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by John Helmer, Moscow 
  @bears_with

Over-confidence in the face of the adversary can be the death of kings.

In the two great battles whose outcomes turned a small, defensive Anglo-Saxon island into an offensive global empire, the Battle of Hastings in 1066 and the Battle of Bosworth Field of 1485, the ruling English kings, Harold Godwinson and Richard III, launched downhill cavalry charges which almost overpowered the invading forces; almost reached the challengers William of Normandy and Henry Tudor; almost killed them. But Harold and Richard were killed instead; their kingdoms were captured.

The lesson of those two cavalry charges led from the front by Harold and Richard has been erased in the story-telling which followed their deaths by the propagandists of William and Henry.

In the present battles with the US and the NATO allies on the Ukrainian battlefield, the Russians could provide an object lesson to the Danes on what they should expect to be done to them by President Donald Trump as he rushes to capture Greenland, confident that the threat of his charge will be enough to force the Danes to surrender, the Greenlanders to capitulate

Danish Prime Minister Mette Fredericksen heard it for herself. “It was horrendous,” said one of the sources in Copenhagen after she and Trump had spoken by telephone last week.  Another source has added: “He was very firm. It was a cold shower. Before, it was hard to take it seriously. But I do think it is serious, and potentially very dangerous…It was a very tough conversation. He threatened specific measures against Denmark such as targeted tariffs.”  This was what was heard and reported to a London newspaper. Prime Minister Fredericksen was shy; she told the Financial Times she does: “not recognise the interpretation of the conversation given by anonymous sources”.  

Officially, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman has declared Russia to be against both Fredericksen and Trump.

Their claims, Maria Zakharova said last Thursday,   “neglect the crux of the issue.” That, she explained, is the concerted Danish campaign to destroy the indigenous identity, culture, and reproduction of the Inuit Greenlanders, combined with the theft and poisoning of their land by US nuclear bomber and submarine bases. “Given the extensive history of colonial exploitation by Denmark and the United States, it is unsurprising that Greenland seeks independence and the establishment of a sovereign state,” Zakharova said.  

No Russian currently engaged in the serious fighting against the US believes in displaying  enthusiasm for either the cavalry charge  or the parley.  Instead, the Russians are preparing to fight Trump’s Greenland move as the opening of a new front to attack Russia from the north.

The US plan of attack on the north front isn’t new with Trump. The recent history of that plan, retold from the Russian point of view, follows.

MAP OF THE ARCTIC REGION, POLAR CENTRIC  

PENTAGON MAP OF ARCTIC COMMANDS, JUNE 2024

Source: https://media.defense.gov/

In the US Defense Department’s “2024 Arctic Strategy” paper, Russia is the principal target, along with Russian-Chinese cooperation in natural resource mining, trade and oil and gas shipping along the Northern Sea Route. “Major geopolitical changes are driving the need for this new strategic approach to the Arctic,” the paper declared, “including Russia’s full-scale [sic] invasion of Ukraine, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the NATO Alliance, increasing collaboration between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, and the accelerating impacts of climate change. This increasingly accessible region is becoming a venue for strategic competition, and the United States must stand ready to meet the challenge alongside Allies and partners.”  

In the Obama Administration prequels of this paper, issued in 2014  and 2016, Russia was not identified as a military target; Greenland wasn’t mentioned at all.  

From 2022 on,  Greenland was identified principally as the site for expanded American basing, firstly for vast new computer communications complexes, and then for projection of sea, air, and cyber weapons against Russia’s “excessive and illegal maritime claims along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) between the Bering Strait and Kara Strait. Russia claims the right to regulate Arctic waters along the NSR in excess of the authority permitted under the United Nations  Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), placing excessive requirements on foreign vessels transiting the route and threatening force against vessels out of compliance with Russian regulations.”     

Source: https://media.defense.gov/.
For a brief review of US proposals to buy Greenland in 1867, 1945, and 2019, read this.   

After the British and Germans have attempted North Front attacks on Russia – the British in 1919;  the Germans in 1941-45  — Russia’s preparations to counter US strategy have a long history.

Under the pressure of the US and NATO sanctions war since 2014, the Russians have been accelerating the buildup of their defences.  “In the Arctic, anything is possible,” reported the security analysis platform Vzglyad on January 15. “The United States has outlined its position and has taken a big step towards the Arctic…its step poses an immediate threat to Russia, because the Americans plan to go to the Arctic with all their weapons.”

