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MOSCOW (Mineweb.com) — What is it that is drawing Russians like Victor Vekselberg and Alisher Usmanov to South Africa?

In Russian villages, the peasants used to say that where there’s honey, there will always be flies. By that, they mean flies, not bees – raiders, not producers. For Vekselberg, manganese is the honey; for Usmanov, vanadium; both produce alloys vital to the production of steel. To those who have signed joint-venture or buy-sell agreements with the two Russians, and also those who have not, but have seen them descend on their assets nonetheless, Vekselberg and Usmanov are agile predators, whose drive is in their nasal instincts, and whose wings are their protection.

Mineweb has already told the story of Vekselberg’s fly-over pursuit of manganese in the South African Kalahari , cheered on in Pretoria by the deputy minister of minerals and energy, Lulu Xingwana, and recently endorsed by President Thabo Mbeki. He has appointed Vekselberg as a member of his board of international mining advisors.

Mbeki’s advisors did not warn him of Vekselberg’s latest legal problems: the first, a clash in Kiev six months ago over a mystery $25 million down-payment that was paid, then forfeited, for the Ukraine’s Nikopol manganese ferroalloy plant; the second, recent Russian court hearings and a London arbitration over contract violations in the trading of shares of Russia’s principal titanium plant.

In Kiev, Vekselberg met his match in the person of then prime minister Yulia Timoshenko, and her local steelmaking supporters. Nikopol, the largest ferro-manganese producer in the world, and the most important source of the alloy to the Russian steel industry, is going back to the Ukrainian government to sell to Ukrainian bidders. In the more recent titanium case, Vekselberg has been swatted by Vyacheslav Bresht, the entrepreneur who introduced the concept of Russian racketeering to the US courts, winning control thereby of VSMPO-Avisma, the dominant titanium producer for the international aerospace industry.

Vekselberg’s troubles in the US courts are about to become even worse, as the man whose oilfield he “stole” almost a decade ago, emerging victorious from the US federal appeals court, gets ready to press Vekselberg and his associates into sworn testimony, and trial.

On the ground, at the Kalahari manganese field, locals tell stories of helicopter landings of men from Vekselberg’s Renova group, who drop in to sniff their turf, and discuss management arrangements with locals, if any are interested. In Gabon, the Kalahari’s African rival in the production of manganese, there is talk of more helicopter landings, Renova concessions for manganese, and more promises. Asked what they are doing in Gabon, Renova’s leadership has told Mineweb in Moscow that they “prefer not to answer that question.”

As metallurgists express its value, the purpose of cornering the world market in manganese, as Vekselberg has been trying to do, is to dictate its price, and hence its profit margin, to those who cannot do without it. The consumption of manganese is vital to steel production, directly at the pig-iron stage of manufacture, and indirectly, when the ore is upgraded to ferroalloys and metal. According to the US Geological Survey, “manganese has no satisfactory substitute in its major applications.” According to the court record, and also his family’s gossip, Vekselberg has made a career out of dictating price terms, and he gets very sore-headed when someone else out-manoeuvres him on price and margin.

Vekselberg’s Russian assets are a group of aluminium smelters, alumina refineries, and bauxite mines. Apart from pending claims in the Russian courts against the smelter Vekselberg allegedly arranged to steal, the underlying value of these assets depends on the Russian government’s attitude towards the price of electricity, and of the gas used to generate it. If the state decides not to subsidize the price of these inputs for up to 20 years ahead, Vekselberg’s assets cannot make a profit, and he cannot borrow the project finance to develop them. Vekselberg’s big Russian problem, therefore – one he is unlikely to advise President Mbeki at their next advisory council session — is that the state owned utilities, UES and Gazprom, may decide to share in the profit of the assets by taking equity in them, rather than granting Vekselberg the right to take the profit for himself. That would be quite a fly-swat, and Vekselberg’s Russian advisors do not hide their concern.

To hedge against this risk, Vekselberg should convert his Russian cash profit into non-Russian assets offshore. If those assets can then be used to produce cheaply, and export expensively into Russia, Vekselberg may be able to preserve the upperhand against his government.

In the case of ferromanganese, Russia cannot supply itself, and thus its strategic steelmaking enterprises are dependent on imports. In Soviet days, these were firmly under control in Georgia and the Ukraine. Today, Russia’s principal steelmaker Evraz – owned by Vekselberg’s sometime partner, Alexander Abramov – refuses to reveal where it buys its supplies from, terming the information a commercial secret. Other domestic steel and pipemakers say the same thing. But Russian trade statistics indicate that at least 85% of ferromanganese imports are Ukrainian. Poland contributes the next largest volume. The steelmakers estimate that the tonnage of manganese they need is equal to about 0.5% of their steel output, in 2004, Russian production was 54 million tons, and so the manganese requirement was about 2.7 million tons. For Russian steel output to expand, imports of ferromanganese must also grow. That’s what deposits in South Africa, and maybe Gabon, are for.

Vanadium is also an alloy for hardening steel. Most of the world’s reserves are in China, but South African reserves are almost as large, and SA mines produce more than their Chinese counterparts. Last year, about 18,000 tons were mined in SA, making 42% of the world total. China comes next with 14,500 tons, and Russia is third with 9,000 tons. As an alloy for steel, there are substitutes, such as manganese, titanium, tungsten, and columbium. But there is no substitute for vanadium in the titanium alloyed metal which the aerospace industry requires for its engines, and other sensitive components.

Russia’s principal source of vanadium is the iron-ore deposit known as Kachkanarsky. At present, that is controlled by Abramov and the Evraz group. The former owners of the combine are in court in the US, charging that they were robbed of the asset. Usmanov controls two of the largest iron-ore mines in Russia – Lebedinsky and Mikhailovsky – and also two steel mills, Nosta and Oskol.

Usmanov is a raider on his own behalf, and also on the behalf of others. His original moves into iron-ore and steel assets were directed by the Gazprom group, who converted mine and plant debts owed for fuel supply to Gazprom, into equity controlled by Gazprominvestholding and other companies. It was Usmanov’s job to manage the holding, and run the mines and plants. He did not own the controlling stakes by himself, at least not at the start. When Alexei Miller, an appointee of President Vladimir Putin, replaced the Gazprom leadership of Rem Vyakhirev, Usmanov faced the risk of losing control of the assets. He survived, and went on to take over the Nosta steelmill, whose previous owners had tried murdering each other, before they gave way to a man reputed to be employed by high-ranking federal police officers. Usmanov renamed the asset Ural Steel.

There is hardly a stone which Usmanov has lifted that Mineweb readers have not had the chance to measure. That is until this week, when Usmanov announced that his Metalloinvest group – for which he and a partner paid nearly $2 billion a year ago – is proposing to bid for Anglo American’s 79% stake in Highveld Steel & Vanadium Corporation. According to Usmanov’s spokesman, “We confirm our interest [in Highveld] and [confirm that Usmanov] was included in the short-list.”

For those readers, who remember that Usmanov once portrayed his raid to seize a diamond-mining licence in northwestern Russia as a patriotic service to keep the Oppenheimer family from Russia’s national treasure, Usmanov’s offer to carry a very large suitcase of case over the threshold built by Ernest Oppenheimer will be amusing.

De Beers is currently pursuing Usmanov through the courts of the US and Sweden for defrauding its company, Archangel Diamond Corporation, of the right to mine the diamonds it had discovered in 1996 at the Grib pipe, in Arkhangelsk region. Usmanov no longer defends what he did, saying only that he has sold out his interest to another partner, Vagit Alekperov, controlling shareholder of LUKoil, Russia’s leading commercial oil producer.

If Usmanov wants to follow Vekselberg on to Mbeki’s advisory board, he may find SA officials whose attitude towards De Beers is quite similar. But for the Oppenheimers, as well as for the Anglo American and Highveld boards, the important issue today isn not Usmanov’s wit or patriotism, but whether his suitcase has all the cash he promises.

Highveld acknowledged this week that it has drawn up a list of bidders, but it is not identifying them. Usmanov has declared himself instead, and is the fourth to do so. The others include the Mitta! group; the Indian steelmaker Tata; and the Kermas ferroalloy group, according to its London-based Croatian director, Danko Konchar. Kermas is connected to Russia through ownership of ferrochrome plants, but its principal business is largely hidden. Last year, Kermas arranged SA bank finance to buy Samancor Chrome for more than $430 million.

Usmanov’s spokesman was asked if he is intending to bid for Highveld alone or with partners. With the price of vanadium expected to stabilize this year, after the record burst in 2005, and Highveld announcing double profits for 2005, the value of the company is reputed to be between $1 billion and $1.6 billion. Usmanov’s bid is thus likely to cost him not less than $1 billion.

Usmanov’s power as the largest iron-ore producer in Russia does not generate free cash, or leveraging, equal to that figure, especially since this is not the only international billion-dollar offer for assets Usmanov is circulating in the international marketplace at the moment.

Bank sources report that, ever since he took over Metalloinvest’s Russian assets a year ago, Usmanov has been seeking long-term, large-scale foreign financing. In the deal to acquire Mikhailovsky, part of the cost was shouldered by Usmanov’s partner, Vassily Anisimov; he had sold his aluminium smelters to Vekselberg for about $500 million several years ago. Usmanov was probably obliged to provide about $500 million himself, and the remainder of the $2 billion purchase price was financed by the state-controlled Russian banking system, which agreed to take shares for security. International banks, with which Usmanov has been in negotiation, are reluctant to accept similar pledges. Also, Usmanov cannot be certain that his Gazprom friends, and the state banks, might still do to him what he and they once did to others – call in the debt, and replace him as the equity owner. It is, therefore, for the same tactical and strategic reasons that are driving Vekselberg into offshore manganese, that Usmanov is keen to move into Highveld vanadium. Funding the takeover is Usmanov’s immediate target.

His first attempt at creating an offshore asset base for himself was a failure in one sense, but a success in another. The largest source of Usmanov’s cash offer for Mikhailovsky last year was the proceeds of his raid on the Anglo-Dutch steelmaker Corus. Buying Corus shares when they were at historic lows, Usmanov’s Cyprus vehicle Gallagher acquired a stake of almost 14%. The Financial Times obliged by reporting Usmanov as Corus’s saviour, promoting his bid for a seat on the Corus board; a deal to supply semi-fabricated steel or iron-ore to Corus plants; and other demands.

But Corus did due diligence on the Russian, and rebuffed him. When Boris Ivanishvili, owner of Metalloinvest and Mikhailovsky, told Usmanov that he was not prepared to enter into a holding partnership with him, and demanded cash instead, Usmanov had to find it. He sold out of Corus at $614 million, realizing more than $300 million in pure profit. Oleg Deripaska, the aluminium oligarch, was briefly Usmanov’s partner in the takeover of the Nosta steelmill, but he also asked Usmanov to buy him out with cash.

In more recent days, Usmanov (and partners in an entity called OEMK-lnvest) paid $400 million to Vladimir Lisin’s steelmill Novolipetsk to buy back a 12% stake which the steelmaker had held in the Lebedinsky iron-ore plant to assure their iron-ore supplies to the mill. At the same time, Usmanov sold to Lisin a 25% stake in another iron-ore producer, KMA-Ruda . Lisin was restructuring to sell off minority stakes and gain majority control of KMA-Ruda. Usmanov, it can be calculated, had to raise about $350 million for the combined deal.

if Usmanov is bringing a suitcase to Highveld, he must find new cash to fill it. That is not how flies usually think of approaching the honey-pot.

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MOSCOW (Mineweb.com) — The two greatest boxing matches ever fought were the two that the slowing, but wily Muhammad Ali won as the 3-to-1 underdog. They were the Rumble in the Jungle (Kinshasa) against George Foreman, and the Thriller in Manila against Joe Frazier. One year separated the bouts, as Ali aged from 32 to 33. By that time, the only fight he had ever lost was to Frazier.

The Thriller in the Chiller is a different sort of bout. In physical terms, Vyacheslav Shtirov is roughly double the weight, girth, and reach of President Vladimir Putin, though the latter, a martial arts adept, is the more agile, and the fitter of the two. In political terms, Putin is the undisputed heavyweight champ. If Shtirov enters the ring, he’s KO’d.

So, to keep his punching power as president of the Sakha republic, and deter Putin from knocking him out, Shtirov is fighting a two-ring strategy — the first to avoid getting on to the mat with Putin; and the second to send substitutes to do his boxing for him. The substitutes, elected politicians from the Sakha region (also known as Yakutia), have their own ambitions too, and their demands pose problems for both the Kremlin and Shtirov.

