By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
The qutab is an exceptional meat pie in a world that’s full of meat pies.
That’s because it is the national meat pie of Azerbaijan, and because there is nothing quite like it outside the Azeri borders or culture.
It is baked with a thin flatbread which is stuffed with heavily seasoned mincemeat of sheep, goat or beef. You might call the combination of meats, onions, pomegranate syrup, herbs, and spices complicated if you weren’t persuaded how uniquely tasty it is.
It’s the same with the politics of Azerbaijan. They are not to be confused with the politics of Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Iran, and Georgia, Azerbaijan’s neighbours, just as there can be no mistaking the qutab for a pirog, gozleme, lahmajoun, kubdari, or لاهم بی آجین (lahm bi ajeen). Caution: if you are MAGA supporter, it would be your big mistake to call any of them a pizza.
Mistaking the superficial appearance of things for the reality is what sophomores do because they haven’t learned to know better. It’s what state propaganda organs and their spokesmen do because they are paid money and because information warfare is what politicians do to advance their interests. Repeating that the qutab or pirog is a pizza over and over will convince many taste testers, according to the Big Lie doctrine of Adolph Hitler, Winston Churchill and their student, Joseph Goebbels.
Forcing taste testers at the point of a gun or bribing them with money will also work to turn the Azeri and the Russian pies into an American pizza for a time; this is to speak literally as well as metaphorically. In Russia, that time was ten years long – the decade Boris Yeltsin was president.
Very recently, his successor President Vladimir Putin acknowledged publicly how long it has taken for him to learn. “I thought that the contradictions with the West were primarily ideological. It seemed logical at the time – Cold War inertia, different views of the world, values, the organization of society. But even when the ideology disappeared, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the same, almost routine deviation from Russia’s interests continued. And it was not because of ideas, but because of the pursuit of advantages – geopolitical, economic, strategic.”
Right now the reality of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Russia isn’t how the propaganda, the force of arms, and the corruption of money are explaining it. To understand, click to listen to this discussion with Nima Alkhorshid, starting at Minute 42:30:
For background on the history of the conflict, the politics involved on all sides, and the reasons of state and of profit at stake now, there is a great deal to read; most Azeri and Armenian readers are very familiar with this history:
- Azeri-Armenian ethnic wars. The ancient history; the Baku pogrom of January 1990. Azeris also remember with especial bitterness the killings of Black January 1990 – an action of Soviet troops under Kremlin orders who opened fire on civilian protesters in Baku, killing at least 130.
- The crash of Azerbaijan Airlines (Azal) Flight J2 8243, December 25, 2024.
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=M5IAZtlVvoE
A preliminary accident-cause report was issued February 5, 2025, which focused on the failure of the aircraft’s hydraulic control systems, not on the cause of this failure which, initially, the Azeri pilots blamed on a bird strike and an explosion inside the cabin.
A few days earlier in mid-January 2025, Russian media had published a verbatim recording of pilot communications with air traffic controllers in Grozny and Rostov (Russia) from 07:36: to 09:02:47, and from then until 09:27 with Aktau (Kazakhstan) air traffic control. The two pilots were killed in the crash. It is unclear whether the transcript, taken from Russian air controller and airport tapes, has been edited. The flight black box decoding was done in Brazil, where the aircraft was manufactured, and the black boxes kept by the Azerbaijan government; it has not released the pilot tapes.
Because of the communications and navigation jamming problems the pilots flew into, they had decided to return to Baku two minutes before the aircraft was hit. The pilots then radioed “bird strike in the cabin… Uh, the bird’s impact and in the cab two chairs exploded.” They requested clearance to land at Mineralnye Vody (230 kms northwest) or Makhachkala (169 kms southeast), depending on the weather and visibilioty conditions. They reported they had lost navigational and altitude controls, also cabin oxygen. They were then cleared to land at Mineralnye Vody, but the pilots refused, insisting they would return to Baku, 483 kms to the south. Four minutes later they asked for a weather report for Aktau, 438 kms to the east.