“Trump raised the topic of the status of Greenland and Canada for several reasons”, Vzglyad added its interpretation. “First, it is about his political ambitions and the desire to repeat the achievements of Thomas Jefferson, who in 1803 bought Louisiana. Secondly, Trump acts in the interests of the capital behind him, primarily entrepreneur Elon Musk and other leaders of the ‘new economy’ (PayPal group [of Peter Thiel] for example.”

In October 2023 the Russian Government’s regional development minister, Alexei Chekunkov,  announced a list of sixteen priority strongholds in the Arctic.  The list included: the Murmansk cluster including the Northern Fleet base at Severomorsk; the Kirovsk-Apatity cluster; Monchegorsk;  the Kemsky-Belomorsk cluster (Karelia); the Arkhangelsk cluster;  the Naryan-Mar agglomeration (Yamalo-Nenets) including  Novy Urengoy, Noyabrsk, and Salekhard; the Vorkuta agglomeration (Komi); Norilsk, Dudinka, and Dikson in the Krasnoyarsk Krai; Tiksi (Yakutia);  Pevek and Anadyr (Chukotka).  

According to Chekunkov, strategic factors, not population numbers, have dictated the listing. “Russia has every reason to develop its competencies and be the best country in terms of skills and planning for the development of life in the Arctic in settlements of any size. Dikson, with a population of 300 people, should also be a world-class model settlement in its category – it is a strategic point on the route of the Northern Sea Route. Only 300 people – compared with the Arkhangelsk cluster of half a million and the Murmansk cluster of 300,000.  In Dikson, 300 people should receive the best solutions that the world’s urban planners and architects will then apply in their work.”  

MAP OF THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC STRONGHOLDS

CLICK ON IMAGE TO ENLARGE

US MAP OF RUSSIAN MILITARY BASES IN THE ARCTIC, 2016

Source: https://blogs.gwu.edu/

A few weeks later, at a meeting President Putin held in Arkhangelsk on December 11, 2023, the strongholds were described as “core cities”.   “Russia’s Arctic which, as I have said many times, holds special, strategic importance for us,” Putin said. “I would like to emphasise once again that this is a region with enormous economic capacity. The strengthening of the energy potential of our country, the expansion of logistics capabilities, and ensuring national security and defence are largely associated with this region. For this reason, it is an indisputable priority to ensure the further comprehensive development and improvement of these territories. I have discussed this matter with the Government and instructed it to draw up a list of core cities.”

Eleven months following, on November 22, 2024, the Kremlin announced the first meeting of the newly established Council for Defending the National Interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, chaired by Nikolai Patrushev (right), the former secretary of the Security Council. The new council has been tasked with “analysing and identifying national security threats in the Arctic, assessing
the current state and development of international affairs in the Arctic, including the military and political landscape there, as well as efforts to gauge the social and economic situation in the Russian Arctic. Accelerating efforts to develop the Arctic economy and its infrastructure, while ensuring that Russia retains the ability to fully control its Arctic territory, the Arctic shelf and the Northern Sea Route are among the main priorities.”  

Several weeks ago, the Moscow-based think tank, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC),  published its most recent assessment of North Front threats from the US and NATO. RIAC is state funded with additional support from the two oligarch groups, Alfa of Mikhail Fridman and Severstal of Alexei Mordashov.  RIAC describes itself as “a non-profit academic and diplomatic think tank that was established by the resolution of its founders pursuant to presidential decree No. 59‑rp dated 2 February 2010 “On the Establishment of the Non-profit Partnership “Russian International Affairs Council”. RIAC activities are aimed at strengthening peace, friendship and solidarity between peoples, preventing international conflicts and promoting conflict resolution and crisis settlement. RIAC operates as a link between the state, scholarly community, business, and civil society in an effort to find foreign policy solutions to complex conflict issues.”  

The timing of RIAC’s paper is noteworthy – publication was dated November 18, 2024. At that point, Trump’s election victory was known. Also understood on the Russian side was the readiness of the US to act unilaterally in the Arctic without coordination with NATO. What was not anticipated in the RIAC analysis was that in accelerating its unilateral strategy for the Arctic, the new Trump Administration would commence with explicit attacks on NATO allies, Canada and Denmark.