When Putin and Shtirov met in Yakutsk on January 6 — in a meeting Shtirov’s office denied for weeks was happening, out of wishful thinking – Shtirov promised that by February 2, he and regional officials would sign an agreement returning to federal authority an inventory of valuable mineral resource assets that have been in their hands for more than a decade.

Behind the scenes for two years now, federal government agencies in Moscow have been trying to reassert their control over state property in Sakha. The most important of these is Alrosa, the diamond miner.

The Kremlin wants to see it expand its capital to include non-diamond resource assets, such as coal, oil, and perhaps others as well. Its current capital value is difficult to estimate because as a closed stockholding company, there is no market in its shares. The capital value at the moment is between $4 billion and $7 billion. The federal buildup of assets is intended to achieve 51% control on the basis of the low valuation. Once done, however, the valuation could take off, hitting between $8 and $9 billion. Alrosa’s reach – for new assets like Norilsk Nickel, for example – would grow significantly.

A decade ago, the Sakha assets had been distributed by President Boris Yelstin by means that were not lawful, in order to buy the political loyalty of his allies in the region. As Putin reasserted federal control, he got rid of Yeltsin’s principal ally, Mikhail Nikolaev, the two-term Sakha president, and replaced him with Shtirov. Nikolaev was, by that time, a very wealthy man, but not a powerful one outside his region. He got what he bargained for – a seat on which to hang on to everything. He was appointed a federal senator with immunity from prosecution.

Shtirov had been Nikolaev’s protege as prime minister of the regional government, then CEO of Alrosa. Putin moved him out of Alrosa, and into Nikolaev’s regional seat. This was to enable Alexander Nichiporuk, the new Alrosa CEO, to reorganize the company under federal control, and Kremlin supervision.

Shtirov, however, had other ideas, and he’s been playing on the lack of concentration of his opponent to advance them.

From the Kremlin’s point of view, just $2 billion worth of rough diamond production a year warrants roughly as much attention from the Kremlin as its value, compared to the annual value of production of Russian oil, gas, nickel, copper, iron-ore, coal, gold, and platinum group metals. Accordingly, Putin cannot be expected by his men to focus on the diamond sector for more than once a year.

And so, by the end of Shtirov’s first year in the regional presidency, on December 28, 2004, the federals were able to get Putin to intervene, summoning Shtirov to Moscow, and telling him that, if he continued to stand in the way of the federal asset takeover, he would be ousted. Another year went by, Shtirov was still fighting the federals, and Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, the minister responsible for the diamond sector and chairman of Alrosa’s board, was too weak to deal with the challenge.

This time, Putin resolved to visit Shtirov in Yakutsk, where the temperature was nearly minus-45 Celsius. Again, Putin told Shtirov that, if he hoped to be reappointed for a second term in Sakha, he must stop sabotaging the federal retrieval of assets at once, and sign them over by February 2. It was made clear to Shtirov that the federals want to end the standoff without delay, and are ready to go to federal court for rulings invalidating the asset transfers of the Yeltsin period, and returning them to federal control The alternative to that process, Shtirov understands, is a negotiating process between locals and federals that never ends.

Shtirov knows how to read the clock, as well as how to count. If the Sakha region currently holds a 32% stake of Alrosa, that is worth only $1.3 billion at today’s sub-market valuation. If the company is expanded, the stake could triple in value. The administrative districts of Sakha, which currently hold 8% of the company, could see their stake jump from $320 million to $720 million. Who should share in these riches is a potent question, but it’s a question Shtirov dare not fight with Putin to decide.

And so, he has recruited some sparring partners to fight for him. The first move was the publication on a Russian website of materials suggesting that Alrosa executives shower Shtirov with vulgar verbal abuse behind his back. But to those who know how the Alrosa executives speak, this appears to have been fabricated. How does Shtirov’s allies gain by making his enemies sound like Mike Tyson?

The answer surfaced in an article published in the Moscow business daily, Kommersant, a few days later. According to the carefully constructed report, not Shtirov, but a group of Sakha region parliamentarians is opposed to Putin’s demands for the transfer of assets to Alrosa. Their conditions are reported to include preservation of the 32% regional government shareholding; the 8% district stake; and written guarantees of compensation for any regional budget shortfall in revenue “in full and on a long-term basis”. Putin, according to an unnamed local parliamentary deputy, should sign a special decree for this.

Shtirov is not cited as favouring the parliamentary move, but it is evident that he is backing it as negotiations open next week between the regional representatives and the federals on the details of the agreement due on February 2. As he marshals the local forces to retrieve the concessions he has already given Putin, a media campaign has been created to suggest that he is the target of an unscrupulous gang of federal conspirators, whose intentions are as foul as their mouths.

In the small world of Russian diamond politics, titrations like these do not change minds. There is no lack of sympathy in the federal government for the Sakha population, who have been more victimized by Nikolaev and Shtirov than rewarded with a share of the wealth Alrosa has generated. The concessions sought to sustain the regional budget, and improve the distribution of its benefits, have already been agreed by the Finance Ministry.

The Speaker of the Sakha parliament, Nyirgun Timofeyev, issued his own statement last Friday, January 27, revealing that, behind the concessions that have been publicly demanded from Moscow – and privately agreed – he wants Putin to write into his decree that Yakut politicians will be able to exercise operational influence over Alrosa in the republic, and enjoy long-term access to the company’s cashflow.

These are unprecedented demands. Even now, the Sakha parliament does not wield this leverage over Alrosa, except insofar as the company pays into the regional budget Rb11 billion ($350 million) in annually agreed leasing fees for use of the region’s resources. This sum amounts to 23% of the entire budget income of Yakut republic.

Beyond assuring this sum, or this percentage, Timofeyev realizes his bargaining power is limited. He publicly acknowledges that, if the Kremlin orders a court hearing, the Sakha fight will be lost. But he also warned that, if the federals move faster than the Yakuts are prepared to concede in negotiations, he will attempt to mobilize an unprecedented parliamentary confrontation.” I do not exclude”, he declared Friday, “that the course of events can force a gathering of the deputies of the State Assembly of the republic for discussion of the situation.”

What remains to be decided is not a choice between the growth of Sakha at Moscow’s expense versus the aggrandizement of Moscow, at the expense of stagnation or impoverishment in Sakha. The choice now is between Shtirov and Putin to control of Alrosa. If Shtirov tries to fight the second, he’s lost. If he believes he can convince anyone in Moscow, let alone the President, that he is fighting the first, he’s lost again. Timofeyev may also be positioning to succeed Shtirov, as the new Putin appointee for republican president, in the event that he can make himself seem more useful to the Kremlin in this contest.

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MOSCOW (Mineweb.com) – From one banker’s point of view, lending Russian aluminium oligarch Oleg Deripaska $22.5 million is peanuts – too little to warrant much concern about the creditworthiness or asset risk of Deripaska’s principal production company, Russian Aluminium (Rusal), the world’s no.3 producer and largest exporter of primary aluminium. To be sure, if Rusal turns out to be a walnut shell, and Deripaska’s asset value is elsewhere, then wagering peanuts in a shell-game could be more than embarrassing for the bankers. It could expose them to liability lawsuits far costlier than $22.5 million.

This is the concern that was quietly acknowledged inside the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC, the World Bank’s commercial lending window) in the middle of 2004. For several months that year, EBRD and IFC had been negotiating a $150 million loan to Komi Aluminium. In August, the deal appeared to have been done, and was formally announced.

What had been a long, uphill battle by SUAL, Russia’s second aluminium producer, owned by Victor Vekselberg, to get financing for his low-grade but sizeable new bauxite mine., appeared to have succeeded. According to the joint EBRD and IFC announcement, the two banks “have each signed a $75 million loan agreement that will in total provide Russia’s privately-owned SUAL group a total of $150 million to boost Russian production of bauxite, the raw material for the aluminium industry.” The deal was described as a nine-year loan of $45 million from each bank, with “the remaining $30 million portion of each organisation’s $75 million facility, syndicated to international banks under an A/B loan structure. The term of the syndicated portion will be seven years.” The EBRD announced that the syndicate banks included BNP Paribas, the leader, and Barclays, ING, Societe Generate, and Standard Bank.The plan, according to the announcement, is “to increase annual bauxite output at SUAL’s Middle-Timan mine, situated 250 km south of the Arctic Circle, to 6 million tonnes from the current 1 million tonnes over the next four years. This will help overcome a major shortage in domestic supplies of bauxite and improve the competitiveness of the Russian aluminium industry as a whole.” The loan money was to be spent as follows: “$100 million for the expansion of the Middle-Timan bauxite mine and $50 million to fund feasibility studies and preparatory works for an alumina refinery at Sosnogorsk, 245 km southeast of the Middle-Timan mine, and feasibility studies for an aluminium smelter at Pechora, 250 km northeast of Sosnogorsk.”

EBRD and IFC knew that SUAL had been seeking foreign aluminium giants, like Pechiney and Alcan, for a joint venture in the project, but they had refused. As a global aluminium producer, Russia is traditionally long on cheap electricity, but short on alumina. Aluminium is the electrolyzed product of their combination; but to produce the metal, let alone expand production, Rusal is heavily dependent on alumina imported from the Ukraine, Australia, and Guinea, where its control over the supplying refineries, and the bauxite feedstock, is weak, or subject to reversal. Rusal has a local alumina refinery at Achinsk; but it cannot produce enough feedstock for the smelters. SUAL produces more bauxite and alumina than its smelters require.

Logically, their combination made sense. But the opening of negotiations between SUAL and its arch domestic rival, Rusal, came as quite a surprise, Vekselberg and Deripaska had been fighting each other over smelter assets in the Russian northwest – Vekselberg won – and neither seemed inclined to trust the other in a partnership. Each suspected the other – then as now – of plotting to monopolize the assets. Rusal executives publicly aired their pessimism about the possibility of a joint venture.

Nonetheless, on April 24, 2005, Rusal announced it had agreed on the joint venture. Burying the hatchet, Rusal’s CEO Alexander Bulygin is quoted in the announcement as claiming: “The partnership of our two companies in implementing such a large-scale project demonstrates that the Russian aluminium industry is maturing. At the same time, this agreement helps each of our companies address important challenges in their respective strategies”.

They had agreed to jointly, and equally, develop the Komi Aluminium project, starting with an alumina refinery near the city of Sosnogorsk to consume the added output of SUAL’s bauxite. The cost of this stage was estimated at $1.2 billion, and “under the Agreement between RUSAL and SUAL Group,” Rusal said, “the financing will be made on a parity basis by means of debt and shareholders’ capital. The Refinery is scheduled to launch in 2008.” The Komi project, according to both companies, is to “double the share of domestic raw materials consumed by Russian [aluminium] producers from 40% to 70-80%.”

To the EBRD and IFC, this was a significant change in the project they had agreed to lend to. Accordingly, they immediately stopped their plan to disburse the funds committed to the mine expansion and the refinery study. The commercial banks also halted their loan disbursement. SUAL and Rusal were asked to clarify the proposed partnership. While the public and commercial banks had already done the due diligence on SUAL, the prospect of their money finding its way into Rusal management, albeit in a joint venture, led to the disbursement freeze, and to the start of a new process of studying Rusal.

The commercial banks had done this before. To deal with what the bankers at BNP Paribas acknowledged to be the perceived risks of Deripaska as an oligarch, and of the Rusal structure, unusual and unpublicized loan and metal securitization had been introduced. The EBRD and IFC had to start their due diligence from scratch.

This week, on January 17, they announced the process had been completed, and that subject to a set of legal covenants and an 18-month timetable of management promises, which Deripaska had submitted, and Rusal had signed, the EBRD and IFC were lifting the freeze on the old loan, and would start disbursing the cash. According to EBRD, the commercial banks in the syndicate must individually complete their own approval process, before contributing their funds.

The EBRD’s total exposure to the project is $45 million, with the same for IFC. Each of the commercial banks is exposed for $12 million each. Theoretically, the EBRD’s and IFC’s exposure to Rusal in the joint venture is just $22.5 million, while each of the bank syndicate members is exposed to Rusal for just $6 million. These are the peanuts. Together, they add up to just one dollar in eight of the capital expenditure required for the project.

According to a statement issued by Rusal, the unfreezing of the 2004 loan is “a strong endorsement of Rusal’s plans. The [EBRD and IFC] decision to disburse the loans is based on the disclosure of ownership by Rusal and provides for commitments to greater transparency, good corporate governance and high business standards on the part of the company. Compliance with these commitments is stipulated in legal documentation with the IFC and EBRD.”