To date, there has been no public release from the Russian or Azeri governments, or in media reporting, on the process which had been under way for clearing, delaying, or diverting regularly scheduled commercial flights from Baku to the Russian Caucasus in advance of or during Ukrainian drone attacks. The first of these to strike near Grozny took place two months earlier, on October 29, 2024; a second followed on December 4; a third on December 12, a fourth on December 15. There is no information on what measures were taken by Russian and Azeri aviation officials to protect civil flights as the Ukrainian attacks intensified. There is controversy in Chechnya and in Moscow on the readiness of the air defence systems protecting Grozny before the crash on December 25. It is thus possible that there was inadequate advance warning from Grozny to Baku before takeoff or during the 66-minute flight. It is also possible the Azeri pilots may have ignored the warning, or acted too slowly after it was transmitted.
Politically, there is reluctance to accept or acknowledge publicly that the Ukrainian drone attacks have been disrupting aviation links between the two capitals. The terms of President Putin’s apology to President Aliyev on December 28 reflects this.
Source: http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/192/events/76003
- The Yekaterinburg arrests of Azeris, Baku arrests of Russians. On June 28 security forces of the Sverdlovsk regional branch of the Investigative Committee arrested more than fifty ethnic Azeris in Yekaterinburg. The official reason for the arrests was a prosecutors’ investigation of murders related to gangland disputes over street and market trade more than fifteen years earlier. Ziyaddin and Huseyn Safarov, the accused gang leaders, died during the arrest. Subsequent evidence presented in Baku, after their bodies were returned for burial, indicated multiple injuries from assault. Three other Safarov kin, Akif, Mazakhir and Bakir Safarov, have remained in prison in Yekaterinburg.
The Safarov family is a publicly prominent one in Azerbaijan, and their uncle, Ramil Safarov, an Azerbaijan Army lieutenant-colonel, has been celebrated as a national hero by President Ilham Aliyev for his act of murder against an Armenian officer at a NATO training camp in Hungary in 2004.
There were immediate protests at the Yekaterinburg incident in the Azeri diaspora in Russia, and in Baku. The Aliyev government ordered the suspension of official Azeri-Russian contacts, and on June 30 Azeri police arrested a group of Russians at the Sputnik media office in Baku. They were paraded in front of national television cameras accused of being Russian spies; Russian consular officials were denied access to them. The Sputnik media operation had been ordered closed in February as a reaction to the aircraft incident, but the Azeri authorities had not enforced their closure order.
The Yekaterinburg case was transferred from the regional Investigative Committee to the federal headquarters in Moscow under the direct control of the Committee chairman, Alexander Bastrykin. The Russian and Azeri foreign ministries summoned ambassadors to announce protests.
Left to right: The two brothers who died during the Yekaterinburg arrest raid on June 28, Ziyaddin and Huseyn Safarov; their brother, Seyfeddin Huseynli, a well-known writer and journalist in Baku. The case of Azeri military officer, Ramil Safarov, convicted in Hungary of murdering a fellow officer because he was Armenian in 2004, is connected because Ziyaddin and Huseyn were nephews of Ramil, and because the government in Baku has made Ramil a national hero for his murder.