The RIAC paper also displays the reluctance of the Russian foreign policy establishment to believe that Trump personally and his newly appointed officials are as intent on war against Russia as their predecessors, or that in their statements and plans they are as untrustworthy.

At a special press interview on the evening of January 24, President Putin claimed he had had “trust-based” interaction with President Trump and had accepted Trump’s version of his election defeat in 2020. Until now, Putin had repeatedly said he does not interfere in domestic US politics. “My first point is that Russia has never turned down contacts with the US administration, and it is not our fault that the previous administration chose not to establish such contacts. I have always had business-like, strictly business-like, but at the same time pragmatic and trust-based, I would say, relationships with the current President of the United States. I cannot but agree with him that if he had been President, if his victory had not been stolen from him in 2020, then maybe there would not have been the Ukraine crisis that broke out in 2022.”    

The following discussion for RIAC by Dmitry Danilov and Natalia Vyakhireva has been translated verbatim without editing. A map and NATO document references have been added to assist the reader.

Source: https://russiancouncil.ru/

November 18, 2024
Is NATO really in the Arctic?
By Dmitry Danilov and Natalia Vyakhireva

Recently, one can often hear the thesis about the intensification of NATO’s activities in the Arctic. This raises several questions. For example, is the Alliance really ready for full-scale institutional activity in this area, or rather, are we talking about the strategies of its individual member states? Will there be any changes in the approaches of the North Atlantic Alliance and its members in connection with the accession of two Arctic Council countries, Finland and Sweden? What is the U.S. position on NATO’s Arctic and Northern agenda? Will the change of the Secretary General of the Alliance affect the level of NATO’s attention to the Arctic?

These and other questions were commented by the Candidate of Economics, Head of the Department. Dmitry Danilov, Director of the European Security Department of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in an interview with Natalia Vyakhireva, Candidate of Political Sciences, Senior Researcher, and Head of the Canada Department at the Arbatov Institute of the USA and Canada.

Dmitry Alexandrovich, today there is a frequent thesis in the media about the intensification of NATO’s activities and strengthening its position in the Arctic. Is it possible to talk about the policy of the North Atlantic bloc in the Arctic today, or would it be more correct to raise the issue of the policy of its individual members in this region?

This is a very interesting research question for experts: is there really a NATO presence in the Arctic? Yes, the media often does identify the policies of NATO and its member states and say that NATO is becoming more active in the Arctic. It makes sense. We have witnessed how, in the context of internal disagreements, the North Atlantic bloc has been used in various situations as an organization that allows it to influence the positions of the participating countries within the framework of the “coalition of the willing” concept. Whether successfully or unsuccessfully is another matter. Initially, the issue of NATO’s activation in the Arctic and the development of its policy in this region was raised in the second half of the 2000s. In 2008-2009, when some countries of the NATO north, especially Norway, said that it was important to strengthen the presence of the North Atlantic Alliance in the Far North and in the Arctic. For example, a conference was held in Reykjavik, attended by senior or senior military and political leaders of NATO, to consider what prospects the bloc has in the Arctic. At that time, there was no previous consensus in NATO on the need to develop its Arctic policy. The political response from the bloc was the following: NATO is already present in the Arctic, at least because the Alliance’s member states are present there. In addition, the territory of the Far North is included in the operational responsibility area of the unit.

Why was such a position expressed?

This position was expressed in order to somehow limit the rather insistent desire of the military wing in NATO to move in this direction, since the military leadership believed that it was necessary to strengthen the collective defense system in the Far North. However, it didn’t work out then — there were too many obstacles. I would name the Arctic states of the United States and Canada as one of the main obstacles, because in general they were not interested in expanding the participation of international organizations in the Arctic agenda. This is not only related to military and political aspects. Any expansion of the competencies of international organizations in this region was seen as undesirable competition from the North American member States of the Alliance. This is the first point.

