

By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
In an unusually frank analysis of the General Staff’s electric war campaign since 2022, Vzglyad, the semi-official platform for security analysis in Moscow, has acknowledged that three years of strikes against Ukrainian energy targets have fallen short of their military objective because the targeting has been restricted by President Vladimir Putin’s tit-for-tat order.
But now that order has changed. Or has it?
Ukrainian military bloggers were reporting on Tuesday afternoon (December 23) that “as a result of the morning strikes of the Russian Armed Forces, the Rivne, Ternopil and Khmelnitsky regions of Ukraine were completely de-energized. There is a risk of disconnection in Vinnytsia, Chernigov, Zhitomyr, Dniepropetrovsk, and Kharkov regions.” The capacities for repair and replacement of damaged energy facilities have “almost dried up”, they add.
If this is the current situation, does this mean that the successive waves of electric war operations – October 10-12 and 16-20, 2022; October 22-27, 2023; March 29-30, 2024; June 1, 2024; and November 7, 2024 — failed in their cumulative impact?
Answers a veteran military engineer and specialist in electric warfare: “The electrical spare parts coming from Europe via rail could have been stopped. The yards containing spare transformers, service vehicles and equipment could have been put out of commission; multiple high-voltage cable towers — easy targets! — could have been hit at the same time. Coupled with strikes on the substations, service equipment yards and supply logistics, such a campaign would have quickly overwhelmed the Ukrainian capacity to effect repairs in anything resembling a timely fashion. Why hasn’t this happened, or why is it, apparently, happening only now?”
“Can you imagine the war continuing if the 33 main Ukrainian electrical substations and the towers carrying the lines to and from them had been destroyed in the autumn and winter of 2022/23? If the railways from Poland and Romania had been de-electrified, had their rolling stock and engines smashed? If the rail and highway bridges carrying Ukrainian re-supply had been bombed?”
“Unless the decision-makers in the Kremlin are stupid, which we know they are not, striking again in 2023, 2024, and 2025 without finishing off the Ukrainian electrical grid can only be explained as a political decision – that’s to say, President Putin’s decision.”
In Moscow on Tuesday, this is publicly admitted for the first time, albeit by inference between the lines and under a byline that is fake.
Vzglyad, the state-funded publication of military, intelligence, security and economic analysis, headlines its report with an irony — “Zelensky’s stubbornness is finishing off the Ukrainian energy industry”. The text which follows makes clear that stubbornness has been a problem from the beginning of the electric war – not in Kiev but in Moscow.
Note that unlike most Vzglyad reports, no source has been cited by the author, Nikolai Storozhenko. No trace has been found of this name as an active writer for Vzglyad. The name belonged famously to a literary historian and Shakespeare scholar in Moscow in the mid-19th century. The use of such an obvious alias carries the invitation to knowing readers to understand this as a semi-official editorial.
Click to read the Russian original.
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