Baku television video of the arrests of Russians at the Sputnik office. The Russian media reaction was swift in retaliation. “Not only were the Azerbaijani media filled with outright anti-Russian, if not outright Russophobic rhetoric, but some [Baku] politicians actually called for an uprising in Russia…Of course, Aygun Attar and her ilk have turned everything upside down – those who are really familiar with Russian national politics understand perfectly well that there is no ‘Russian chauvinism’ and Islamophobia in the Russian Federation; rather, on the contrary, Islamophilia is flourishing. But these messages are aimed at a very specific audience – the domestic consumer, and Azerbaijanis in Russia. However, unfortunately, the threat of migrant protests is quite real, given that there are a lot of migrants in Russia, and various diasporas (including the Azerbaijani one) have great power in the Russian Federation. In theory, diasporas can become a factor of political instability in Russia, as they are instruments of political influence of third countries…The aggravation of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan has shown us Baku's true attitude towards Moscow – you can talk about ‘brotherly friendship’ and ‘multi-nationalism’ as much as you like, but in fact Azerbaijan is very cool towards the Russian Federation…The rhetoric of the Azerbaijani media at the moment is not much different from the rhetoric of similar Ukrainian media. With such ‘friends’ there is no need for enemies.”
The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Maria Zakharova, announced that “the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are in the nature of a strategic alliance,” but that “there are forces which do not like this”, adding the Ukraine was trying to “add fuel to the fire.”
She and Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov attempted to play down the conflict. “We are maintaining contacts with the Azerbaijani side on this matter, including along law enforcement lines,” Zakharova announced. “We are convinced that all emerging issues should be resolved in a spirit of partnership, using the existing political and diplomatic channels. This approach, in practice, serves the fundamental interests of the peoples of our two countries.” According to Peskov: “We still believe that logic dictates one thing: Russia and Azerbaijan are and should remain close partners and allies, as the two nations share a common history, along with a shared present and future. The issues that arise should undoubtedly be addressed in a constructive way, reflecting the spirit of our bilateral relations.”
- Azeri-Russian Declaration of February 22, 2022. Signed by Presidents Aliyev and Putin in Moscow, the terms require “readiness to hold urgent consultations in the event of a situation that, in the opinion of one of the Parties, may pose a threat to peace, disrupt the peace or affect the security interests of one of the Parties, as well as in the event of a threat of such a situation arising, for the purpose of its settlement” (Article 6); and “the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan refrain from any actions that, in the opinion of one of the Parties, damage the strategic partnership and allied relations of the two states. To this end, they are establishing a permanent mechanism of consultations through the ministries of foreign affairs of the two countries” (Article 7). Also: “The Parties refrain from any actions, including those carried out through third states, directed against each other [Article 17].”
Source: https://president.az/en/articles/view/55498 Aliyev’s decisions to supply fuel and other military assistance to the Kiev regime since the commencement of the Special Military Operation, two days after the signing the Declaration, amount to violations of Article 17, in the Russian view.
- Think tank propaganda on the political conflict from the US, Israel, the Azeri opposition to the Aliyev regime based in Georgia. According to the Washington think tank, Jamestown Foundation, reporting on July 7, “the present level of tensions between Baku and Moscow is unprecedented in the post-Soviet period, making the future trajectory of the relationship unpredictable. While a complete break between the two is less likely due to deep economic and political ties, Azerbaijan appears to be leveraging the crisis to renegotiate its relationship with the country’s northern neighbour on more equal terms.”
An Israeli think tank assessment is even more anti-Russian. “It seems that in addition to the criminal behaviour that has long been normalized, the atrocities committed by the FSB may have more defined geopolitical objectives. Russia is weakening in the Caucasus, whereas Azerbaijan is getting stronger. Finally, personal Putin motives add fuel to the fire of the ‘aim’ tensions… The crisis signals the potential end of the post-Soviet period of Russian hegemony in the South Caucasus… The Yekaterinburg crisis may be remembered as when Russia’s imperial overreach finally caught up with its regional ambitions, forcing a new generation of post-Soviet leaders to choose between subordination and sovereignty. One must not forget that Russia has no moral qualms whatsoever about resorting to the most cynical pressure for want of better options. Azerbaijan’s neighbors have similar concerns regarding future Russian moves. Russia may lose its influence, yet it is still dangerous for its former colonies.”
The Israeli author, a retired military officer, omitted to mention the development of Israeli military assets on Azeri territory.