The dossier EBRD’s lawyers gathered from Rusal remains secret, and EBRD officials refuse to discuss the details. They are sensitive to the fact that Russian prosecutors and auditors of the Accounting Chamber, the Russian state auditor, have long been interested to secure evidence that the offshore companies through which Rusal metal is traded, and through which tax exemption is claimed according to tolling contracts, may belong to Deripaska. If they don’t, then Deripaska doesn’t benefit from more than half of Rusal’s trading activities. If they do, he has violated Russia’s tax laws.

According to a publication by Neil Buckley of the Financial Times, it is the “first [EBRD loan] to Mr. Deripaska.lt suggests an increasing willingness by the EBRD to lend to oligarchs embracing higher governance standards.” To illustrate his own due diligence on this point, Buckley noted that Deripaska had been “named in a $3 bn US lawsuit filed by rivals alleging fraud and racketeering. The case was thrown out by the US courts, and Mr. Deripaska denied all charges.” Buckley and his newspaper omitted to report that the US courts rejected their jurisdiction over the claim, but never tried the charges. He also omitted to mention that Deripaska and Bulygin secretly settled, and paid the claim last year.

New court litigation alleging a similar pattern of business tactics by Rusal has started in the High Court of the UK, in Nigeria, and in the US afresh. The Financial Times has ignored them all.

Remarks and rulings in recent weeks by an English judge in a case where Deripaska, Bulygin and their offshore companies face charges of illegally and fraudulently taking control of the Tajikistan Aluminium Plant (TadAZ) have publicly targeted Rusal in the court record. In the Nigerian case, currently pending in the federal Nigerian appeals court, Rusal is accused of violating Nigerian privatization rules, and corrupting senior Nigerian government officials, using a British Virgin Islands company as a conduit, in order to take control of the Aluminium Smelter Company of Nigeria.

According to its press release on January 17, the EBRD and IFC “confirmed that they plan to disburse loans totalling $150 million for the Komi Aluminium project after determining that the recent entry of Russian Aluminium (RUSAL) as an equal partner is acceptable. The decision is an important step towards final agreement to disburse. It is based on full disclosure of ownership by RUSAL’s and Basic Element’s owner Oleg Deripaska, and additionally provides for detailed commitments to greater transparency, good corporate governance and high business standards, covering RUSAL and Basic Element. Compliance with these commitments is covenanted in legal documentation with the EBRD and IFC. In particular, the EBRD and IFC welcome the adoption by RUSAL of an action plan over an 18-month timetable covering significant corporate ownership disclosure, the publication of financial information and specific steps aimed at improving corporate governance – notably the election of three independent

Did the EBRD come to these conclusions by glossing over the court record, because the loan was peanuts, or because the courts are peanuts?

Mineweb asked, and EBRD answered: “The EBRD conducted extensive checks on the information provided by Mr. Oleg Deripaska on the companies he owned. As stated in its press release, the Bank decided the information provided was sufficient for the Bank to proceed with the project — with Rusal as a new partner in the borrowing entity. The loan agreement includes a large number of detailed legal covenants covering all aspects of the project, including the information disclosed to the Bank by Mr. Deripaska on the ownership and structure of the group as well as the commitments made by Mr. Derispaka on future action.”

Lawyers are trained to write this sort of thing, and expensively compensated to produce it. Mineweb readers can analyze what is meant, free of charge.

There is no secret about the ownership of Rusal. Deripaska controls about 96% of the company, which in turn has yet to complete the consolidation and financial reporting of the principal smelter, refinery and related assets in the aluminium production chain on the territory of Russia. Less than 5% of the shares is held by or for CEO Bulygin, and Gulzhan Moldazhanova; she used to run the commercial operations of Rusal, before moving to Basic Element, the Deripaska holding company supervising all the Russian assets.

Court records in cases filed against Rusal; court and arbitration rulings in Switzerland; and a new UK High Court case involving another Russian oligarch in breach-of-trust proceedings, indicate how the EBRD may have achieved something less than it seems to claim, and to have produced something less than the “endorsement” Rusal claims.

There are four ways in which Deripaska’s Rusal could be the empty part of an elaborate shell-game: if Deripaska’s claim to controlling ownership turns out to be based on hidden trust and other arrangements with others, who claim ownership rights, but have not been bought out or compensated; if Rusal’s assets turn out to be no more than the smelters, and related raw material supply and affiliated production plants, on Russian territory, but do not incorporate the offshore-registered companies through which assets outside Russia are held; if most of Rusal’s tradeable aluminium does not belong to it, or to the smelters, but is governed by tolling arrangements which vest title, tax exemption, pricing, and profit in tollor companies, also registered by the dozens across the globe; and, finally, if the Kremlin has decided that rather than litigate against Deripaska for tax recovery, it may buy him out through a takeover bid from Unified Energy Systems (UES), the state utility company.

On the ownership issue, the EBRD concedes that the principal claimant to dispute Deripaska’s submissions is Mikhail Chernoy, who currently lives in Israel. He has publicly averred, many times, that he provided Deripaska with an unspecified form of trust arrangement to administer the metal production assets in Russia, and that he still owns a sizeable stake, for which, he claims, Deripaska has yet to pay. As often as Chernoy has made these claims, Deripaska has denied them.

Deripaska has certainly told the EBRD the same thing, assuring the bank that long ago he severed his past relations with Chernoy. Chernoy’s influence over Deripaska from his early days at the Sayansk smelter has been so powerful, the EBRD’s due diligence ought to have questioned Chernoy directly. If the “extensive checks”, to which the EBRD refers, omitted him, then the Mineweb reader might judge that the information gathered may be insufficient. If the EBRD’s lawyers decided not to interview Chernoy, but put Deripaska’s severance of relations, and claim to have bought him out, into the form of a legal covenant, then what Chernoy says in future should bear on compliance with that covenant, and hence on the loan disbursement and project agreement.

Giving Deripaska the benefit of the doubt on this point, with the protection of a covenant against future discoveries, is reasonable. Time should tell, one way or the other, and the risk may be peanuts.

The EBRD told Mineweb that it has sufficiently investigated the “structure” of the Rusal group. Investigation appears to be past tense. Legal covenants relate to future actions and promises by Deripaska and Rusal. The lawyers have not obliged Deripaska and Bulygin, or their assigns, to accept the covenants, if they intend to look the other way when they are broken. But the EBRD is not prepared to disclose what the covenants say, and hence what the EBRD is afraid of in terms of borrower risk.

According to its own statements and press releases, legally, the Rusal group is a Russian territorial holding. According to Bulygin, “we operate on five continents, deliver products to major corporations in 40 countries across the globe and cooperate with leading financial institutions.” According to former Rusal spokesman, Yevgenia Harrison, in a statement she was authorized to issue to Mineweb, “the Russian government is well aware that Rusal is the only Russian metals company whose revenues do not primarily come from the mining of Russian ore. To a very large extent, we are processors of imported raw materials. Thus a relatively large portion of Rusal’s value added is created outside of the Russian Federaton.”

At the time she said this in late 2004, Harrison was responding to a federal Tax Ministry report, commissioned by the Prime Ministry, and delivered on September 6, 2004. In the report, tax payment rates of several major Russian metals companies were disclosed and analyzed. Rusal was reported to have paid tax amounting to just 2% of revenues. This was well below comparable rates reported by the Tax Ministry for the other metal exporting companies examined, and even further behind the rates disclosed by Russian oil exporters.

According to the Tax Ministry report, Rusal was able to lower its tax rate by the use of tolling contracts with offshore companies it claimed not to own or control; and by a regional tax relief scheme for corporate affiliates registered in the fareastern region of Chukotka, where Rusal had no other business and negligible investment. Regarding the Tax Ministry report, Harrison said that Rusal was not under official investigation. “To dramatise what is a routine governmental report into an article that insinuates that Rusal has acted somehow improperly is misleading and damaging to the company’s corporate reputation; a reputation that we are working hard to develop as the company, and indeed Russia, moves forward.”

If Rusal’s value is mostly that of a foreign group, did the EBRD receive a comprehensive list of all the foreign-registered companies through which its trading and asset holding operations are conducted? Did the EBRD oblige Bulygin to sign a covenant that the consolidation of assets and financial reports promised in the next 18 months will bring these entities into the group?

The point is a fundamental one for the future of both Rusal and Deripaska. Governments, including at least one government that is a shareholder of the EBRD, have issued opinions on the point. For example, almost a year ago, when Rusal claimed to be bidding for the privatization of the Podgorica Aluminium Plant (KAP), the most important industrial asset of Montenegro, the Montenegrin government refused to accept the bid at first, when Rusal used a Cyprus-registered company called Salomon as the bidder. In Nigeria, when bidding to take Nigeria’s smelter was conducted, Rusal operated behind Dayson Holdings, a BVI registration with no known holdings and no business activities. In the takeover of TadAZ, leading to a privatization expected after the Tajikistan presidential election this year, the cutout for Rusal, identified in London court proceedings, is a BVI company called CDH Investments.

These are asset holders; CDH is also a participant in tolling. But the full list of trading companies engaged in supplying alumina to the Russian smelters and taking out aluminium, according to tolling contracts, runs into the dozens, if not hundreds. Many of them have been identified in litigation or arbitration proceedings related to Rusal’s trading contracts. Last year, for example, in a BVI case initiated by London traders Simon and David Reuben, and reported by Adrian Gatton in The Independent and Metal Bulletin, a $300 million claim accused Deripaska of breaking an alleged joint venture agreement made in 1995, and creating a tolling chain through companies including the Irish-registered Tradalco.

The claim also alleged that Deripaska siphoned off assets without the knowledge of the Reubens to shadow BVI companies, with identical names but different registrations and bank accounts, to pass them off as the jointly owned companies into which profits were to be directed.

That case was never decided by trial in court, but the Reubens were paid off.

If the process of tolling is legal, according to Russian law, then the companies identified in these proceedings, if they are still active, cannot be considered by the EBRD to be part of the Rusal group. And if Rusal has promised to consolidate its trading into Rusal’s accounts, then either it admits it has controlled the tollors – which would expose the group to huge back-tax claims and penalties – or else it is abandoning the tolling practice altogether. The EBRD holds no promise, or covenant, of either kind.

In 2004, Mineweb did the following calculation of the profitability of Rusal’s aluminium exports for the offshore tolling contractor. This was gauged from the margin of difference between the price Rusal declared at Russian Customs for aluminium, as it left the country, and the price at which the same metal was declared at US Customs, when imported to the United States. The average price in the first half of 2004 for Russian alumium imported to the US was $1,685 per metric ton. The average price of Russian aluminium exported from Russia in the same period was $1,262, a gap of $423 per ton.

According to the US trade data, the US imported 524,455 tons in the period to July 31 of this year, mostly from Rusal. The price gap was thus roughly equal to $222 million. Double that for the full year, and count the parallel, but larger volume trading of Rusal metal into countries other than the US, and the price gap in 2004 may have been larger than $1 billion. According to industry estimates, almost two-thirds of Rusal’s metal is traded through tolling schemes. Rusal has confirmed the legality of its tolling agreements; it has not challenged this calculation of the size of the value gap.

The Kremlin has carried through just one experiment in prosecuting large-scale corporate tax avoidance, and that was the Yukos oil company case. Since the dismantling of that company in 2004 and 2005, and its takeover by state oil company Rosneft, a different procedure has been used to achieve the same end, at least operationally and financially. That is, a leveraged buyout of oligarch assets by state companies, in which loan financing is provided by international banks, secured for their repayment by trade receipts or shares.

In this way, Roman Abramovich’s Sibneft oil company has been bought by Gazprom, Kakha Bendukidze’s OMZ (heavy engineering) by Gazprom; Vladimir Potanin’s Power Machines by the electrical utility, UES; and Norilsk Nickel, property of Portanin and Mikhail Prokhorov, is being considered for purchase by Alrosa, while Rosoboronexport, the state arms agency, is planning to take over VSMPO-Avisma, the titanium producer.

Why should Deripaska’s Rusal be exempt from this process? EBRD’s due diligence assumes that it is, and the 18-month programme it has drafted confirms that Deripaska will still own Rusal when the promise to appoint three independent directors comes due. There are, however, international aluminium makers, as well as senior Russian government officials, who suspect otherwise. And they detect in recent news of Norsk Hydro’s negotiations with UES, the opening of a Kremlin campaign to buy out Rusal, and transfer the aluminium assets to the electricity company, without whose supplies at beneficial tariffs, the metal couldn’t be produced and traded so profitably – UES. This is not the only contender. Vekselberg has also sought Kremlin support for a takeover plan of a different kind.