Secondly, let’s ask ourselves, to what extent are the United States and Canada interested in collective defence in the North? “Why does America need Europe?” is a question that is constantly being asked. However, it can also be formulated as follows: “What can NATO bring in terms of strengthening national security and defense to the United States of America and its ally Canada?” In principle, there is probably hardly any added value here, since North American defence is based on the United States and Canada’s own resources. First of all, this is the system of the Northern military space command NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD). Thus, there was little interest in collective instruments. I would like to emphasize once again that this question sounds a little different now. Nevertheless, it retains its importance, and it must be answered in the current conditions. If we recall the period of 2008-2009, then we must return to the question of how relations between Russia and the West, Russia and NATO, were generally built. It was the period of the American “reset” under the administration of Barack Obama. At that time, the United States was interested in reducing the level of conflict with Russia; convincing Russia that they were ready to strengthen partnership and cooperation along many lines, including those areas which were then fixed in the documents of the Lisbon NATO Summit in November 2010 and, accordingly, the Russia–NATO Council, which took place there at the same time.

Publicly, the concluding summit agreement of November 2010 identified twelve regions in the NATO area of coverage;  the Arctic wasn’t one of them.  

A closed document was adopted — a joint analysis of challenges and threats. The desire, or at least the declaration of the United States, to move in this direction, enshrined in the NATO documents, suggested precisely the restraint of NATO in advancing in areas of conflicting interests. The conflicts have already been formulated. The military stated that the Arctic is a zone of conflicting interests, and the bloc should prepare for this. It was not said what these conflicts might be. However, then the situation changed. The so-called “reset” ended very quickly, and the mood for including the Arctic in the NATO agenda began to intensify. Norway has never given up hope that it will be able to advance its position. However, I repeat, the main thing is that even at the preliminary stage it was impossible to count on a political consensus within NATO in this regard, and everyone took this factor into account.

In 2013-2014, there was a crisis in Russian-Western relations. The question was raised very sharply: “To what extent can the Ukrainian conflict be considered as a driver of NATO’s activity in a broader space and the expansion of Russia’s northern deterrent flank?” There were activists here, and their position was very clear. The line of the Nordic states, not only Norway, but also NORDEFCO (English: Nordic Defense Cooperation, Nordefco), was actively voiced in this regard. NORDEFCO is a northern cooperation organization that includes the Nordic states. At that time, of the 5 members of this organization, Finland and Sweden were not members of NATO, and this imposed significant restrictions on the Alliance’s presence as an organization in the Arctic. Nevertheless, this line was taken into account, but at that time the NORDEFCO was used as a format allowing to combine or increase the interaction and interdependence of the member states of the Alliance with the northern states that are not part of it. This format seemed and probably was indeed the most effective from a tactical point of view.

At the same time, the prospect of NATO’s expansion to the north was already being explored. The first serious attempts to analyze such possibilities were made already in 2016. That year, the Warsaw NATO Summit was held, at which fundamental decisions were made on the formation of a comprehensive system of deterrence of Russia, including strengthening operational and command structures. Against this background, the issue of the possibility of Finland and Sweden joining has begun to be explored. The prospect of the integration of these two countries into NATO has strengthened the positions of those in the Alliance who have traditionally advocated NATO’s involvement in the “northern affairs” and the operational strengthening of the organization in this area. However, there were significant limitations, which I have already mentioned.

Among other things, there were other priorities. As we understand it, it is impossible to change priorities and make important decisions overnight. This requires significant preparatory work, including political and diplomatic work, preliminary behind-the-scenes coordination, political coordination, and then political solutions. With the advent of the [first] Trump Administration, the main tasks of the American administration have become completely different in terms of using NATO and its mechanisms. As a priority, Trump saw an increase in the contribution of Europeans to collective defence, the one that had already been defined in the documents of the Warsaw NATO summit in 2016 (that one, not the future one).

“You have to comply with the decisions that we have made, and for that you have to pay more,” was his thesis. After all, Donald Trump managed to include cyberspace and outer space in the Alliance’s operational activities. In addition, for the first time, issues of relations with China were included in the official political agenda of the North Atlantic Alliance. These were the priorities of the Trump administration. Therefore, the Arctic agenda was pushed aside. And although some countries said that the Arctic region should be included in the NATO agenda one way or another, nevertheless, even the term “Arctic” itself did not appear in the documents of the bloc either conceptually or doctrinally.

Will something change in connection with the accession of Finland and Sweden to the North Atlantic Alliance?

Yes, of course, it will change. And a lot will change. First of all, even before Finland and Sweden joined NATO, but with this perspective in mind, NATO went to the lengths to include climate and climate change issues on its agenda as challenges to which the Alliance should respond. This is a direct path to the Arctic agenda, since climate change is largely tied to it. While not directly articulating its desire to raise questions about NATO’s presence in the Arctic to a new level, the Alliance nevertheless states that the climate agenda is now a very important agenda item in terms of challenges. Moreover, as an organization, NATO must play a crucial, if not a key role in solving these problems.