A Georgia-based media platform of Azeris opposed to the Aliyev regime, reported in detail on the criminal dimension of the Yekaterinburg incidents. “Putting the Safarov brothers’ alleged criminal ties aside, it is a fact that within the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia, mafia-connected figures fulfilled enforcement and arbitration roles. Migrant-run markets and businesses often fall under protection rackets controlled by Azerbaijani criminal groups linked to so-called vor-v-zakone (the Russian term for thief-in-law) traditions. These groups leverage ethnic and kin ties to recruit, control labour, and enforce territorial order. This phenomenon is still understudied.”
“Prominent figures include Nadir Salifov (Lotu Guli) and Rovshan Janiyev (Lankaranski), both ethnic Azerbaijani crime bosses who built criminal syndicates controlling markets, trafficking, and rackets in Russia and beyond. Salifov, while in prison, is believed to have directed extortion against Azerbaijani businesses across Russia and maintained control of Moscow’s wholesale markets. Lankaranski, is similarly believed to have commanded ethnic Azerbaijani criminal networks in Moscow’s labour and produce markets, collecting protection fees and overseeing illicit trade until his assassination in 2016. Lankaranski is still revered in Azerbaijani society for his protection of Azerbaijanis in Russia. Even though not reported in the media as much as the Yekaterinburg killings, Russia also arrested two such Azerbaijani thieves-in-law within the same time-frame: Zaur Nakhchivansky (on 2 July) and Vagif Bakinsky (on 4 July). Nakhichivansky is the son of Bayram Talibov, himself a thief-in-law who was murdered alongside Hikmet Mukhtarov in 2006. Nakhichivansky was later ‘adopted’ by Lankaransky, who subsequently raised him to thief-in-law status in 2013.”
“So far, the news is not promising. The head of the Azerbaijani diaspora of the Moscow region, Elshan Ibrahimov, was deported from Russia on 9 July; he was deprived of citizenship on 18 June for ‘committing actions that pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation’. He has headed ‘the national-cultural autonomy of Azerbaijanis of the Moscow region’ since 2018 and was a close ally of Andrei Vorobyov, the governor of Moscow oblast. Perhaps unrelated to the topic, but interesting enough — Vorobyov isn’t alien to the South Caucasus either; he was one of the few known soldiers of the Russian ODON (Separate Operational Purpose Division) who was deployed to Sumgait, Baku, and later Yerevan, to quell the nationalist riots and pogroms in the crumbling Soviet Union.”
For a Georgian analyst’s assessment, click to listen to the podcast of July 15.
For an anti-Russian Carnegie Foundation perspective, following the air crash incident, consider: “Aliyev’s hardline position over the plane crash has once again affirmed his role as the ‘defender of the nation’: a nation that is not only impossible to oppress, but that can also stand up to its large, dangerous neighbor. Indeed, a sense of belonging to a national community is often predicated on being part of a nation that commands respect. And Azerbaijan’s response to the downed airliner could be added to a textbook on nation building. Whether intuitively or deliberately, Aliyev is acting according to the best principles of political science by fostering the shaping of a national identity. Nevertheless, Aliyev’s approach could backfire. Tactical attacks on Moscow must yield something, otherwise disappointment could set in. It’s far from certain that Putin will abandon his traditional intransigence to do something like admitting culpability in the air crash and handing over those who are guilty to Baku. After all, if Putin concedes in this way, all Russia’s other allies would be lining up for the same treatment.”
There has been uncharacteristic silence from the main Russian think tanks and media platforms. Instead, this was published by Monocle, a relatively new Russian business magazine and successor of Expert. “As for the sharp slaps from our neighbours, which, in the opinion of some, should be urgently responded to with loud fist bumps on the table, we can recall the three Baltic countries and ask how they are doing with transit, how busy their ports and railways are, and whether their fishing industry is doing well. There were times when unpleasant attacks from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia confidently held on to the top of the news agenda and echoed extremely painfully in Russia. At the same time, 35 kilometers from the border with one of the loudmouthed neighbors, work was silently underway to expand the port’s capacity in Ust-Luga. As for Azerbaijan, there seems to be an understanding that its geostrategic position in the region is advantageous, but not unique. Is it indispensable for all the surrounding countries in terms of transit? Being at the crossroads of all roads, the most important investment has always been, is and will always be good-neighbourly relations with neighbouring countries.”