While EBRD is countiDeripaska may still be the controlling owner of the Rusal group in two years’ time; or he may not. EBRD has decided that whether he does, or he doesn’t, there isn’t much at risk for its $45 million outlay to the Komi project, or to the $22.5 million stake that is Rusal risk. But the one thing the EBRD hasn’t done is the very thing it inspired the reporter of the Financial Times to say it had – to endorse the multi-billion dollar flotation of Deripaska’s shares in Rusal on the London Stock Exchange to non-Russian share buyers. The EBRD’s bet on Deripaska may be peanuts; an IPO would be a much bigger nut to crack, and the EBRD wouldn’t dare.ng its covenants and promises of good corporate governance, the Kremlin will have a choice of a rather more strategic kind. And Deripaska will be under pressure to sell out locally, and concentrate what remains of his metal business abroad, disconnected by tolling.

Let’s give Deripaska the additional credit for knowing how to fight a takeover of this type, and to mobilize the resources required to defeat it, and win the Kremlin to his side. In his sale of two rolling mills to Alcoa of the US in 2004, he demonstrated considerable skill in overcoming high governmental objections to what he was doing. In Kremlin thinking, by comparison with Yukos’s and Sibneft’s oilfields, or Potanin’s nickel mines and engineering works, those aluminium plants were peanuts. Subject to some tight domestic supply commitments from Alcoa, letting them go was conceded. Selling a large stake of Rusal to foreign owners is a different story.

Deripaska may still be the controlling owner of the Rusal group in two years’ time; or he may not. EBRD has decided that whether he does, or he doesn’t, there isn’t much at risk for its $45 million outlay to the Komi project, or to the $22.5 million stake that is Rusal risk. But the one thing the EBRD hasn’t done is the very thing it inspired the reporter of the Financial Times to say it had – to endorse the multi-billion dollar flotation of Deripaska’s shares in Rusal on the London Stock Exchange to non-Russian share buyers. The EBRD’s bet on Deripaska may be peanuts; an IPO would be a much bigger nut to crack, and ; the EBRD wouldn’t dare.

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MOSCOW (Mineweb.com) – If Israeli diamantaire Lev Leviev and trade mediator Arkady Gaydamak buy football clubs, as they have recently done, the Roman Empire rule of thumb would be that the businesses of the two men are running into difficulty.

English tabloid readers have been told that Roman Abramovich — the Russian oligarch who accumulated roughly $20 billion milking his oil, aluminium, and gold assets, and then selling them – invented the idea of establishing personal character, institutional respectability, and political asylum by buying the Chelsea Football Club, and pushing it to the top of its league with expensive acquisitions. But Abramovich, who has made up for lack of ideas of his own with very swift fingers, was not the first.

In modern football history, it was a Greek named George Koskotas, house painter by trade, who deserves the credit for the idea that, if your asset acquisitions are in doubt, buy a football team, and let the team’s winning streak deflect suspicion of its owner; and deter investigations of how he came by the cash that, according to the fans, is the key to the club’s success. Koskotas bought his Athens football club after taking over, and looting the Bank of Crete. He was subsequently to discover that football success and media popularity weren’t protection enough from prosecution by the then Socialist government of Greece, led by Andreas Papandreou. An attempt to flee Greece for asylum in the United States, and a deal with US officials to accuse Papandreou of corruption, was foiled when the FBI arrested Koskotas on landing. Ultimately, he was transferred from a US prison to a Greek prison to serve a lengthy sentence for fraud.

But the Koskotas ploy had a much longer, Roman precedent. Almost two thousand years earlier, it was well-known that the more corrupt the consuls, or aspiring caesars, were in business, and the more ruthless in politics, the more extravagant were the Coliseum games they organized for the Roman public. Just the business of supplying exotic animals for parading and killing made fortunes that tied purveyors and shippers all over the empire to the imperial candidates in Rome. The multi-million dollar purchases of footballers from Africa or South America, and their agents, duplicate this antique trade, the rationale for which is something more potent than public entertainment, and also riskier. The problem the Roman consuls quickly ran into was that the rapid cost inflation of their games triggered a cycle of worsening corruption, taxation and criminality which became very unentertaining, indeed.

Football club investment, with its insurance and player purchase schemes that link media rights and related revenues to winning games, is a pyramid scheme, in which the day will inevitably come when winning turns into losing, and debts become unpayable. Getting out of the game before that happens is usually unpopular, but it’s a knack Abramovich may have to learn.

Until he does, the English prime minister Tony Blair isn’t the man Prime Minister Papandreou was; and it remains to be seen if the official investigation now under way into football finance will shake the high-level protection Abramovich’s cash flow receives in the UK. Whether Arkady Gaydamak, father of Alexander Gaydamak, the new purchaser of Portsmouth Football Club, receives similar protection remains to be seen.

Before the Portsmouth deal, Gaydamak senior had acquired Beitar Jerusalem, a football club, and Hapoel Jerusalem, a basketball club. Leviev has bought Hapoel Tel Aviv, a football club. Their gamble is limited to Israel, where the only one of the two reported to be under investigation is Gaydamak. He has said he is innocent of money laundering, and also of other allegations, reported in European jurisdictions, related to his past dealings in Angola and France.

Both Leviev and Gaydamak have enjoyed better relations with the Russian government in the past than they do today – Leviev to assure rough diamond supplies to his cutting factories, and Gaydamak to earn commissions on Soviet debt, arms, and oil trading. Leviev has steadily lost ground in the past three years, as men he was close to exited from the government; and as federal officials began a crackdown on the leakage of rough diamonds from Airosa to favoured buyers.

A scheme, with which Leviev is thought to have been associated, to help accumulate stocks of Russian rough in Israel, and encourage Israeli influence to improve US policy towards Russia, reappears from time to time, at least in the imaginations of Israeli politicians and diamantaires. The latest version, suggested by Israelis close to Ehud Olmert, a prime minister in waiting, is that if the Kremlin would agree to a big increase in Alrosa’s deliveries to Israel, Olmert will neutralize President Vladimir Putin’s opponents from the Yukos oil empire, who have found refuge, and public platform, in Israel – Leonid Nevziin, Mikhail Brudno, and others. The Kremlin has heard this all before (when the target list included ex-oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky), and has no reason to believe it.

Leviev, on the other hand, senses the opportunity of capturing more Russian rough, as De Beers’s share dwindles to nothing; and ultimately, perhaps, of positioning himself to capture equity in Airosa, if, after the federal restructuring now under way, the Kremlin decides to privatize a sizeable stake. So far, however, he’s failed to develop the diamond-mining business he promised to start in the Urals two years ago; he has not drawn more Airosa rough into the domestic cutting industry, let alone his own Ruis plant; and he has no obvious friends left in the Airosa export establishment. These shortcomings are not as ignominious and comprehensive as those which Leviev’s Israeli rival, Beny Steinmetz, has suffered in Russia.

What exactly the Kremlin can achieve with Airosa in the last two years of President Putin’s term depends on how successful Putin himself was in frightening Sakha boss Vyacheslav Shtirov into subservience, when they met on January 6. For the time being, this is very much an internal affair, and neither Leviev nor any of the other major Israeli diamantaires is likely to be able to capitalize in the short term. In the longer term, the government is likely to make sure that Alrosa’s marketing strategy allows noone to corner the bulk of the trade, in order to rig a sub-market price or build buffer stocks abroad, and no-one to replace De Beers.

Gaydamak’s return to Russia has so far failed to produce notable success, either in the Angolan or Congolese diamond schemes he has proposed to Airosa, and to the government ministers who sit on its board. He has thoroughly failed to reestablish himself in the debt trading markets, in which he had undoubted success almost a decade ago. It is a sign of how weak he feels himself to be that Gaydamak thought to ingratiate himself with the Kremlin, and promote himself, by recently buying the Moskovsky Novosti (Moscow News) media group, which has been a bastion of anti-Putin sentiment, funded by the Yukos group. Now, under Gaydamak, it is nothing at all.

Buying media was the Russian oligarchs’ initial target to enhance their reputations and promote their agendas. Football clubs were not. The reason was that in the Soviet Union, sports clubs, especially football and ice hockey, had always been part of the social outlays of the great state and city-forming enterprises. When these were privatized, the oligarchs who acquired them saw the clubs as a negative balance-sheet item – at least until Abramovich gave them a different idea. Now men like aluminium oligarch Oleg Deripaska are keen supporters of the football teams around his plants, and also in the southern region that may be his political base in future – the Kuban.

Buying newspapers is not a gamble like football clubs because the former always lose money. It is a mark of Leviev’s shrewdness that he has not lost money in Russia on either. He is acutely sensitive, however, of what is published about him, and will telephone proprietors personally to remind them of their obligations, when he is offended. Gaydamak has been threatening in a similar fashion. They are about to learn that such tactics do npt avail them much, if their objective is to inspire the teams they put their money on to win public trust.

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MOSCOW (Mineweb.com) — It was a year ago when the President of the Sakha republic in fareastem Siberia, Vyacheslav Shtirov, was summoned to :the Kremlin for a meeting with President Vladimir Putin. That was not a jolly exchange of seasonal cheer; and because certain New Year promises that were made then have not been kept, Putin is considering flying east to drop down Shtirov’s chimney for Christmas.

Actually, according to the Russian tradition, Dyed Moroz (“Father Frost”, aka Saint Nicholas, Santa Claus) uses the front-door when he makes his annual visit to children, as he is always accompanied by Snegourochka (“Snow Girl”). It can happen that she is late. Then Dyed Moroz is obliged to ask the children to call out aloud to summon her. Those who can shout the loudest are motivated by the idea of catching the old duffer’s attention, and if they are lucky, first pick at his bag of Christmas rewards. Once Snegourochka arrives, Dyed Moroz reviews who has been on his best behaviour for the past year. Asked who has been naughty, the children naturally scream their noes, and again, those who cry loudest hope to be rewarded first and best.

Putin is less impressed by no-screaming. Recently, Shtirov launched a local political initiative, gathering signatures of Sakha residents who say they want Shtirov to be appointed by Putin to a new term in office. Shtirov’s first term expires in 2006. He had been elected as the Kremlin’s candidate to replace the republic’s godfather, Mikhail Nikolaev, after the latter crossed Putin by trying to arrange local support to run for a third term, which wasn’t altogether legal at the time, and worse – it wasn’t what the Kremlin wanted.

For more than a decade, Nikolaev had arranged with former President Boris Yeltsin that, in return for supporting him against parliament, throwing the region behind him on presidential election day, and sharing such diamond revenues as Yeltsin needed or wanted, Nikolaev could run the republic, and manage its assets exactly as he saw fit. Since Sakha’s principal assets are its diamond-mines, and the cashflow of Alrosa – the largest producer of diamonds in the world after De Beers – Nikolaev naturally saw to it that his trusties controlled the company. Shtirov was one of them – first a republic administrator, then prime minister in Yakutsk, and finally chief executive of Alrosa.

Putin did not suffer from Yeltsin’s political insecurities. Believing he was safer if he put an end to these regional satrapies, and retrieved control of the cash that gave the satraps their power, he ordered Nikolaev to give up the presidency, and seated him, with a conditional immunity from prosecution, in the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the federal parliament. Shtirov was told he was to vacate his seat at Alrosa, and become Nikolaev’s successor as president of the republic. But there was a condition. Shtirov was to understand that he was the federal government’s custodian of the diamond assets, and that he was to return them to federal government control.

Shtirov is a bigger, burlier man than Nikolaev. But what he lacks in the agility of his former patron, he makes up for in stubbornness. As the years of his term have rolled towards its conclusion, Shtirov has done as little as possible to divest the republic’s asset, and return them to Moscow’s charge. He is also much tougher than the man Putin put officially in charge of the return of assets – Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin.

When Shtirov used to take the De Beers management out on fishing expeditions, he would always surprise with his fisherman’s good humour.Kudrin is about as charming as the fish. A protege of Anatoly Chubais from St.Petersburg, he rose through federal government ranks with the skills of a chartered accountant, and, by comparison with Chubais, Mikhail Kasyanov, and other predecessors at the federal treasury, slower fingers. Putin thought he could trust Kudrin to take charge of Sakha, Alrosa, and the diamond cash. But in the contest between Kudrin’s fingers and Shtirov’s feet, it is the latter which have been winning.

Kudrin has pressed Shtirov to sign one protocol of obligations after another, returning assets Nikolaev had squirreled away from Moscow’s control, in order to add them to the capital of Alrosa, and the federal revenue base. Shtirov has procrastinated with his signature, and then dug in his heels against implementation. The federal shareholding in Alrosa should already have reached 51%, according to the plans drafted by Kudrin’s subordinates in the federal Finance Ministry. But even as chairman of the Alrosa board, clearly out¬ranking Shtirov, Kudrin hasn’t been able to extract compliance from Shtirov, or the transfer of the assets.

