President Vladimir Putin is serious about making the Oreshnik threat of retaliation in public, and also serious in holding it back. A red light, which is also flashing yellow and green.
One reason is political. Russian public opinion is strongly in favour of a peace settlement negotiated with President Donald Trump if that’s possible, and for as long as the public believes Putin should continue to try. Russians do not support military escalation by the Kremlin to compel a peace agreement in Washington and Kiev. This is because they don’t believe escalation will work that way, and because the price they believe they will pay is too high to suffer. Reflecting this calculation of cost, benefit, risk, and probability of outcome for escalation, public support for Putin’s performance, including his conduct of the war and negotiations with Trump, is stable and high – 87% at the moment, two points short of the 2015 record.
This indicator should not be misinterpreted as unconditional in the personality cult or state propaganda fashion. Rather, it is the calculated consensus that Putin’s combination of goals, political and military, is the right one. Also, because Putin’s method of ambiguity, compromise, and flexibility is the only practical one for the time being.
The second reason is military. A strike by hypersonic multiple-warhead Oreshnik missiles against Ukrainian targets, including decapitation targets in Kiev and Lvov, will not produce the capitulation of the Ukrainian regime and surrender of the Ukrainian armed forces. It also cannot stop or deter the US, Germany, France, the UK, Poland, Finland, and other NATO states from continuing their war against Russia on the Ukrainian battlefield, and simultaneously on the fresh war fronts they are preparing along the full extent of Russia’s borders in the north, the Arctic, the far east, and the south in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and Iran.
If the Russian public can make this calculation in an approximate fashion, it’s plain the General Staff, intelligence services and Foreign Ministry have calculated it with precision. Moscow sources in a position to know confirm this, and also the details leading to it. Opening the file on the latter in wartime will give aid and comfort to the enemy — not here.
Read instead the latest summary reports – here and then here.
Putin has tied the credibility of the Oreshnik for the Ukrainian battlefield to the strategic battlefield – this means the nuclear war calculation – in the START nuclear arms control treaty talks which he and Trump have opened and agreed to extend for a year until February 2027. About these negotiations, at the Valdai conference last Thursday (October 2) Putin cracked what looked like a joke, a pun on names.
Asked what will happen next if the extended START talks fail, Putin replied: “it is very difficult to say what would happen next because the answer does not depend on us alone. I know what will happen within a year if the US administration accepts our proposal, but it is difficult to say what would happen beyond this limit. It is not a simple dialogue; we are aware of the pitfalls. First, we have created many modern high-tech weapons, like Oreshnik. Not Oreshkin, but Oreshnik.”
Maxim Oreshkin is the deputy chief of the President’s staff, a former minister of economic development, and a principal domestic policy advisor to Putin at present. Misspelling the missile name Oreshnik, literally hazel tree, as Oreshkin is a common mistake in Russian. Putin was joking — and he wasn’t.
“We have recently shown that such systems are not strategic weapons,” Putin went on in his answer. “Yet some experts in the United States claim that they are strategic weapons. This issue must be clarified. I will not go into detail now, but it needs clarification, which will take time, of course.”
The point has been missed by most commentaries from the Russian and American military bloggers on the test firing of the Oreshnik against a Dniepropetrovsk target on November 21, 2024. Read the archive on what happened then and on interpretation of the Oreshnik Moment since then.
Putin tried elaborating. “The second issue concerns tactical nuclear weapons. The treaty covers strategic weapons, but modern tactical weapons are many times more powerful than the bombs which the Americans dropped on Japan, on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I believe those were 20-kiloton bombs, but modern weapons – tactical systems – are several times more powerful. There are pitfalls in this sphere too. The only place where we have deployed them outside Russia is Belarus, whereas the Americans have such weapons all over the world – in Europe, Turkiye [Kremlin spelling], and in various other places. But it is true that we have more such weapons. It is an issue that needs attention.”
“Several other aspects still need to be worked out. We know there are voices in the US who say they ‘do not need an extension.’ Well, if they do not need it, then neither do we. Overall, we are doing fine as is; we are confident in our nuclear shield, and we know what we will be doing tomorrow and the day after. So, if they do not need it, neither do we.”
For the time being, that’s the Russian response to Trump’s escalation to the long-range Tomahawk missile and the space weapon system he is calling Golden Dome. Politically, the Moscow sources judge this is enough said. The military discussion of the Ukraine battlefield options, they say, must remain under wraps. Putin has made explicit also that this discussion, and the conclusions reached, are collective ones with his “colleagues”, civilian and military. Enough to speak operationally, not strategically for the time being, the sources say. “The operational strategy is to keep the line hot; keep the Ukrainians, and of course the Americans, in doubt about which direction we will concentrate our ground movements. This is operational dominance, manoeuvre control, control of the surprise factor.”
The Foreign Ministry has followed by indicating the conclusion that the Russian oligarchs have failed to get Trump and his intermediary, Steven Witkoff, to accept the billion-dollar business deals and bribes which have been offered by the Kremlin’s emissary, Kirill Dmitriev, in exchange for sanctions relief. This is the meaning of Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov’s announcement on October 8: “Unfortunately, we have to admit that Anchorage’s powerful momentum in favour of agreements has been largely exhausted by the efforts of opponents and supporters of the war. This is the result of destructive activities, primarily by the Europeans,” Ryabkov explained with the qualifier in the adverb.
By “Europeans”, Ryabkov meant the money lobbies in Europe and the UK, and also in Washington. Since January Putin has agreed to authorize the Dmitriev strategy of neutralizing them by outbidding them with more money. Here is how that started in January with the oligarchs’ picnic. Here is how it was failing in April. The Anchorage summit meeting on August 16 was Dmitriev’s last chance.
Those Moscow officials who believed Dmitriev would fail with Witkoff have been saying, “we told you so”, but Ryabkov practises diplomatic discretion.
Russian public opinion remains powerful. US military bloggers miss its significance. Putin does not.
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