

By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
How long is a piece of string?
The recorded history of that question began in a New York newspaper in 1885. At the time and ever since, asking the question implied the answer that there is no limit to the string. The answer in the lead images, a Jeff and Mutt cartoon, appeared in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram in April 1937.
Today, in the two world wars in which President Donald Trump is directing US empire forces, including the British, Europeans, Israelis, Arab sheikhs, Canadians, Ukrainians, and others – that’s the war for Europe against Russia, the war for the Middle East against Iran – the answer to the string question depends on whether the count starts at the US end or at the Russian and Iranian ends.
In the politics, logistics and economics of these wars, measuring the length of the string starts with who is at the pulling end and who is on the other end.
When US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Trump’s national security advisor, called an urgent meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on July 23, his plan was to tell Lavrov that the US had the measure of the string between Moscow and Teheran; and to warn President Vladimir Putin to stop assisting Iran with the means to kill American troops and spies in the Middle East. Lavrov had his answer ready. That was to reverse the string between Washington and Kiev and warn Trump to stop assisting Ukraine with drones to kill Russian civilians at work, on roads, in factories, refineries, port terminals, warehouses.
Read the details of what was said and done at the Manila meeting here.
In the days since then, Lavrov has appeared to deny the Rubio warning. “For no apparent reason, the West, and Washington in particular, are now stoking a narrative that Russia and China are directly supplying Iran with the weapons to attack US targets. Well, you know, it is embarrassing to even hear that.”
Trump himself tweeted what appears to be a similar correction, but attached the same warning to Putin which Rubio had addressed to Lavrov. “President Xi, at our recent meeting in Beijing, China, told me that he would not, under any circumstances, give or sell Weapons to the Islamic Republic of Iran — And that statement included Chinese Companies. Considering our relationship, I take him at his word and, besides, l am doing him very big favors, also. Likewise, President Putin, despite the horrible War going on in Ukraine (The relationship remains, as it does with President Zelenskyy), told me that he would not sell Weapons to Iran. He understands that I do not sell Weapons to Ukraine, but to NATO Countries. They pay full price, and how those Weapons are distributed, I have no idea. Therefore, two major Countries that people speak of often in terms of Iran are, in my opinion, not participating. If they did, it would be very bad for them — Certainly not in their best interests.”
The string is obvious; so are the two ends. In between there is war, the escalation of which is violently contested. For that reason, what is being said, written, and broadcast can be true and untrue at the same time, depending on which end of the string is doing the pulling, the counting, and also the cutting.
In the interpretation of Stephen Bryen, the Trump-Zelensky escalation against Russia and Iran simultaneously can be deterred, cut short, stopped, defeated by a combination of retaliatory strikes and supply cutoffs if Russia, Iran and China will agree to act together, swiftly and comprehensively. Bryen has been a senior Pentagon official during the Reagan Administration, a war planner for US and Israel, and an advisor to the US and NATO military-industrial complex.
Bryen’s analysis: “Kiev fields two distinct drone categories: FPV (First-Person View] drones whose role is critical on the battlefield and long range drones aimed at Russian territory and Crimea. FPV drones are typically plastic or composite quadcopters powered by electric motors. In 2025 Ukraine used around 3 million FPV drones. Current reports suggest Ukraine is using 10 to 15 thousand drones daily. In recent months Russia has been targeting drone manufacturing facilities in Ukraine, as well as warehouses and distribution points, but there is not much hard evidence that Russian operations have meaningfully impacted Ukraine’s use of FPV drones. Between 85 to 90 percent of the components powering Ukraine’s FPV drones come from China. These include power systems (such as lithium ion cells, high discharge LiPo [lithium polymer] batteries and power distribution boards), brushless electric motors for propulsion and servos, and electronic speed controllers and flight controller boards, CMOS [Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor] navigation cameras, thermal sensors, fiber optic dispensors and basic RF [radio frequency] transceiver modules.”
“In addition there are some supply issues for factories in Ukraine and in Europe that are supporting Ukraine. Included here are neodymium rare earth magnets for motors, synthetic graphite for battery anodes, and specialized carbon fiber coming exclusively from China.
Similarly Russia depends on China for its drone supplies. Even the Pentagon has given waivers so US drone producers can support US War Department needs. Ukraine buys most of its components from third country intermediaries because China, after protests from Russia, restricted its domestic drone makers from directly exporting to Ukraine. But these so-called restrictions are just a way to jack up the price for parts and to enrich friends of the Chinese regime. China has made no effort to account for the millions of parts it is shipping that fuel the war effort. Should China get beyond its usual corruption and clamp down, Ukraine would be out of business on the battlefield.”
Bryen’s conclusion: “Ukraine probably can ignore peace initiatives that would leave Russian forces on Ukrainian territory, at least for a short while. But the supply crisis is closing in and it will significantly impact Ukraine’s defenses and ability to hold territory and fend off Russian missile and drone attacks. How soon will Ukraine’s situation turn critical? If the fighting resumes in Iran, only a few months for air defenses. If the Chinese crack down on supplies for drones to Ukraine, even sooner.
The day after the Rubio meeting, Lavrov met China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, the chief foreign policy advisor to President Xi Jinping; this was on July 24; the two ministers were still in Manila.
Lavrov acknowledged in the small print of his ministry communiqué that after their talks “covered relations with the United States and the situation surrounding the Ukrainian crisis,” he “noted a convergence or similarity of approaches to the majority of the issues raised.” Wang’s ministry issued no communique, told reporters nothing.
What then were the “minority” of issues on which Lavrov and Wang failed to “converge”? Was one the refusal of the Chinese to finalize the new Russian gas supply project known as Power of Siberia-2? Was it the refusal of the Chinse to stop supplying drone components to the NATO allies and to Ukraine for their attacks on Russian targets?
This is another of the big strings which are being pulled: how long is it?
In the new podcast with Dimitri Lascaris, aired on Tuesday afternoon US ET, we discuss the US-guided Ukrainian drone attack on the Ana, an Iranian flagged cargo ship in the Caspian Sea, off Astrakhan, on July 25. The Russian, Iranian, Ukrainian, and US strings are measured out. Click to view or listen: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gk1mcqaTO_U
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