In fact, Kudrin’s desk is now so stacked with orders from his superiors that he cannot discharge, he too is in danger of receiving a visit from an unwelcome visitor down his chimney. The failure of both Shtirov and Kudrin to bring the $2 billion annual revenue of Alrosa under the Kremlin control Putin wants would already have been the end of them, if $2 billion in diamond revenues could match the size of the sums Russia’s principal mineable resources currently fetch. Shtirov has thought that the sum was small enough to be overlooked, while he played his waiting-game.

A year ago, on December 28, 2004, Putin gave Shtirov his marching orders. After a proposed meeting of the two men in the Kremlin was recently called off, sources close to Putin indicate that he’s prepared to spend Orthodox Christmas in Sakha. According to Shtirov’s office in Yakutsk, and Nikolaev’s office in Moscow, there is no information about this possibility, and no confirmation that it will happen.

The Kremlin pressure continues to build up on Alrosa, and for Alexander Nichiporuk, the first chief executive of the company appointed by Moscow, not by Yakutsk, this is a severe testing time. For if Shtirov can defy the Kremlin, and Kudrin proves too weak to implement his orders, how can Nichiporuk pilot the company into next year’s enormous challenges?

Last week, at the traditional end-of-year press conference at Alrosa headquarters in Moscow, Nichiporuk did the best he could to emphasize the positive. Alrosa and its affiliated companies have lifted the value of their production this year by 17% to reach Rb72 billion ($2.5 billion). Cost of production rose slightly less fast at 15% to Rb53 billion ($1.8 billion), and profit after tax was Rb14.9 billion ($520 million). Total investment for 2005 was Rb14 billion ($486 million). This is to be cut to Rb12.3 billion for 2006.

Among the positives in addition to the balance-sheet, Nichiporuk cited the completion of the company’s social investment plan; expansion of diamond exploration in both western Sakha and northwestern Russia; and the launching of new ore-processing plants at Alrosa’s mining operations in Angola.

If he was discreet about the internal troubles brewing at home, Nichiporuk was forthright about the unprecedented external pressure Alrosa is facing on its export marketing system. He confirmed that the European Commission (EC) in Brussels has proposed a total ban on diamond trading between Alrosa and De Beers, to start in 2009. He added, however, that this is still to be negotiated, and is far from decided. “The idea is to cancel trading between the two named companies to create competition and avoid monopolization,” Nichiporuk acknowledged, after spokesmen for the EC have tried denying what the EC has formally communicated to both Alrosa and De Beers. “The background is that, even if one company [Alrosa] is not under EU jurisdiction and another [De Beers’s Diamond Trading Company] only by half, since the trading is happening on EU territory, the [EU] can apply the rules.” Referring to the changeover this year of commissioners and staffs at the EC headquarters in Brussels, Nichiporuk added: “We had a good understanding with the previous commissioner on that issue, and no discussions with the new one.”

At this point, the unprecedented attempt by the EC to order the two companies, the two largest producers of diamonds in the world, to cease trading with one another at the end of 2008, has produced no comment from De Beers, and no stated willingness by either side to threaten a legal challenge to the ban in court. In 2005, according to Nichiporuk, Alrosa has supplied $680 million worth of rough to the DTC, representing 45% of total export value. He said that the value of exports allowed by Alrosa’s multi-year export quota is 20% higher than actual value shipped this year.

In 2004, Alrosa warned that an EC decision forcing “an overly rapid or extensive reduction or termination of our sales to De Beers could have an adverse impact on our sales.” Negotiators for Alrosa and De Beers are now discussing in Brussels, not only the cut-off and the deadline, but also the value for trade allowable in the years that remain before the cutoff takes effect. The trade agreement between Alrosa and De Beers, which the EC is reviewing, was signed at the end of 2001 and anticipated five years of sales at an average of $800 million per annum. Internal pressure among Alrosa’s senior management, and from the federal government, to break out of these terms has curtailed this level of annual shipments by roughly 15% since the signing. If the EC goes ahead with the trade ban, the current value of shipments to De Beers may decline to $600 million in 2006, and then around $500 million per annum in 2007 and 2008. By then, roughly 25% of Alrosa’s rough production, or less, would go to De Beers. What has been an effort-free trading partnership for the Nikolaev-Shtirov regime is now a major management challenge for the federal managers. The deadlines imposed by the EC are naturally increasing the impatience Nichiporuk and the Kremlin feel towards Shtirov’s attempts to prevent the reorganization of shareholding control.

According to Nichiporuk, forward planning by the company anticipates the total elimination of annual diamond export quotas, issued by the federal government and signed by the Kremlin, which have caused repeated delays in shipment of rough from the new Nyurba mine in Yakutia. In addition, Nichiporuk said, the company plans to allocate up to 65% of its rough output each year to a stable list of sightholders, and the remainder to auctions and tender sales. Independent selling outlets will be multiplied, adding Israel and Dubai to the one already in operation in Antwerp. With international demand for rough expected to remain high, and supply short for the foreseeable future, Alrosa should be able to create an effective, independent marketing system in the time that is left. Putin, however, is unwilling to cede the benefits of the new scheme to the old gang in Yakutsk.

Nichiporuk must therefore demonstrate fresh loyalty, and imagination, onshore and abroad.

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By John Helmer in Moscow

The two dominant Australian vices are not indigenous.

Envy came with the Irish Catholics, who were at first the convict, then the indentured, and finally the working class. Hypocrisy came with the English Protestants, who began their economic enterprise in the country by declaring the land unoccupied (“terra nullius” was the pseudo-legal expression), the property of noone, and hence the right of the Crown and the colonial administration to distribute. That began one of the nineteenth century’s first and most methodical genocides of an indigenous people: their exit provides Australian farmers and miners today with their most under-valued asset, land. Whenever Australians preach to Europeans about state subsidization of their agriculture, they forget that, just two centuries ago, they obtained their farmland at zero-cost by killing the owners; and at marginal extra cost by employing prisoners to clear and tend the land thus acquired. It takes English hypocrisy to forget that; and Irish envy to claim that the resulting rural productivity is superior to Europe’s.
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MOSCOW (Mineweb.com) –The two dominant Australian vices are not indigenous.

Envy came with the Irish Catholics, who were at first the convict, then the indentured, and finally the working class. Hypocrisy came with the English Protestants, who began their economic enterprise in the country by declaring the land unoccupied (“terra nullius” was the pseudo-legal expression), the property of no-one, and hence the right of the Crown and the colonial administration to distribute.

That began one of the nineteenth century’s first and most methodical genocides of an indigenous people: their exit provides Australian farmers and miners today with their most under-valued asset, land. Whenever Australians preach to Europeans about state subsidization of their agriculture, they forget that, just two centuries ago, they obtained their farmland at zero-cost by killing the owners; and at marginal extra cost by employing prisoners to clear and tend the land thus acquired. It takes English hypocrisy to forget that; and Irish envy to claim that the resulting rural productivity is superior to Europe’s.

Last week, in a fit of both, a former jackeroo and rural property speculator, currently Australia’s Minister of Trade, Mark Vaile, claimed that, although Australia supports Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Australia is unsatisfied with its access to Russian markets. Indeed, Australia is one of the last four WTO member-states whose refusal to sign bilateral agreements blocks formal Russian accession. The other three are the US, Colombia, and Switzerland. By the end of last week’s Hong Kong round of WTO ministerial meetings, all 149 WTO members had agreed to accession, save these four.

What makes Australia’s position of interest to the international mining community is the repeated claim by Vaile’s ministry that Russian must grant access to Australian “mining-related services.” Australia’s international mining peers – Canada and South Africa, for example – have already negotiated their accession terms with Moscow, but without referring to “mining-related services”. Although US demands for access to the Russian services market are considerable, and financial services such as insurance and banking are the crux of the argument, mining services aren’t at stake for the Americans.

A year ago, a Canberra statement on the Russian WTO negotiations – which first began in 1995 – referred to the fact that “Australia is seeking commitments from Russia to guarantee levels of access to a number of sectors such as mining-related services”. In a more recent ministry paper entitled Russia Country Brief, it is claimed that “Australian mining and mining services companies are interested in prospects in the Russian far east, particularly Sakhalin Island’s oil and gas projects.” The only example of such a service trade referred to in the Brief is the sale of software by Mincom to Norilsk Nickel. But its principal mines are in northwestern Russia, not the fareast, and they are hard-rock, not oil and gas.

The dominant trade item in Australia’s relationship with Russia is alumina, produced by Comalco and others in Queensland, and sold to the Russian Aluminium (Rusal) group of Moscow, owned by Oleg Deripaska. Deripaska’s only bauxite mine is at Achinsk, in western Siberia.

The alumina trade has traditionally taken such a large proportion of Australia’s export aggregate to Russia – about US200 million in 2004-05 — that a precise figure is not cited in the trade statistics. Rusal is also referred to in the government’s trade papers as the dominant Russian investor in Australia – with the 20% shareholding stake it acquired last year from Kaiser in the Queensland Alumina refinery. Ever since then, Australian trade and provincial government officials have been falling over themselves to ingratiate Rusal.

If there is to be a market in “mining-related services” produced by Australian companies, the likelihood is that its principal Russian clientele includes Deripaska; the owners of Norilsk Nickel; and other resource giants of the Russian economy. With putative clients like these, it is understandable perhaps that Vaile’s brief on Russia hints at regret at losing a potential client in Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the fraudster whose Yukos oil company has been taken over by the state. But it was not commercial operators like Yukos, which had any interest in the capital-intensive projects of Sakhalin. There, state-controlled Russian oil companies are partners with such western majors as Shell and Exxon.

Understandable also that Vaile’s brief omits to refer to the biggest Australian investment loss in Russia. That occurred in 1997, when the Star Mining group’s right to mine the Sukhoi Log gold deposit was revoked, and its shareholding stake in local partner Lenzoloto diluted to non-significance. The current beneficiary of that misfortune is Mincom’s client, Norilsk Nickel.

Five years ago, when Vaile’s predecessor Tim Fischer was negotiating the terms Canberra wanted to see for Russian accession to the WTO, not a word was said about the ill-fated Star and its investors. The emphasis was clearly on agricultural products. Australia insisted that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bankruptcy of the Kremlin treasury through the 1990s, Russia should commit to supporting its agricultural sector by the average budget value of the years, 1995-97. In fact, as Canberra acknowledged, so sharply had state funds (for energy, fuel, seeds, fertilizer, commodity price supports) fallen at the time, the Producer Subsidy Equivalent for Russia had become negative -minus 26% in 1993, minus 9% in 1994. That means the state was taking more money out of farming than it was putting in! Not even Australia could match that fiscal performance. Russian officials argued that those were exceptional years, and proposed the last years of the USSR, 1989-91, as the baseline, when the Producer Subsidyequivalent for Russia was 75%,

Of course, that was communism. The rural political party, which Vaile currently heads in Australia’s governing coalition, has made a career of winning votes on the basis of hating communists for their ideology, but catering to their appetites – especially for wheat, wool, meat, and sugar. It was, in fact, the Soviet system’s capacity to import Australian commodities, on which Vaile’s farm constituents all depended for their well-being. When the Soviet Union fell, the Australian government was left holding enormous bills for wheat and wool; huge unsellable stockpiles; and falling prices.

Today, Australia is far too marginal in the international meat and sugar trade to be in a position to hold up Russian accession to the WTO on behalf of beef offal and frozen lamb. As for sugar, Vaile’s ministry is on record as favouring the total dismantling of beet sugar production in the cold-climate countries of Europe, so as to allow cane sugar producers in the hot territories to prosper. And so, Vaile has become the miner’s friend, a unique canary whose warning of market access problems was apparently sung at Russian trade negotiators last week in Hong Kong.

They responded with uncharacteristic bluntness. Russia is “skeptical”, reported RIA-Novosti, a state news agency, that “Australia regards itself as a protector of moral standards in the WTO”. “Nobody asked it to play this role”, reported an “informed source in the Russian delegation.” Australian demands in the bilateral negotiation with Russia are “rather unfair”, the source is reported as thinking.

Russia’s import business has been such a hugely corrupt sector since Boris Yeltsin saw to the dismantling of the Soviet state, it has been impossible for Russia’s trade negotiators to represent anything like the national interest, let alone balance impoverished consumers against powerful traders, or vested producer interests. For one thing, for the entire decade of WTO negotiations, the Russian government has produced no detailed White Paper weighing accession’s benefits against its costs, and identifying those Russian sectors iikely to gain, or likely to lose. The government has not encouraged a public debate on trade policy. Nor has federal parliament taken the initiative to legislate the kind of trade supports and conditionalities, which are a feature of democracies like Australia and the US. Russia has been targeted for countless anti-dumping penalties in the international steel industry, but it has never retaliated.