Following the NATO summit of 2021, this summary of action plans was issued. The Arctic is mentioned 27 times; Greenland not one. Russia was also unmentioned. Source: https://www.nato.int/

The question is an interesting one. I would like to emphasize that this was done taking into account the prospects of Finland and Sweden joining NATO. I am focusing on this because in 2022 after the start of the special military operation, both Finland and Sweden very clearly stated the thesis that it was Russia that pushed them on this path, and Sweden and Finland had no choice. Well, that’s not true. The process had been going on for a long time. It was taken into account and calculated as part of strategic planning in NATO, at least the prospective possibility of Finland and Sweden joining was calculated. In 2022, Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO. The question arises: “What will it change?”. This changes a lot, as NATO has new political opportunities to gain a foothold in the Far North, including, most importantly, strengthening NATO’s northern flank in order to build a full-layered front to contain Russia. The point is not just geographically to secure this line from south to north on the eastern flank, but to implement very specific operational measures that the bloc could not have carried out before. Thus, we are talking about planning collective defense and deterrence measures, taking into account the membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO.

If we look at a number of NATO analytical materials, back in the mid-2010s, NATO openly talked about the existence of so-called Anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) zones. This American concept means that a potential adversary or military opponent can create conditions unacceptable for the active deployment of enemy forces and for subsequent operational maneuvers. The two main such zones at that time were considered to be the Black Sea zone and the North Baltic Region (in fact, the Baltic Sea). After Finland and Sweden joined NATO, the situation “turned upside down.” In 2023, NATO openly declared that the Baltic Sea is now an internal sea of NATO. Thus, the situation has not just changed, it has “turned over” in the opposite direction. For Russia, the North Atlantic Alliance now has this no-deployment and maneuver zone. Now Russia is facing the same problems, and NATO plans to strengthen this system. Look at Estonia’s latest proposals, which almost involve mining the passage in the Baltic Sea in order to limit, so to speak, the echelons for Russian maritime transport in the Baltic Sea.

MAP OF ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL (A2/AD) ZONES, NATO AND RUSSIA

To enlarge view, click on source:  https://csis.carto.com/ 

If we consider the strengthening of NATO’s northern flank, it becomes clear that it built a deterrence system according to the following scheme: first, Central and Eastern Europe, that is, the Baltic States and Poland; then Southeastern Europe, primarily Romania, and the creation of new multinational battalion groups in this zone as part of the rapid reaction forces; now the same task actually stands in the North to strengthen the northern flank. And therefore, the vectors of NATO’s operational planning are inevitably strengthening precisely in the northern direction. It is in the northern direction that NATO needs to decide how to strengthen its borders. This is quite difficult for the organization, because they need to include Finland and Sweden in the integrated defence system, and the integrated defence system includes the work of the nuclear planning group, which means that nuclear planning is also involved.

The United States in the Arctic against the risks from Russia and the looming China?

And so Finland and Sweden are joining NATO. You and I met together in 2022 with the diplomatic representatives of Sweden and Finland in Moscow, and they said very clearly that after joining, there would be no NATO bases on the territory of their countries, and also that they did not plan to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory.

Now let’s look at what is happening in terms of Finland and Sweden’s inclusion in the NATO collective defence and security system. The space of these states is currently being explored. Finland is deciding to build a NATO ground forces base on its territory 140 km from the border with Russia. A decision is being made to re-equip the aviation component of both Finland and, incidentally, Sweden with new aviation systems. I would like to emphasize that Finland buys F-35A aircraft (“A” means that these aircraft are capable of carrying nuclear weapons). To say that we will not deploy nuclear bombs of the United States of America on our territory, since they already exist in Europe, so Finland does not need them, especially not close to the borders, and at the same time, as if not to notice that the airforces of these countries are being retrofitted with American fighter-bombers that can to carry nuclear weapons, is in my opinion, very frivolous. Therefore, initially, Russia had to take into account the risks associated with the ongoing changes.