Source: https://monocle.ru/monocle/2025/28/azerbaydzhan-pereshel-granitsy/
- “According to Dmitry Trenin, it is obvious that Russia will never abandon the South Caucasus. Geo-economically, Transcaucasia is a corridor connecting Russia with the countries of the global South – Iran, India, Turkey, Pakistan, the countries of the Arab East and East Africa. In the event of any conflict in the Caspian region, it is not only our interests that suffer, and we have someone to join forces with in order to ensure stability in the Caspian Sea. Despite the concessions to our post-Soviet neighbors, the fear of Russia is inherent in all former Soviet republics, without exception, says Nikolai Silaev: ‘This is completely natural and understandable, given that Russia surpasses them many times in all indicators.’ And this fear is growing, because for the last 30-35 years they have been able to balance between Russia and the West, and now these swings have begun to break little by little. There is no single West, to which both we and the entire post-Soviet space are accustomed, now, says Silaev: ‘And most of the former Soviet republics have growing concerns about how they should now build their foreign policy. They are especially afraid of the moment when the special military operation will be completed and Russia will have its hands free. That’s why they’re frantically looking for new resources to balance things out.’ ”
- Military escalation. In a speech in Azerbaijan on July 19, Aliyev made an explicit statement in support for the Zelensky regime to continue the war against Russia. “ ‘We created a new reality in 44 days in 2020, and they were forced to accept it. Ukrainians must also not surrender and must never accept the violation of their territorial integrity,’ Aliyev said, referring to the second Karabakh war in fall 2020, which paved the way for Karabakh’s full liberation in 2023. On the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, now in its fourth year, he urged the Ukrainians to ‘never accept occupation.’”
Source: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/azerbaijan-s-president-urges-ukrainians-to-never-accept-occupation-/3636060 For more on Aliyev’s scheme to establish the “Zangezur Corridor” – also known as the Nahichevan and Meghri Corridors, running east-west between Azeri Nakhichevan, Turkey further to the west, and mainland Azerbaijan, along the frontier with Iran, read this.
- The timing of Aliyev’s declaration followed heavy Russian air attacks earlier in the month on oil refinery and related petroleum production plants, as well as shipping terminals in Odessa, which are owned by the Azeri state oil company SOCAR and used to process Azeri crude oil for the fuel needs of the Ukrainian forces. Azeri media have also been reporting Russian attacks on SOCAR petrol stations in western Ukraine. The military escalation, according to Moscow military blogger Boris Rozhin, marks an end to informal undertakings between Putin and Aliyev that SOCAR assets in the Ukraine would not be hit.
Asked how he interprets the current conflict, a Russian with long experience in multi-million dollar business in Moscow, who was born Jewish in Baku and educated there, said: “We think that the absolute rulers can do whatever they want. But in this case they both act as hostages of their population’s mentality.”
“First- the plane. Russia had to express publicly its regrets, condolences, pay compensation and damages; participate in the funerals; mourn with the friend as they called Ilham and his father. But the big part of the Russian population may not like that. Azerbaijan could have accepted the private ‘I am sorry’ call from Putin but the big part of the Azeri population would not like it.”
“Second – the police raids on the Azeri gangs. Policemen want promotions and well-being, and if there is a small evidence of a crime, they catch people in mass if they belong to one ethnic group. Normal practice. But again, a big part of the population wants things done brutally with the aliens. Brutality and arrogance come to a certain high level and then things calm down as the rulers don’t need unnecessary headaches.”
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