But so dominant and powerful has Russia become as a global energy supplier, there is considerable sentiment in the domestic business community, as well as in the Kremlin, to suggest there may be little value in joining the WTO – at least not at the price demanded by the hold-out member-states.

And so, what exactly is Australia demanding from Russia on the commodity and resource playing-field, on which it likes to piay?

When asked by Mineweb to explain what he is after in the Russian market for “mining-related services”, and what Russian obstacles he would like to dismantle, Vaile refused to say. Instead, a spokeswoman claimed: “Unfortunately a number of the questions you raise relate to issues that are the subject of continuing bilateral negotiations between Australia and Russia as part of Russia’s WTO accession commitments, and we do not wish to comment on them at this time.” John Larkin, who heads a WTO negotiations section in the Australian Embassy in Geneva, also refused to be specific, either as to the Australian claim, or the Russian response.

Russian goldminers told Mineweb they had heard nothing of the Australian demand. A source close to the federal ministry in charge of licensing mining projects said the ministry had not been consulted on this issue, and could scarcely imagine what the Australians have in mind. Russian geologists and other mining professionals currently work with international mining consultancies, as well as western mining companies, to meet Russian regulatory and statutory requirements for mining projects. Bateman of South Africa has operated a Moscow office for years, as have Canadian and other international consultancies. According to a Natural Resource Ministry source, the market in feasibility study work is a professionally competitive one, and hardly the subject for foreign trade demands.

One Russian trade negotiator said he was reluctant to get into detail about the Australian demand “because we don’t want to warm up the situation.” His superior was no less solicitous, but revealed that what the Australians are really after is access to Russia’s enormous geological archives. “The key issue,” the source told Mineweb, “was the access of Australian companies (and other countries as well) to study Russian deposits, in order that Russia should obligate itself to give access for foreign companies to Russian deposits.”

This is a highly sensitive issue, and it is no longer surprising why Vaile is trying to hide it. In essence, the Australian government is demanding access to the accumulated capital of Soviet geology, covering the entire mineral wealth of the country. Implicit in the demand is the discovery that the communist regime produced a bonanza of geological studies which, according to the Australian concept of how the mining-game is played, should be made freely available to Australian mining companies or consultants. This is the new concept of “terra nullius”. Nothing the Soviets did should be deemed to have any property value to their successors, at least not once an Australian explorer or entrepreneur has set foot on the territory.

The Russians have no intention of agreeing, although, so far, they are being polite. “We were able to explain to the Australian side that this is impossible due to current legislation,” the trade negotiator said in Moscow today. He went on to add: “the situation will change somewhat after the new Subsoil Law will be implemented.”

That legislation – prematurely introduced in the State Duma a few weeks ago, and withdrawn for further amendment — sets out for the first time a set of strategic mineral and underground resource deposits which non-Russian miners will not be permitted to develop. It’s possible that BHP Biiliton, Australia’s biggest miner, may have told Vaile to use the WTO talks to lobby for access to Russian diamond deposits that BHP has spent three unsuccessful years pursuing. If so, Vaile will fail, as surely as BHP.

The outcome for BHP is unremarkable. The Melbourne management can at least comfort itself by noting that it lost far more money pursuing diamond, oil, and copper projects in Russia a decade ago, than it has done so far in this decade.

Vaile’s performance is a failure in quite a different class. As the Russian trade negotiators hinted in Hong Kong, the rhetorical role of moral guardian of free trade is a bad joke. What Vaile has been doing is lobbying the Russians for a narrow commercial mining interest he doesn’t dare reveal. Down with the level playing-field! Up with the fix! And a hearty cheer for Australian hypocrisy!

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MOSCOW (Mineweb.com) – At the start of Raymond Chandler’s last novel,the private detective Philip Marlowe is on watch at the Los Angeles railway station. “There was nothing to it,” he says to himself. “The subject was easy to spot as a kangaroo in a dinner jacket.”

Later, after trailing her to a hotel room down the Pacific coast, he observes: “She didn’t look like a tramp and she didn’t look like a crook. Which meant only that she could be both with more success than if she had.”

Two weeks ago, when we were on watch outside the London Stock Exchange, ts Vladimir Lisin was advertising to sell 420 million shares in his Russian steel company, Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine (NLMK). A 7-percent shareholding in a company with revenues of almost $5 billion, its own iron-ore mines, and cash in the bank of almost $2 billion, and Lisin was as obvious as the kangaroo. With a little help from the BBC, his dinner jacket was also showing. “A former welder,” reported the epitome of British newsworthiness, Lisin is “already estimated to be Russia’s second richest man.” He was letting his shares slip, he told the BBC, to “raise Novolipetsk’s international profile.”

Two weeks later, after the Financial Times had trailed him to a hotel suite, Lisin complained that reporting of Russian business might be “scaring people away”. He added that he wasn’t selling because he lacked faith in Russia as a place to do business. And he was tired, he said, of the behaviour of foreign investors who “spend their time asking the [Russian] government what it can give them. What would you think of me,” he asked the FT, or none in particular, “if I came to the UK and concentrated my time on asking the British government for some sort of preferential treatment?”

Here was the innocent, to be sure, certain the FT reporter hadn’t read the small print in the NLMK prospectus. If he had, he might have spotted Lisin’s hostility towards the Russian government for not assuring him the preferential tax, transport, anti-trust, and power supply tariffs on which the profitability of his steelmaking depends. And also Lisin’s hostility towards the media, which “regularly published slanted articles in return for payment.” And then there are the disclosures of the two UK companies, through which Lisin trades much of his steel company’s metal, and possibly also its profit.

But wait – the appearances of things are getting ahead of the things themselves.

According to the official announcement, as of last Friday, December 9, the owner of NLMK (also called Novolipetsk Steel), Russia’s fourth largest steel producer, and also its most profitable steelmill, had sold his bloc of shares at $1.45 per unit, for a personal take of $609 million. Is this the dinner-jacket, or the kangaroo?

During year-long preparations for the share sale, Lisin had indicated that he wanted to raise more than three times as much, or almost $2 billion from the listing. In April, NLMK confirmed that it had secured permission of the Russian securities regulator, the Federal Service for Financial Markets, to sell 1.498 billion shares, or 25.1% of the existing stock, on a foreign exchange. At the time, Lisin’s holding was 95.6%. The big sale was scheduled for June, but then called off.

In August of this year, Lisin arranged for the sale of two blocs of shares,totaling 3.34%, to two companies, Costen and Akractos; these are in turn owned by members of the management or board of directors of NLMK, or its affiliated companies. Another 1.2% bloc was also sold to Trixton, a company indirectly owned by the steel trading companies Lisin controls for NLMK’s exports. These transactions appear to have been a form of untaxable share option distribution, with a purchase price below $1.20, and no payment required until December 31, 2006.

Another 1.2% was sold by Lisin, also last August, to unaffiliated investors. That left him in control of 89.85% of NLMK’s shares at the listing announcment, when it finally came on November 24. After the placement of the shares was announced last Friday, Lisin continues to hold at least 82% of the shares through Cyprus-registered and other offshore companies.

Disclosures in the NLMK prospectus, despite its highly restricted circulation, appear to have lowered the bidding price for the NLMK shares by 3%, compared to the Moscow stock exchange price on December 9; and by 8% off the peak which NLMK’s stock hit on the Russian stock index, just before the formal announcement to list on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) was issued. The market capitalization of the steelmaker has been cut by more than half a billion dollars since Lisin engaged investment banks UBS and Merrill Lynch, and Financial Dynamics, a London public relations firm, to promote the sale of his shareholding.

Neither NLMK, nor Lisin’s London spokesman, Jon Simmons, agreed to release the prospectus, nor answer detailed questions relating to the way in which Lisin has organized the steelmaking company, its raw material suppliers, and trading units.

Unlike the Russian steel companies which have preceded Lisin on to international markets – Mechel at the New York Stock Exchange in October 2004; Evraz at the LSE last July — the NLMK document of almost 300 pages was not prepared in pdf format, easy to transmit electronically from fund manager to manager, brokerage to client. Instead, it was circulated in a bound hard-copy that could not be easily machine-scanned or copied. Photo-copying the prospectus by hand requires several hours.

Once available, however, the prospectus makes the unusual statement up front that the principal risk to investors in buying NLMK shares from Lisin is “our controlling shareholder’s ability to exert significant influence over us [NLMK].”

That he had already done what he could to raise the selling price was also disclosed. In a note to the accounts, in 2002 an $85 million interest-free, 2-year loan of NLMK funds was issued to LKB Invest to facilitate purchase of shares in NLMK. The borrowing unit was then absorbed by LLC Rumelco, owned by Lisin, and the loan paid off in 2003.

Although considerable historical and financial detail is revealed for the first time about Lisin’s acquisition of the steel plant from the Trans World group of London, controlled by the Reuben brothers, a significant omission is the ownership and operation of three trading companies — Steelco Mediterranean Trading of Cyprus, Moorfield Commodities and Tuscany Intertrade, both of the UK.

According to the prospectus, these three are “independent wholesale traders”. There is a “long term strategic partnership”, agreed in October 2004 for three years, between these companies and NLMK for sale of at least 70% of NLMK’s steel exports. In 2004, the percentage was 90%; this year to September 30, the percentage has been 85%. Nothing about the ownership of the traders is disclosed, except that they are “under common ownership” and “unrelated parties to NLMK”.

By press time, Lisin’s spokesman did not respond to questions about who owns, controls or benefits from their operations. If, as industry sources believe likely, the trading companies are controlled by Lisin, then he is able to vary the export pricing of NLMK’s products, so as to enhance, or detract from, the cashflow and profitability of NLMK’s domestic operations and its balance-sheet. In current market conditions, that may be of little concern to investors – NLMK reports that as of September 30, it held cash and cash equivalent of $1.93 billion, with debt of just $19.9 million.

Precise financial details of the export revenues are not disclosed in the prospectus. However, data reported on export percentages indicate that exports amounted to 74% of NLMK’s sales revenues in 2004; or about $3.3 billion in value. This year, the proportion changed significantly, with just 58% of sales revenues accounted for by exports in the first nine months of the year; for a value of $1.9 billion. According to a note to the accounts, prepared by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, the three trading companies owed NLMK about $294 million at December 31, 2004; by September 30, this was $238 million. The prospectus reports that the traders must make payment within 60 days of delivery of goods, but concedes: “any failure by these international wholesale traders to satisfy their payment obligations to us may adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations.” The company also concedes that Russian law on transfer pricing between related companies could have a detrimental impact on the group’s financial results.

At the same time, and in parallel, NLMK reports that it has reduced the proportion of low-value pig iron and slabs in its export shipments, while raising the share of relatively high-value hot and cold-rolled steel, and grain oriented steel. NLMK’s export destinations have also shifted, with declines in shipments to the European Union and North America, and offsetting increases in shipments to Asia.

The consolidated structure of the NLMK company, as reported in the prospectus, includes three mining units, the most important of which is Stoilensky ore-processing combine (GOK), the iron-ore supplier, for which NLMK appears to have paid $659.3 million when it was consolidated into the NLMK structure last year. NLMK reports that it is now self-sufficient in iron-ore. On a stand-alone basis, before consolidation, Stoilensky reported profit in 2004 of $207.8 million; it is the target of an on-going Russian government investigation into price collusion in the iron-ore sector.

Coking-coal production, the second basic raw material requirement for steelmaking, is not consolidated in the NLMK structure as yet, although the prospectus refers to the acquisition in August 2005 of the licence to develop the Zhernovskoe-1 deposit in Kemerovo (Siberia). NLMK says it plans to invest $430 million in the mine over the next four years, and that when fully operational, it will supply 50% of the group’s steelmaking requirement. Who will own the coal mine is not disclosed. The prospectus reports that “we are currently in talks to acquire more than 90% of the shares of a Russian coke producer. As part of this transaction we may also acquire a number of coal producing companies.”

NLMK’s scrap supply requirement, another vital feed for the furnace, is 2.3 million tons, of which 1.4 million tons (60%) are supplied by third parties. Limestone and metallurgical dolomite come from consolidated subsidiaries, while ferroalloys come from third-party suppliers.

Control of transportation , especially maritime outlets for exports, is a key element of the group’s vertical integration, according to the prospectus. However, the document identifies only Tuapse port and related facilities, on the Black Sea, as consolidated within the NLMK group ownership structure. The larger-volume St.Petersburg port company, which Lisin acquired through offshore companies in the past two years, is not included.