The question arises about these restricted access or deployment and maneuver zones. I have already mentioned the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. In foreign military analytics, we are talking about the fact that Russia has such capabilities virtually around the entire perimeter of its Arctic territory. That is, the opportunities for NATO there are minimal. On the one hand, this is a deterrent to NATO’s activity in this direction; on the other hand, to the contrary, it motivates the countries of the North Atlantic bloc, at least a number of its countries, to overcome these operational and strategic limitations. In this regard, we are asking the question that I posed at the beginning: how interested will the United States of America and Canada be in activating the Arctic agenda of the North Atlantic Alliance?

So far, I have formulated the answer to this question in the category of one possibility. It seems to me that the United States is creating a kind of “window of opportunity” so that, if necessary and with its own serious motivation and new resources related to strengthening NATO’s northern flank, it can use the organization precisely as an organization so that NATO is useful and, I would say, involved in the implementation of the new American Arctic strategy. In July 2024, the US Department of Defense announced a new Arctic strategy. The document is very interesting. It talks about Finland and Sweden. The answer to your question is that their joining the Alliance increases the opportunities for strengthening cooperation and interaction with the United States within the bloc.

However, there is no mention of any other NATO activity in the Arctic. Until now, the United States of America has focused on developing an interstate system of military-political and military cooperation with the member States of the Alliance, that is, with European allies. If we look at the legal relations of the United States with the Nordic countries, be it Norway, Finland, Sweden, etc., we will see that they are built on an interstate basis. Even the largest military exercises that are held in the north are the NORDIC response. We’re talking about this being a NATO exercise. However, this is not entirely true. When operational training and even combat training events take place in this region, they are conducted and conducted according to the formula — the host country invites its allies to participate in the event. This should not be misleading. In the last exercises in March 2024, 90,000 people from all 32 NATO member states took part, including Finland and Sweden, of course. Therefore, this is a window of opportunity. It turns out to be a game of variable geometry: here we act like NATO, and here we do not act like NATO. In this sense, it seems to me that the United States is now looking for opportunities for fine-tuning within the bloc in order to use it as a reliable tool in implementing its new strategic objectives. If NATO is needed as an organization, then such decisions will be made. If this is difficult, including due to the difficulty of reaching consensus within NATO, then it is quite natural to use this network of intra-NATO interactions.

How can NATO be used as an organization?

This can be done very simply. In this regard, the example is illustrative when Trump insisted at the NATO summit in 2017 that NATO, as an organization, join the US-led coalition in Syria. The French and Germans really did not want this, they had their own very serious problems, including problems related to ensuring intra-European balances. However, there was nothing left to do, and they accepted this ultimatum. The decision was made. Yes, it was quite limited back then. The outgoing Secretary General Stoltenberg said that NATO would participate as an organization, but would not carry out combat activities, it would have auxiliary tasks that it would solve. However, a political decision was made.

In the Arctic case, the decision-making formula may be the same. The next question is: how to implement or not to implement this political decision? That is, is it really possible to direct NATO’s activity in this direction, or is this political platform still sufficient to be flexible in terms of decision-making in the future? This is another window of opportunity for the United States. Therefore, for Finland and Sweden, their membership in NATO has changed a lot — this is a serious factor. I would like to emphasize once again that previously there were very significant restrictions related to US policy that hindered NATO’s progress in the Arctic, but now the situation has changed, and the United States is inclined to create a window of opportunity in order to be able to institutionally use NATO in the future to achieve its strategic goals in the North Arctic region, and, probably in the geopolitical containment of Russia and China. It is important to understand how useful this NATO toolkit will be in terms of solving Washington’s broader geopolitical tasks.

You mentioned the climate agenda, the Lisbon Summit document, and the documents of the Russia–NATO Council. Is there a documented element of Arctic policy somewhere else, specifically within the framework of NATO?

It’s fixed. We are talking about certain terminological references to the Arctic. The NATO 2030 concept mentions the Arctic, which is listed in inverted commas in terms of the increasing activity of China and Russia. The wording should be clarified in the document itself. If you look at the official concepts of NATO, including the Madrid Strategic Concept of 2022, there is no Arctic in them. At the same time, this region is present in the speeches of officials, especially the military. This once again confirms what I am talking about. Yes, the agenda is kept afloat, but it is not included in the official policy of NATO. If this happens, then this area must inevitably be included in NATO’s operational planning. So far, the United States does not see the need for this, and the Europeans probably do not have such potential and opportunity. From the point of view of the Alliance’s agenda, the Arctic issue will remain in limbo.

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