By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
To understand President Vladimir Putin’s recent public statements on the Russian economy, the Tuapse refinery fire, and security controls for the internet, the question is – does he believe what all Russians know to be obviously misstated and mistaken? Does Putin understand he is discrediting himself with Russian voters as the national parliamentary election campaign gets under way?
The voter evidence is plain to see in both the VTsIOM’s April report and in the Levada Centre tracking chart (lead image, right). VTsIOM is a state polling agency, the Russian (until 1992 All-Union) Public Opinion Research Centre; Levada is an independent group of Russian sociologists, based in Moscow and currently under state sanction as a foreign agent for having received US funding in the past.
According to VTsIOM’s daily tracking poll of trust in the country’s political leaders, Putin’s approval rating has dropped from 81% in mid-December to 71% this month. This has not (repeat not) been accompanied by an increase in voter trust in the four parliamentary opposition figures, led by the Communist Party’s Gennady Zyuganov.
This downward line in the polls reflects the loss of confidence which Putin himself has triggered; it isn’t a response by voters to alternatives proposed by Putin’s critics in the opposition parties.
According to the March 18-26 survey by Levada — conducted by face-to-face interviews with a random sample of voters in their homes across the country – “six out of ten respondents negatively assess the current political situation in Russia – 61% (including 52% considering it tense, and 9% critical, explosive), the share of such respondents has increased by 9 percentage points since May 2025. A third of the respondents look positively at the political situation in the country (including 27% talking about it as calm, 9% as prosperous). But since May 2025 their share has decreased by 10 percentage points…”
“More often than others, the political situation in Russia is assessed as tense, critical, or explosive by women (70%); those aged from 40 to 54; the less well-off (65% — 67% among those with barely enough for food); residents of cities with a population of 100,000 to 500,000 (68%); entrepreneurs (71%); those who believe that things in the country are on the wrong track (89%); and those who do not approve the performance of the incumbent president.”.
In Putin’s public speech to a session of his economic ministers and advisors, including Central Bank chief Elvira Nabiullina, on April 15, the President acknowledged the obvious: “Statistics show that economic growth has, unfortunately, been slowing for two consecutive months. Overall, GDP contracted by 1.8 percent between January and February. Manufacturing and industrial production as a whole have suffered losses, as has construction, a strategically important sector.”
He then told voters not to blame him.
“Yes, experts point to calendar effects, weather conditions, and seasonal factors as the reasons for this negative performance. As I mentioned at our last meeting, we are fully aware that in January this year there were two fewer working days than last year, and in February, one fewer. These are, of course, objective circumstances, but it is clear that they are far from the only factors shaping business and investment activity in the country.”
Regarding the Tupase refinery fire in the Krasnodar krai, the Ukrainian drone attacks began on April 16. Putin did not begin to address the public on what was happening until twelve days later, on April 28. In the mid-afternoon the Kremlin announced that “the President received a report from the Emergencies Minister on fire situation in Tuapse following Ukrainian drone strikes.” This report came by telephone from the Emergencies Minister, Alexander Kurenkov, who was calling from his office in Moscow. It was then announced that “in accordance with Presidential instructions, in the next few hours, Alexander Kurenkov will head off to Tuapse to personally oversee firefighting operations at the affected oil refinery and the elimination of consequences of the incident.”
Thinking to reassure voters who for several days had been watching dramatic television and social media reports of the extent of the fire, the acid rainfall, and the oil pollution in Tuapse, Putin said he was sending a subordinate but wouldn’t be going to Tuapse himself. He was remaining in Moscow to meet his health minister, the President of Congo, and visit an emergencies clinic in Moscow.
Putin was also recorded at a Kremlin meeting for “ensuring election security” as saying: “Drone strikes against civilian infrastructure are also becoming more frequent. A recent example is the attack on energy facilities in Tuapse that could potentially cause grave environmental challenges. The governor has just reported – he is there on the ground or was there a couple of hours ago – adding that there don’t seem to be major threats and the people are coping with the challenges they are facing.”
At the same time Putin made an election pitch at Russian businessmen, blaming the recession on Russia’s foreign enemies. “The Russian economy has for many years already been operating under serious external challenges. This includes a difficult economic environment, illegitimate sanctions, and a number of other adverse circumstances. You know well that in relation to many of our entrepreneurs and members of their families – and not even immediate family members, sometimes in the third generation – these very illegitimate sanctions are imposed. The same is being done in relation to entire major companies. At the same time, the overwhelming majority, practically all entrepreneurs, work effectively and with full dedication, take a patriotic position, sincerely strive to make their contribution to achieving Russia’s development goals, help our fighters at the front, and support participants in the special military operation and their family members. The state also needs to work in partnership with business, ensuring its lawful rights and interests.”
The widespread Russian voter reaction to Putin’s remarks was reported by Oleg Tsarev, a leading figure in the Ukrainian opposition to the Kiev regime and an exile in Crimea: “It is very important that the president is given objective and truthful information. Now we know that Tuapse will be all right There are no serious threats. Sad irony.”
Tsarev’s irony is a political understatement. It’s sad for Russians to see and hear because the President appears not to understand the damage he is publicly inflicting on his own credibility.
So the question they are now asking is whether Putin is once again showing the loss of understanding of how his statements, actions, and inaction are understood in the country. Again: this refers to the sinking of the Kursk submarine on August 12, 2000, and Putin’s delay at the time, his refusal to acknowledge the obvious while he vacationed at the seaside, and his reluctance to meet and hear out his critics, face to face.
When Putin did meet the Kursk’s crew’s families at Vidayevo, the Kremlin reported the six hours in four lines. What happened in fact was hostile questioning, bitter scepticism of Putin’s replies, and anger at the official cover-up. Putin, then just eight months into his presidential term, directed his ire at domestic reporters who broke through naval base security to interview the crew’s families.
Read more on the Kursk disaster.
For public reaction at the time, and Putin’s subsequent recovery in voter polls, read this. For a discussion of Putin’s Kursk syndrome, view or listen to the new podcast with Martin Sieff and Pelle Neroth Taylor, recorded at 3 on Wednesday afternoon, Moscow time.
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