Fresh steel assets are very briefly referred to in the prospectus. Lisin appears to have changed his mind regarding expansion abroad. Dan Steel, which he bought in Denmark several years ago, may be sold by him to NLMK, but no decision has been reached. After a period of disclaiming interest in foreign acquisitions, this year Lisin put himself in contention for the Erdemir privatization in Turkey, only to drop out when the bidding price exceeded his target.

NLMK also reports “we are currently in talks to acquire another Russian steel producer specializing in high value-added types of steel.” No details of the target are available.

The key to understanding why Lisin and his bankers and promoters are so furtive about the details of their business lies in their underlying lack of confidence that they can count on hanging on to it. Notwithstanding what he told the Financial Times, Lisin and the NLMK management don’t really enjoy the Russian business environment. Corruption is rife in the courts, NLMK declares in the prospectus – and not only there. Challenges to the way in which the steel plant was privatized – its employee vouchers bought up by Trans World, Cambridge Capital Management, Boris Jordan, and Vladimir Potanin -could still occur, and heavy back-tax claims could be imposed. “Signs of a breakdown in the consensus among key government officials are beginning to appear”, the prospectus concedes, arousing apprehension.

The case of convicted Yukos oil company fraudsters Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev is reported in the prospectus as a serious omen for Russia’s largest asset holders. Lisin isn’t about to concede the folly of Khodorkovsky’s attempt to sell up to 40% of his oil assets to a US oil company, despite a Kremlin veto. But he has been careful to apply for government permission to sell his stake;and even more cautious to keep it small. Steelmaking, iron-ore and coal mining could be strategic to Russia’s economic security, the prospectus acknowledges, and thus the permissible scope of Lisin’s future ownership of these assets uncertain.

This, then, is the strategic problem for Lisin, and others with similarly large resource and commodity holdings. To acquire them, and then secure them from counter-attack, a decade ago, required vertical integration from raw material to production plant and transport outlet; with the shareholdings distributed in chains of offshore companies so numerous and complex as to defy investigation and defeat unravelling . To achieve market value, however, requires consolidation of shareholdings, assets and cashflows; audited financial reports and disclosure of related party transactions; the appearance of tax compliance; and market assessment of risk.

Lisin, like other major Russian asset-holders, can’t let go of the trading chain he created a decade ago, and the prospectus reveals how limited to date the consolidation process of the NLMK group has gone. Lisin is simply keeping some of his most valuable eggs out of the basket. Were there to be an attack by a domestic rival on the core steelmaking plant, or a squeeze on raw material or energy supplies, he could quickly transform his existing structure into a heavily indebted shell, with the profits exported to the safe havens he continues to operate offshore. That Lisin is less inclined to do this than some of his peers in Russian metals is to his credit.

But he also undermines the credibility of his ambition by one of the worst disclosure records in the Russian steel sector. The investment market, according to the NLMK prospectus – if you can find a copy, break open its spine, and analyze what is missing — should deliver a vote of confidence in Lisin’s share price. But he has structured his group, and his listing, in a fashion that suggests he takes more seriously the Russian risks adumbrated in the prospectus than he asks investors to accept. Anything discovered to the contrary must be “slanted in return for payment”. The kangaroo in the dinner jacket.

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MOSCOW (Mineweb.com)-Despite the visit this month to Moscow of a 64-person delegation of South African government and corporate officials – the largest ever to come to Russia – the outcome appears to be a cooling in mutual sentiment. One-sided lobbying by Russia’s natural resources minister, Yury allies is one of the reasons. Reluctance to challenge him on the part of his SA counterparts is another.

On the Russian side, there is unspoken frustration at the year-long campaign by President Thabo Mbeki to secure a South African seat in the expanded UN Security Council, without sufficient consensus from other UN members.

Sources in Moscow are aware that Mbeki made the admission of South Africa to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council a personal priority this year.

High-level African sources, present at the G-8 summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, in early July told Mineweb that they believed Mbeki, attending as one of several African Union observers, had asked President Vladimir Putin for Russia’s support of SA’s Security Council plan. All that Russian spokesmen would say about their conversation was that “the development of bilateral economic relations was discussed.” Regarding talk of a UN seat for SA, the Russian Foreign Ministry said they “do not have such operational information”.

Mbeki then ordered Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, to Moscow to meet her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov on July 12. In no uncertain terms, she was told that Russia would not support expansion of the UN Security Council unless there were demonstrable backing from the entire UN membership, a point which Dlamini-Zuma could not demonstrate. The Russian Foreign Ministry then issued a brief communique confirming that Dlamini-Zuma had made the UN Security Council her priority. But the diplomatic language treated the SA initiative coolly.

Dlamini-Zuma returned to the same issue again, when she met Lavrov in Moscow on October 6. By then, most UN representatives had concluded that seating African states in the Security Council had been effectively stopped by US action. Why then were Mbeki and Dlamini-Zuma insistently repeating their request for Russian backing?

Lavrov’s ministry issued a new communique, acknowleding Dlamini-Zuma’s visit, and repeating that “reform of the United Nations” should be carried out “on the basis of the widest consent, and what is even better, the consensus of member states.”

There was nothing new in the Russian position, and officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) IN Pretoria claim the Russians are “still open” on Security Council reform, adding that “the situation is changing all the time,” Dlamini-Zuma and Lavrov are reported to be personally on the best of terms.

When great powers meet, there usually is no time for senior officials to address more than a handful of priority concerns at a sitting. For several years, the South African priority in Moscow was to lift a 5% import duty penalty which South African exports to Russia were trading under, compared to rivals in South America. That penalty was finally removed in 2002.

This year, the priority has been the UN Security Council seat, and Mbeki has obliged Dlamini Zuma to expend most of her time on that, aware that other African states with Security Council ambitions were dangling the possibility of oil concessions and other inducements to Russian oil companies who have clout with the Kremlin.

Nigeria, South Africa’s leading rival for the Security Council, has clashed with Minister Lavrov over the detention in a Lagos prison for two years, without trial, of Russian seamen caught up in an oil smuggling scheme, masterminded by Nigerian officials. On the other hand, the Nigerian government recently offered an oil exploration concession to LUKoil – a name that will appear again in this story. Egypt, another candidate for a Security Council seat, has already granted LUKoil a concession.

On the South African side, sources at major mining companies express concern that South African government officials, including the new Minister of Minerals and Energy, Lindiwe Hendricks, have done too little to deal with Russian restrictions on South African mining companies investing in Russia; and perhaps too much to endorse Russian involvement in the South African mining sector.
It has been customary for the two governments to issue a detailed report on the results of their annual inter-government commission on trade and economic cooperation (ITEC). At the conclusion of the last session in Moscow in 2003, the joint communique ran for four single-spaced typed pages. In one excerpt, the two governments “undertook to encourage South African business and capital investments in the Russian economy.” There was no reference then, or since, to the most obvious restriction on South African mining investment in Russia — the statutory 49% limit on foreign control of a Russian diamond-mining venture.

A source at DFA in Pretoria claimed that the minutes of the latest round of talks in Moscow were signed, and a press conference held to discuss the results. Lasting 12 minutes, this set a speed record.

Instead, Russia’s co-chairman at ITEC, Yury Trutnev, the Minister of Natural Resources since 2003, issued a summary of his own interests as expressed at a meeting with counterpart, South Africa’s Minister of Minerals & Energy, Lindiwe Hendricks. Trutnev repeated previous promotional statements he has made on behalf of the Renova group’s plan to mine manganese in the Kalahari.

DME’s head of licensing, Jacinto Rocha, told Mineweb in August that he had issued a manganese exploration and mining licence to Pitsa ya Setshaba, Renova’s BEE partner. It is unclear, however, whether Renova, owned by Russian metals oligarch Victor Vekselberg, intends to bring significant cash into South Africa for the project, honouring its pledge to DME to bring foreign investment into the country; or else borrow funds from South African banks.

DME appears to be unaware that in recent weeks, following a spate of disclosures in the Ukrainian media and statements by Ukrainian government officials, Renova has been accused of corruption to obtain shareholding control of the Nikopol manganese processing plant in the Ukraine. Action by the Ukrainian courts has blocked Renova’s manganese investment there, at least for the time being.Following his meeting with Hendricks, Minister Trutnev also announced that he had met with a delegation from De Beers. Russian sources confirm there was such a meeting; and that it lasted for a few minutes. Neither De Beers nor Alrosa has reported publicly on the meeting, and both were surprised when Trutnev did so.

The two world leaders in diamond mining are quietly assembling a work group to consider joint exploration for diamonds in northwestern Russia. However, a significant obstacle to cooperation remains existing, as well as new Russian legislation preventing foreign diamond-miners from mining any diamonds they
discover.

Hendricks did not issue her own communique.lt appears that she failed to ask Trutnev why Russian legislation is becoming increasingly restrictive, and how South African miners could be expected to pursue exploration in Russia, if they cannot be assured of the right to mine what they find.

Trutnev has already demonstrated that he is disinclined to respond to this concern. During last year’s ITEC round in Pretoria, Trutnev was hosted at De Beers headquarters, and asked what he was willing to do to resolve a long-running dispute over the Russian refusal to transfer the mining licence for the Verkhotina project and the Grib diamond pipe in the northwestern region of Arkhangelsk. Trutnev replied that the dispute was a “commercial” one, meaning he did not intend to take any action.

De Beers’s affiliate, Archangel Diamond Corporation (ADC), discovered the pipe with its partner, Arkhangelskgeoldobycha (AGD), in 1996. But the latter then seized the development rights for itself. AGD is controlled by Vagit Alekperov, the CEO of LUKoil, one of Russia’s leading oil producers. Russian mining sources believe Alekperov promoted Trutnev to his post, replacing a minister who was more troublesome for LUKoil than Trutnev has proved to be.

Trutnev hasn’t exactly done nothing, as he implied when speaking to De Beers a year ago. A few months ago, he arranged to replace the head of the supervisory agency responsible for monitoring licence compliance, when it challenged AGD’s performance at the Verkhotina project. Alekperov then went public to defend his pet company. Trutnev’s action eliminated the danger.

According to his public statement, Trutnev claims credit for the fact that De Beers and Alrosa “have agreed upon realization of joint projects in the field of search and prospecting works in the territory of Russia and other countries.” This is false. There is negotiation, but no agreement.

Trutnev went on to claim that his ministry is “developing criteria of reference for sites of sub-soil resources as ‘strategic deposits’.” Actually, Trutnev’s ministry had been doing this for years before he arrived, and the only reason the criteria haven’t been delivered to parliament for enactment is that Russian miners and their government allies have been unable to decide how to mine the treasure themselves.

If large enough to be purportedly strategic, foreign miners will not be able to develop the deposits. In addition to all diamond deposits under the current legislation, this new measure will extend to gold deposits, such as Sukhoi Log; the Udokan copper deposit; and possibly platinum, coal, iron-ore, and other minerals as well.

US, Japanese, Chinese and other government officials have already made clear their dissatisfaction with Trutnev’s arbitrariness, particularly in the oil and gas sector. But as a leader in the hard-rock mining community, the South African government has been silent.

Although it has been one of the proponents of transparent African resource development, the Mbeki administration is well aware of Russian efforts to enter oil and mineral resource exploitation in Angola, Nigeria, Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Why the terms of their entry should be unreciprocated by the Russian government is the question Hendricks should have raised at ITEC, but didn’t. In short, she failed to do what Russian officials expect their counterparts to do, if they are to earn reciprocity – they should state their national interest, and be serious in pursuing it.

In one of his most detailed statements on Africa this year, President Vladimir Putin had this to say, following a meeting in Moscow with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. One of the topics discussed had been forgiveness of African state debt. Another had been human rights. Putin agreed to Blair’s position on the former. Responding to Blair’s criticism on the latter issue, Putin remarked, according to the following translation: “We all know that African countries used to have a tradition of eating their own adversaries. We do not have such a tradition or process or culture and I believe the comparison between Africa and Russia is not quite just.”

Had Putin’s attention been drawn to Alekperov’s attempt to swallow the diamond deposit he seized from ADC, or Norilsk Nickel’s part in trying to eat Gold Fields, he might have been dissuaded from employing his metaphor at the expense of Africa. In the mineral resource world, eating the adversary is a standard operating option, if not always the wisest procedure. Unless Hendricks and other SA officials demonstrate otherwise, Russians like Trutnev are bound to conclude that there is no objection in Pretoria to the Russian appetite, or their eating habits.

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MOSCOW (Mineweb.com) –Among the world’s top producers of aluminium, all are public companies regulated by the laws, securities market and anti-trust regulations, and disclosure requirements of the United States and the European Union, save one. The exception is Russian Aluminium (Rusal), which is owned by Oleg Deripaska, a young Russian.

What Deripaska allows to be known is that Rusal sells about 3 million tons of primary metal per annum for about $5 billion in revenues, and carries more than $2 billion in debt. In output volume and market value, Rusal ranks third in the global aluminium league. Alcoa of the US ranks first, with a current market capitalization of $20 billion. Alcan of Canada – which acquired Pechiney of France – ranks second with a market cap of $12 billion. Although the commodity price of aluminium has been climbing, the share price of these two companies has been falling – by roughly 30% apiece so far this year.

Rusal is privately owned by Deripaska. But when he bought out the 50% stake owned by Roman Abramovich and his friends at Millhouse, a London holding, over the past three years, the exit price (still secret) put a valuation of about $8 billion on the entire company. A year or so later, and Moscow investment bankers believe that Rusal is currently worth $10 billion, a purported gain of 25%.

How to realize this value, and enjoy it at the same time, is Deripaska’s biggest problem. How to get him to share it with Russia is the problem to which the Kremlin has been giving attention recently.

Aesop once told the fable of the man who turned his earnings into gold, and buried it. Every day he went to the spot to contemplate how rich he was. But a passing labourer spotted him, dug up the gold, and made off with it. When the owner returned and discovered his loss, he started to tear out his hair. A wise passerby told him not to despair. “When you had all that gold,” he said, “you didn’t really have it.” He advised burying a stone, and imagining it to be gold, for that would serve the same purpose. The moral of his story, Aesop thought, was that possession is nothing – without enjoyment.

Deripaska’s contemplative and recreational habits are a matter of rumour, but his financial strategy is straight out of Aesop. This was made clear by his friend, junior shareholder, and chief executive of Rusal, Alexander Bulygin. He has suggested that the best way to hang on to the gold would be to take it away from Russia, and leave a stone in its place. A few weeks ago, he told the Sunday Times of London – the city where everyone goes to bury their gold, and display their enjoyment – that Rusal is thinking of making a share flotation to foreign investors.

Exaggerating the value of the assets left behind in Russia, and minimizing their indebtedness, he claimed “we are very close to announcing that our company is fully compliant with the principles required by the stock exchanges with regard to issues such as corporate governance, transparency and accounting.”

Bulygin came closer to the truth when he added that Russian “companies are using floats to hedge against political risks. They hope foreign investors will defend them against any politically motivated tax risks.”

As show ponies go for these foreign investors, Deripaska is something of a piebald. He produces the aluminium metal in Russian smelters, but as his former spokesman, Yevgenia Harrison once admitted, most of the value (read profit) in Rusal is earned offshore. “To a very large extent,” she said, “we are processors of imported raw materials. Thus, a relatively large portion of Rusal’s value added is created outside of the Russian Federaton.”

This is done through what are known in the metals trade as tolling schemes. Tolling is a chain of contracts, according to which raw materials, such as alumina, are supplied to a smelter, which electrolyzes it into metal. This is then returned to the owner of the alumina and the trading chain. In Russia, this scheme eliminates 18% internal value-added tax and other taxes payable when the alumina enters the country, and the metal leaves it. But if the scheme is owned and secretly controlled by a single Russian owner, with the objective of avoiding tax, then, according to the letter of the law, it is illegal. The perpetrator of such a scheme could thus be vulnerable to back-tax claims, penalties, and interest.

Deripaska’s domicile and Rusal’s also have enormous tax implications because Russian law on transfer pricing and on tax residency could be interpreted and applied in such a way as find Deripaska, Rusal and Basic Element, Deripaska’s Moscow-based holding, liable for hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars in obligations to the government. That’s what Bulygin has admitted he is afraid of.

It is possible to make a rough calculation of what Rusal avoids paying in tax through its tolling schemes by estimating the difference between the price at which Rusal aluminium is declared when it enters an import market with reliable customs statistics, like the United States; and the price it was declared at for export, when it left the shores of Russia. For the first half of 2004, for example, there was a difference of $423 per ton. Multiplying that by the 525,000 tons imported in the period to the US produces a value of $222 million. The US is not the most significant of Rusal’s export destinations, and if you were to multiply the differential by Rusal’s full export volume, you are likely to guess that the gold Deripaska is burying outside Russia may be worth about $1 billion a year.

That is a lot to gloat over, and enjoy. But it is far too much to hide from passersby. And so, a flotation in London for Rusal is only one of the two big options which Deripaska must now consider, if he is to preserve his fortune. His second option is to follow the example of his fellow oligarch Roman Abramovich, and sell Rusal to the Russian state. Selling, you should understand, is much better than having the property confiscated as the outcome of a tax and fraud claim and a federal prosecution. That has proved to be the fate of the Yukos oil company oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and his fellow shareholders. Deripaska has been taking pains to ensure he does not follow them into exile or prison.

He has, however, acquired a residence in Belgrave Square, London, establishing himself there as England’s 6th richest man. For a time, Downing Street and the Home Office were obliged to issue Deripaska a waiver of the visa ban which had been applied by the US Government, and which, under UK visa rules, is generally applied to the same people the US blackballs. According to an Australian government official, Australia, which belongs to the US-UK intelligence-sharing network, also granted Deripaska a waiver to visit there too.

Then on October 1, Deripaska announced through a brief posting in the Financial Times that he had been granted a visa to enter the US. According to the newspaper, the restriction on Deripaska had just been raised “after the American immigration authorities lifted a long¬standing visa ban. Georgy Oganov, deputy director general of Basic Element, said yesterday US officials had not given any reasons for lifting the ban.”

Oganov should not have said this, because it implied the reasons the ban had been imposed in the first place.

Deripaska has been trying to lift this US visa ban for almost a decade, and he has employed well-known US law firms and Republican Party politicians to lobby in Washington for him. But he has never admitted there was a visa ban – until Oganov did so. This could be why for the past two weeks Oganov has refused to answer questions from Mineweb to clarify what he told the Financial Times. Oganov also ordered his deputy Eleanora Vaitsman, and everyone else in the Basic Element office in Moscow, to pretend that they were not on the receiving end of telephone-calls or emails, seeking clarification of the matter.

For if Deripaska is now free to cross the US border, he is also free to enter US legal jurisdiction to answer the charges the FBI and other investigative and law enforcement agencies have deemed credible enough to block his visa for so long. What these charges are can be found in federal US court documents stretching back for several years. Although the US courts have so far ruled that they had no jurisdiction to try the civil claims, the American press, along with the US stock market regulators, have yet to assess these charges publicly.

Just how damaging this review could be for Deripaska’s prospects of floating Rusal shares to US investors was signaled in a ruling of the federal US District Court for the District of Columbia on September 27. In that case, Deripaska’s fellow Russian oligarchs, Mikhail Fridman and Pyotr Aven, controlling shareholders of the Alfa Bank group, lost a libel suit they had waged for five years against the Center for Public Integrity, an investigative journalism group in Washington, and two journalists who had reported that Fridman and Aven had acted criminally in the acquisition of their Russian assets and fortune. The initial publication had relied on a variety of evidence, including Russian government agency documents, as well as US intelligence agents’ testimony and US government reports.

But federal judge John Bates ruled to dismiss the case without trial, and without cross-examining the documentary evidence or witnesses. In his ruling, the judge declared that, under the US constitution and decided case law, Russian businessmen like Fridman and Aven are “limited public figures for purposes of the public controversy involving corruption in post-Soviet Russia.” The very extent of Fridman’s and Aven’s effort, through media they have sought out, and public relations they have paid for, established themselves as appropriate targets for investigation, criticism, and public opinion. “Serving as the target of criticism -sometimes false — is the burden our system of laws quite consciously places on the shoulders of public figures,” the judge declared.

Now criticism is not something Deripaska tolerates. But he has also found that the best way to deflect, or inhibit criticism is not to sue for libel – he has tried that in Germany – but rather to persuade the managements of publications that Rusal can be a generous donor, sponsor, or advertiser. The effect is a demonstrable loss of editorial interest at several publications in investigating the charges against Deripaska, Rusal and their companies, which have been aired in courts around the world, or settled out of court by payments from Deripaska.

Deripaska has also tried to remove some of the reason for the criticism – the claims that have been lodged in court alleging he stole the assets currently making up Rusal’s value, or defrauded his partners on trading and import-export contracts. A few days ago, the Sunday Times began reporting the most recent case, currently before the High Court in London. “According to court documents seen by the Sunday Times, Ansol [the plaintiff] alleges that Deripaska unlawfully broke the terms of the joint venture by personally brokering a new deal with the president of Tajikistan in which Rusal was granted complete control of the lucrative smelter [in Tajikistan].” Stealing assets is not a new charge Deripaska, Bulygin, and Rusal have faced, and which they consistently deny. But they have settled the other claims, and this is the first time the charges may be tried in an English court.

The Sunday Times went further, reporting the counter-claim in the court documents which contains “serious allegations, including details of a plot by Deripaska’s office to kidnap Nazarov [the smelter’s former supplier and investor].” According to the initially talkative Oganov, “we want to develop our involvement in Tajikistan…Our lawyers are looking at the allegations in the counterclaim. It will take some time but it is a matter for the court.”

Another misspeak by Deripaska’s spokesman, for the London judge has already intimated that he has grave doubts about Rusal’s veracity. According to a court transcript of proceedings in July, Justice William Blackburne said that “on the face of it [Rusal] is as involved in all of this as is Ansol.” That being the case, he surmised, “Rusal is at the back of this and it is the pot calling the kettle black.”

Is Deripaska ready to invite the readers of a Rusal prospectus to put on Blackburne’s judicial wig, and decide whether to put their money in a black pot?

For any man to put his reputation on trial in a court of law, or in the stock market, there is always the risk of adding to his notoriety, and thus, win or lose on the legal issues, to reinforce the impression that he is the very bad man he has been made out, so wrongly, to be. After all, it is not the exoneration, or esteem, of the man in the street, or the reader of newspapers, that an oligarch is seeking when he goes to court. His target is a bankers’ head of risk, the chairman of the credit committee, the insurer of officers and directors’ liability, the independent auditor, and the legal drafter of his next prospectus for an unsecured Eurobond or American Depositary Share. That’s a small, sophisticated audience, who know the unprintable truth. They are not greatly influenced by guilty or innocent verdicts in libel cases.

Deripaska’s men can make mistakes as bad the one Aesop warned of , in the case of the man who stared too hard at the gold he had hidden. Entering the High Court in an attempt to launder the takeover of the Tajikistan aluminium smelter may be recognized as one. Instructing his spokesman to announce his US visa may be another. Both are a funny way of preparing investor sentiment for a Rusal IPO.

But there is an alternative, and it is plain that Deripaska has begun pursuing it.

A direct sale to the Kremlin – I mean the Russian state – is more straightforward to accomplish than selling an IPO to foreign investors. For one thing, there are no international regulations, no disclosure requirements, no accounting rules, no transparency required. The state buyer is also in a position to agree relatively easily to the asking price, if international lenders like Citigroup, BNP Paribas, Morgan Stanley, and so on, are willing to put up the loan money. Securing multi-billion dollar loans for a deal like this has already proved swift and uncomplicated for the banks when the state-owned oil company Rosneft recently took over Yukos; and when Gazprom proposed buying Abramovich and the Millhouse holding out of Sibneft. You might say that so long as President Vladimir Putin appears to be pledging the full value of the state’s credit, and commodity prices can be expected to remain high enough for the payback period, then the banks are only to happy to open their ATMs.

What has yet to happen, however, is that the Kremlin will decide to apply their model of state interest beyond the oil and gas sector of the economy to the metals. That, too, is what Deripaska has had reason to be afraid of, at least until now, not least of all because he is just one of two proprietors of aluminium in Russia; and it might seem to a commonwealth-minded policymaker that everyone would be better off if they were consolidated under control that was invulnerable to offshore supply manipulation, paid taxes, and complied with the law.

Kremlin officials have also noted that Deripaska has appeared to have political ambitions for himself, regionally perhaps to start with, and then perhaps nationally. Then he tried to sell two of his aluminium finishing plants to Alcoa – a deal that offended the national interest lobby in the government for months, until Deripaska found the way, and the means, to persuade officials that they could share in the transaction, and in the offtake of metal, once Alcoa took over producing it.

The cool sentiment towards Deripaska on the part of Putin’s men has also ensured that he was barred from several transactions which he tried to take over on his terms – hydro-electricity generation and heavy-machine building were two in which he has recently failed.

But that does not mean that Deripaska does not have a deal to offer for selling Rusal that would be difficult to refuse – more difficult, that is, for Russian officials than for foreign investors.